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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I begin by arguing the case for a secondary school science curriculum 
which aims at scientific literacy for all pupils as a first priority rather than a training 
for future scientists. My view is that the emphasis on content in the science 
curriculum (for reasons of utility) has been overplayed and that a broader 
understanding of the main ideas in science is more appropriate. A vital aspect of 
scientific literacy is pupils’ understanding of the nature of science. This includes, for 
instance, what it is about science that makes it a distinct discipline, to what extent 
there is a scientific method, and some understanding of the epistemology of science. 
My contention is that school science education should be more informed by 
contemporary views on the philosophy of science and that philosophical issues need 
to be given more prominence.
I find that there are signs that textbooks are using historical material in a more central 
role but that most historical material still consists of biographical and anecdotal 
background information to ‘humanise’ the main text. I argue for the development of 
more units to be written using an historical theme so that pupils acquire an appropriate 
understanding of the growth of scientific knowledge.
I believe that a more informed and mature view of the nature of science is essential 
for non-scientists if they are not to experience alienation from science. Such a view 
would entail the appreciation of scientific achievement as a major part of society’s 
cultural heritage. It would enable non-scientists to take a full part as citizens in a 
democracy without undue dependence on scientists for the resolution of scientific 
issues.
My thesis is that historical case studies can provide insights into the nature of science.
I start from the consensus view that many pupils have a mistaken notion of the 
epistemology of science. They perceive the progress of science as a relentless process 
of discovery, aided by increasingly sophisticated technology. The human imagination 
and creativity involved in the development of scientific theories is neglected by 
school science in favour of a decontextualised presentation of science as a ‘rhetoric of 
conclusions’. I argue that the use of a story-line approach appeals to pupils more than
the often dull and unattractive ‘final form’ presentation of science, stressing its 
objectivity and removing it from its human origins. The popularity o f ‘discovery’ 
methods of learning in the 1970s and 1980s reinforced the notion that pupils could 
attain an understanding of theory by direct experience. 1 reject this pedagogical 
approach as a legacy of an outdated philosophy of science. My research shows that 
the historical perspective restores the image of science as a human endeavour in 
which psychological, sociological and historical factors have played a part in the 
progress of science.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction
(i) Personal motivation for this PhD study
Between the ages of eleven to eighteen I attended a boys’ grammar school in 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne. This gave me my first contact with science in a formal sense. 
The science curriculum was presented as three separate subjects -  physics, chemistry 
and biology. At the end of the first year at the school pupils who had demonstrated 
any ability in French were given the option of studying German in the second year at 
the expense of biology. Having, at that time, no ambitions to be a science teacher I 
chose to study German and ended my education in biology. This was the first in a 
series of choices to be made in a crowded curriculum between science subjects and 
humanities that led from a balanced educational diet to an enforced degree of 
specialism.
At this time 16+ pupils continuing into the sixth form were obliged to study three 
subjects at General Certificate of Education - Advanced level (GCE -  A level) and to 
make a choice between humanities and sciences. Constraints on the timetable at a 
small grammar school meant that a combination of humanities and science subjects 
was not available. Effectively, the choice was between the two cultures represented by 
science GCE -  A levels and humanities A levels (Snow, 1959). Those pupils, like me, 
who had similar aptitude for, and equal interest in, both domains found themselves 
faced with a dilemma. By choosing humanities subjects they would exclude 
themselves from a major aspect of culture, knowledge of which is essential for 
understanding important advances in science. To be denied this knowledge is to be an 
‘outsider’ in the same sense as someone who is unable to read (Millar and Osborne, 
1998). Not only is this a blow to one’s self-esteem but it also leaves the individual 
powerless to participate in debate on issues which could bring about radical changes 
to society. On the other hand, by taking the science option they would run the risk of 
becoming the stereotypical illiterate scientist with poor communication skills and 
disdain for the arts.
In 1964 the Durham University Examination Board (which is now defimct) operated 
the system of grades shown in Fig. l.a at General Certificate of Education - Ordinary 
level (GCE -  O level):
Fig. l.a  -  System of grades for GCE -  O level
1
2 PASS GRADES
3
4
5
6
7
8 FAIL GRADES
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Grade 1 was the top grade and grade 6 was the lowest grade of pass. My GCE O level 
results are shown in Fig. l.b:
Fig. l.b  -  GCE O level results
Humanities subjects Grade Science subjects Grade
English Language 3 Maths 2
English Literature 1 Physics 3
History 3 Chemistry 3
French 2
German 3
The results shown in Fig. lb indicate moderate success in all subjects without any 
particular ability in humanities or sciences. The choice between sciences and 
humanities for pupils in this position then becomes (like Kuhn’s (1970) assessment of 
the choice between rival theories) a matter of personal preferences, which could entail
factors far removed from the subjects themselves. In my case the choice rested on my 
pattern of friendships at that time and my perception of the sciences as the more 
‘masculine’ culture.
My sixth form science teachers were steeped in what I describe later as the positivist 
tradition. They prided themselves that science was a dispassionate activity -  a matter 
of facts rather than emotions or opinion. All the lessons took place in laboratories 
whether there was any practical content or not. The nature of the practical work was 
largely ‘cookbook’ style repetition of well-tried ‘labs’ with hardly any work that was 
genuinely experimental. Physics ‘labs’ consisted of a circus of familiar ‘experiments’, 
for example, to find the specific gravity of methylated spirits or to calculate the 
coefficient of expansion of a copper rod. A quick conversation with the person who 
did the ‘experiment’ last was enough to decide whether the result was satisfactory. 
Chemistry ‘labs’ often meant identifying a salt by a process of elimination involving a 
tedious trawl through group analysis. As a knowledge foundation this was (at that 
time) suitable for the study of science at university but as a means of accurately 
reflecting the nature of science the A level curriculum was both misleading and 
uninspiring.
A mediocre performance in science GCE - A levels (Maths -  E, Physics -  E,
Chemistry -  B, from a descending order of pass grades A to E) led to a Chemical 
Engineering course at Loughborough University and eventually a Third Class degree. 
The nature of the course was vocational with one year spent in industry, in much the 
same way that an apprentice would be inducted into a skilled trade. The academic 
content of the course fitted Kuhn’s (1970) classical description of a scientific 
education in the sense that it consisted of a large proportion of transmission- style 
lectures supported by tutorials in which a series of exemplars were discussed. The 
exemplars were generally convergent problems with ‘right answers’ which left little 
room for imaginative or creative thinking. The course was taught exclusively as a 
‘rhetoric of conclusions’ (Schwab, 1964) -  that is, it was transmitted as a statement of 
what was then up-to-date knowledge in chemical engineering without any discussion 
of how that knowledge had been achieved. In fact, it was a point of professional pride
amongst the departmental teaching staff that they were abreast of the latest techniques 
in their subject. The degree course left me with no desire to become a chemical 
engineer so I enrolled on a Postgraduate Certificate in Education (PGCE) course with 
the aim of becoming a science teacher.
Some aspects of the PGCE course were ‘humanistic’ in that they dealt with 
psychology and philosophy and history of education as well as standard science 
pedagogy. After nineteen years as a science teacher in London comprehensive 
schools, including six years as a Head of Chemistry and ten years as a Head of 
Science, I felt the need to further my education. I enrolled in a part-time Masters 
programme (MA) in the Philosophy of Education at Roehampton Institute, London 
(now the University of Surrey -  Roehampton). There, I was introduced to the work of 
influential philosophers of science like Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend and 
realised then that my approach to science teaching was vaguely aimed at producing 
future scientists, but lacked any deeper philosophical basis.
More than that, the MA course sowed the seed of dissatisfaction with my own 
education and my lack of balance. Whatever potential I had in science as a 16 year- 
old had been, to some extent, realised (albeit without great distinction). My 
‘humanities’ potential, as indicated by a respectable set of GCE - O level results was 
hitherto untapped. This lack of balance was undoubtedly a result of early 
specialisation and premature loss of contact with humanities. But I also felt that the 
nature of my sixth form course and the nature of my degree course in engineering had 
precluded any contact with the humanistic aspects of science.
The study of the philosophy of science led me to believe that there is a strong sense in 
which science is a humanity. The history of science testifies to the creativity and 
imaginative power of individuals. The word ‘scientist’ has been applied to such 
individuals only for about 100 years. Before that they were more likely to be referred 
to as ‘natural philosophers’ and were often accomplished in several fields of human 
endeavour. Matthews (1994) cites Ernst Mach as good example of a philosopher- 
scientist at the turn of the century. His accomplishments included being fluent in most
European languages, an enthusiast of Greek and Latin classics, a physicist, a historian 
of science, an educationalist and a psychologist. More recently, Jacob Bronowski, a 
scholar with a foot in both camps, attacked the widespread attitude that science is 
different and separate from general culture. He felt that, like any field of human 
endeavour, science and the scientific community are rooted in history and are shaped 
by the common perceptions of different periods (Bronowski, 1951). I feel that such 
all-round ability should be encouraged by school education, albeit on a less ambitious 
level. An education system which aims at developing pupils either in humanities or 
science does a disservice to all children but in particular those who are all-rounders.
My MA course led me to the realisation that I had been teaching science throughout 
my career without ever reflecting on the philosophical basis underpinning my 
teaching. This realisation is in accordance with the findings of Lakin and Wellington 
(1991) in their study of science teachers’ philosophical stance. They concluded that:
‘the only common features appear to be a lack of reflection about the nature 
of science and a feeling of insecurity tinged with traces of elitism’ (pi 6).
(ii) The schism between science departments and humanities departments
The reference to elitism accords with my own experience as a science teacher and 
member of a science department. The science departments I have worked in have all 
had an identity distinct from the rest of the school. They have usually been physically 
separated, often in an annexe or ‘science block’. The hectic pace of the typical school 
day often results in science teachers spending break times and lunchtimes within the 
department. This sometimes leads to the science department having a separate identity 
as a social group, poorly integrated into the social life of the staff room. This physical 
separation and separate identity widens the gulf between the humanities departments 
and the science department, deepening the schism between the ‘two cultures’ in most 
secondary school contexts.
Lakin and Wellington (1991) found that the majority of teachers they interviewed 
concerning their views on the nature of science regarded science as ‘separate or in 
isolation from the humanities’ (p i7). When strategies for teaching the nature of 
science were suggested, such as discussion, small group work, reading for learning, 
role-play or drama, few teachers felt comfortable with such teaching methods. This 
reluctance led Lakin and Wellington to suspect that innovative work on the nature of 
science is unlikely to be teacher-led or even teacher-driven -  ‘it may even be teacher- 
impeded’ (pi 7).
This evidence points to a strict demarcation between science teaching and humanities 
teaching, a distinction which cannot fail to be conveyed to pupils. Yet science in 
schools seems to be failing in comparison to humanities subjects. Wellington (1994) 
quotes the following statistics from the Times Educational Supplement:
• 24% of the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) age group (16+ 
years) managed grade F or above in GCSE chemistry in 1988 compared with 
74% in English
• only about 15% of 14 year-olds will reach the National Curriculum target (levels 
5/6) for average pupils in science at Key Stage 3 ( 1 2 - 1 4  years) (p48)
Matthews (1994) quotes Bown (1993) in which he comments:
‘wherever you look, students are turning away from science. Those that do go 
to university are often of frighteningly low calibre’ (pxiv).
He acknowledges that there are complex economic, social, cultural and systemic 
reasons for this rejection of science, which are beyond the scope of teachers to rectify. 
However, there are curriculum and pedagogical failings that can be addressed. One of 
these is that much of the science curriculum is ‘too boring’ for many of the pupils.
If humanities subjects are relatively attractive to pupils it seems logical to incorporate 
elements of humanities into science and to reduce its isolation as a school subject.
Throughout history, science has developed in conjunction with other disciplines and 
within a broader cultural and social context. It seems sensible therefore to emphasise 
the ‘connectedness’ and interdependence of science and other subjects and to place 
science in the broader culture. I will argue in Chapter 3 that one of the most powerful 
arguments for teaching science is so that pupils appreciate that scientific achievement 
is a major part of their cultural heritage.
(iii) The search for an authentic epistemology of science and its influence on 
science education
I described my own teachers as being positivist and I believe that the philosophy of 
positivism had an adverse effect on people’s perception of science. I make that case 
throughout this thesis. The positivists sought to apply an algorithm to scientific 
progress that would lead fi’om empirical observation by rational argument to 
undisputed conclusions about the natural world. Their philosophy rejected scientific 
theories originating in speculation and claimed complete objectivity as one of its 
major strengths. All subjectivity was eliminated in favour of the dispassionate 
analysis of indisputable factual observations. Individual or group psychology had no 
bearing on the conclusions reached using ‘the scientific method’. Unfortunately, the 
influence of positivism has been long felt in school science education. For decades, 
science education has sought to suppress the human agent in science and stress the 
cold, impartial inspection of the ‘facts’. In this thesis I seek to emphasise the human 
element in science without wishing to convert science education to a liberal arts 
course about science.
The narrowly positivist view of science conveys an image of authoritarianism. By 
elevating ‘the scientific method’ to the status of the pinnacle of methodologies it 
fosters a perception of scientists as arrogant and dismissive of alternative views 
(Longbottom and Butler, 1999). If science education reinforces the positivist 
philosophy then it suppresses people’s critical and analytical attitudes and justified 
scepticism. It educates people to accept information on the basis of authority rather 
than evidence. This, I believe, contributes to a public fear of science and technology.
In direct contrast, a postmodernist view relegates science to the position of being only 
one of a number of equally valid ways of explaining the world. In terms of theory it 
amounts to a philosophy o f ‘anything goes’ and rejects any special claim that science 
makes to privileged status. My own philosophical position regarding the epistemology 
of science corresponds closely to that of the critical realist defined by Harre (1986). 
That is, I regard scientific explanations of phenomena as fallible but, because they 
have withstood the tests of internal consistency, adequacy of explanation and 
conformity with the evidence, they are the best available and can be relied on for 
action.
(iv) The overemphasis on science as a practical subject
A major distinguishing characteristic of science as a school subject is its association 
with practical work. Lakin and Wellington (1991) report a science teacher’s 
estimation of pupils’ expectations of science lessons in which practical work features 
prominently. Nott and Wellington (1995) characterise pupils’ approach to science 
lessons with the question ‘Are we getting the Bunsens out today?’ Equally, science 
teachers dislike teaching topics that are devoid of practical work (Wellington, 1994). 
Therefore there is a natural reluctance on the part of teachers to include topics like 
astronomy in schemes of work simply because there are few opportunities for 
practical work. This is despite the fact that commentators like Sutton feel that that 
there is an over-emphasis on ‘experiments’ at the expense o f ‘thinking and 
‘discussing’. (Sutton’s personal comments are discussed at length in Interview 3, 
Chapter 3). The result is that an insistence on practical work as an essential feature of 
school science can actually restrict the science curriculum.
(v) How the average citizen encounters science in the media
The average non-scientist citizen will usually encounter science through the media.
Sir Martin Rees, the Astronomer Royal, in launching the Daily Telegraph Young 
Science Writer competition, warns that media reporting of scientific discoveries can
be a ‘minefield’ for non-specialists (Daily Telegraph, Wednesday December 2, 1998). 
Newspaper reporting is such that coverage has to be restricted to crisp, newsworthy 
breakthroughs, which often distorts the way science develops. There is a danger that 
misleading or over-confident claims on any topic of practical import can gain wide 
currency. He warns that hopes of miracle cures can be raised; risks can be either 
exaggerated or else glossed over through commercial pressures. Rees notes that 
serious books on cosmology, Darwinism, human origins and consciousness find a 
ready market but books on pyramidology, visitations by aliens, coded messages in the 
Bible, and such like do even better: a symptom of the fascination with the paranormal 
and ‘New Age’ concepts. The latter are often treated uncritically in the media, 
distracting attention from more genuinely scientific advances. For the non-scientist 
the distinction between genuine science and non-science is not always clear.
Consequently, I believe that non-scientists need the kind of knowledge that will 
enable them to demarcate well-based ideas from ‘flaky’ speculation. Otherwise, 
credulous readers may take too much on trust, whereas hard-nosed sceptics may reject 
all scientific claims, without appreciating that some have firm empirical support. I 
will argue in Chapter 5 that suitable historical case studies help pupils develop an 
appropriate ‘epistemic distance’ from science knowledge claims, enabling them to 
judge better the merits of such claims. They should learn neither to believe everything 
they read about science nor to dismiss out of hand reasonable claims to new 
knowledge.
(vi) The format of this thesis
In Chapter 2 I will make the case that the present school science curriculum is failing 
in its aim to provide an acceptable standard of scientific literacy for the mass of the 
population who will not become scientists. It continues to present, in diluted form, a 
science content that was originally intended for the training of future scientists. In 
their report. Beyond 2000, Osborne and Millar (1999) concede that an advanced 
technological society will always require a supply of well-qualified research scientists 
but this represents only a small minority of the population. The greater need is for the
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majority of non-scientists to have sufficient knowledge and understanding to follow 
science and scientific debates with interest. Longbottom and Butler (1999) think a 
scientific education should serve a more general purpose -  that of enabling people to 
take part in a healthy democracy. They argue that science education should produce a 
general population with a rational view of the world, a predisposition to think 
critically and a respect for evidence. My contention is that these dispositions can be 
inculcated only by treating the nature of science rather than restricting the curriculum 
to traditional science content.
Chapter 3 presents the main arguments for teaching historical case studies in science.
I make the case that the nature of science is illustrated most clearly by its history. I 
argue that a rudimentary understanding of philosophical issues is appropriate for 
pupils at Key Stage 3 even in the form of discussions prompted by questions like 
‘How do you know?’ or ‘How did they find that out?’ An historical approach 
addresses these questions and by doing so, illustrates effectively the nature of science. 
However, the current fashion in secondary school science for including in the 
curriculum only those aspects of scientific knowledge and understanding that are 
easily measurable and assessable puts ‘the nature of science’ at a disadvantage. I 
argue that science education should give greater emphasis to philosophical issues 
despite the fact that measuring this kind of understanding is relatively difficult.
Having advanced the arguments for teaching historical case studies I investigate in 
Chapter 4 the extent to which school science textbooks contain material that aids this 
approach. I survey a series of textbooks available to me in a typical school science 
department with reference to the status of historical material as supplementary text or 
main theme. The selection of textbooks ranges from pre-National Curriculum to post- 
National Curriculum, which enables me to gauge the effect of the introduction of this 
major change in secondary school science. My analysis attempts an appraisal of the 
usefulness of the historical content of the textbooks in conveying appropriate 
messages about the nature of science and in raising pertinent philosophical issues.
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Dissatisfaction with the content-led National Curriculum in science, the peripheral 
treatment of historical material in textbooks, and the neglect of the nature of science 
in assessment at Key Stage 3 led me to my own research into the usefulness of 
historical case studies in science (Chapter 5). I was influenced by previous research in 
the field by Conant et al (1957) and Solomon et al (1991) and more generally by the 
qualitative research carried out by Edwards and Mercer (1989). I decided on an action 
research approach in similar vein to Solomon’s except that I assumed the role of 
teacher/researcher with no third party involved. I carried out a pilot study with an able 
Year 9 group on the development of theories of combustion, using the overthrow of 
the phlogiston theory by the oxygen theory. The main thrust of the case study was to 
demonstrate the fallibility of scientific knowledge, thereby undermining its 
authoritarian image.
The pilot study suggested other areas of investigation (like the misconceptions many 
pupils have of scientific discovery), which encouraged me to design a more extended 
case study tracing the development of theories on the Atom and the Periodic Table. I 
was able to gauge the effectiveness of the historical theme in teaching and learning 
conventional curriculum content by comparing two Year 9 groups of similar ability, 
one of which I taught using the historical theme and the other the ‘final form’ 
approach. The latter term was applied by Duschl (1994) to the kind of science 
curriculum which presents science as a body of knowledge without a past and which 
therefore ignores the means by which scientific knowledge has been obtained.
The data for this research were collected from six main sources. In figure l.c below I 
outline the progression of the databased research from my opening discussion with 
Professor Lewis Wolpert to my extended classroom research on Atoms and the 
Periodic Table.
The extent to which this research provides an insight into a more authentic and up-to- 
date science education is discussed in Chapter 6. It does enable me to recommend a 
change in emphasis from the products of science to the human struggles by which 
those products were achieved, at least in a few selected cases. In this introduction
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I have explained the motivation for this research which is rooted in my own 
education. Too early specialisation in science curtailed my study of the humanities. 
Not only did this leave me with an imbalance in my own education but my subsequent 
career as a science teacher and my studies in science education led me to the belief 
that secondary science education itself suffers from a lack of balance. I have argued 
that it denies the humanistic aspects of the subject misleadingly by clinging to an out­
dated philosophy of science. I contend that school science education leaves the 
average citizen ill equipped to participate in debate on the scientific issues which 
affect their lives. I have briefly outlined the format of my research including a survey 
of textbooks, two pieces of classroom research and the views of individuals who have 
a stake in the kind of science education with which children are provided.
In the next chapter I define the problem in more detail and I present a discussion I had 
with an eminent research scientist as a springboard for the rest of the thesis.
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Fig. l.c
Sequence of data-based research
Survey of the historical material used in science textbooks spanning the 
introduction of the National Curriculum. Investigation of the extent to which text 
book authors address the issues relating to the nature of science as portrayed in 
the historical aspects of science.
A pilot study designed as a preliminary exploration of issues arising from 
discussions and textbook survey above. This uses the overthrow of the phlogiston 
theory of combustion as an example of the fallibility and revolutionary nature of 
scientific theory.
Recorded discussion with teachers representing science and history 
departments, focusing on the role of history of science as a means of teaching 
pupils an authentic version of the nature of science. These discussions explore 
the division between the disciplines of science and humanities at school level.
An extended case study following up issues emerging from pilot study, including the 
role of human creativity in scientific progress. This explores the establishing of an 
authentic version of the epistemology of science in the light of pupils’ impressions of 
the origins of scientific knowledge.
Discussion with a prominent advocate omhe historical aspects of science in 
science education. Dr. Clive Sutton. This investigates the rationale behind the use 
of historical aspects of science from the perspective of a researcher with an 
influence on design of the science curriculum.
Recorded discussion with Professor Lewis Wolpert, a high-profile advocate of 
the value and achievements of science from the point of view of a working 
scientist actively engaged in research at the forefront of knowledge. The 
discussion covered topics relevant to a secondary school education in science, 
including scientific method, fallibilism, creativity, determinism, realism and 
constructivism.
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CHAPTER 2 Improving Scientific Literacy
(ii Introduction
In this chapter I trace the development of a ‘content led’ secondary school science 
curriculum from its origins as a training for future scientists. I argue that this curriculum 
is inappropriate for future non-scientists whose scientific literacy depends just as much 
on their knowledge about science as it does on their knowledge of science per se. I 
suggest that a more mature view of the nature of science is an essential component of 
science education given the possibility of pupils’ exposure to distorted views of science 
from many other sources. I recommend that pupils be given the opportunity of debating 
basic philosophical issues at a rudimentary level rather than relying on implicit messages 
on the nature of science to emerge from science teachers whose grounding in those issues 
may not be adequate. I give an assessment of the extent to which school science can and 
should ‘mirror’ real science. Finally, I seek the views of an eminent researcher inside 
‘real science’ to provide a starting point for my own research into the use of the historical 
perspective as a means of influencing pupils’ views on the nature of science.
(ii} Why was this research undertaken? What problem needs to be solved?
a) The evolution of the science curriculum
The secondary school science curriculum has to serve two purposes. Firstly, it must 
provide an adequate foundation course for those pupils who will extend their study of 
science into the tertiary stage and go on to be scientists. Secondly, it must give access to 
scientific literacy for the majority. From my own science teaching experience I know that 
these two objectives are difficult to reconcile. Millar (1996) traces the evolution of 
secondary school science from GCE 0-level science, which was designed principally to 
fulfil the first purpose. The comprehensive ideal then led to the introduction of CSE 
science, which I regarded as a diluted form of GCE, bringing more pupils into the 
examination range without changing the basic character of the curriculum. The more 
recent combination of the two to form GCSE science has not eased the difficulties since 
(with its emphasis on content) it retains the characteristics of a training in science for
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future scientists. In my opinion the curriculum ought to be designed starting with the 
needs of the majority as a priority -  a notion echoed in Millar and Osborne (1998). 
Increased specialisation and more advanced study for the minority ought to be a 
secondary consideration.
As the head of a school science department in the early 1980s I had several opportunities 
to introduce novel and innovative courses into the science curriculum. Examination 
boards offered courses linking science, technology and society, or applied sciences like 
electronics, as well as their own brands of more traditional single sciences. They also 
encouraged departments to submit their own examination courses to suit their own local 
circumstances. The result of this diversification was that the secondary science education 
provided by different schools could vary greatly, especially in Years 10 and 11 (at age 
14-16). The government of the day reacted against the profusion of curriculum initiatives 
both because of the lack of uniformity of courses and because of a concern that they were 
moving science education away from ‘hard’ science towards ‘soft’ science. The latter 
refers to aspects of science which are perceived to be less rigorous and more difficult to 
define and assess -  for example, science as it relates to social issues (Solomon, 1991).
b) The effect of the National Curriculum in Science
The government’s response was to create the National Curriculum in Science 
(DESAVelsh Office, 1989) in which secondary school science education would be 
controlled centrally and be more rigidly pre-scribed. The ‘softer’ courses linking science 
to society were banished along with applied science courses like electronics. The 5-16 
curriculum was divided into four Key Stages corresponding to pupil ages 5-7, 8-11,12-14 
and 15-16+. In addition the government was committed to setting up ‘bench-marks’ to 
facilitate the closer monitoring of pupil attainment. Consequently, the curriculum would 
consist of attainment targets, defined as the knowledge, skills and understanding which 
pupils of different abilities and maturities are expected to have by the end of each key 
stage. They provided the objectives for what was to be learned during that key stage. It 
was also agreed that each attainment target would be assessed on a ten level scale, each 
level being defined by a statement or number of statements of attainment an individual
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pupil had reached. The range of levels specified for each key stage is set out below:
Key Stage 1 Levels 1 -3
Key Stage 2 Levels 2-5
Key Stage 3 Levels 3-7
Key Stage 4 Levels 4-10
This ten level system affords a means of following pupils’ progression towards any given 
attainment target and is clearly suited to ‘hard’ science content (DESAVelsh Office, 
1991). For instance, at level 5 in attainment target 3 covering ‘Materials and their 
properties’ the curriculum’s statement c) specifies that:
‘pupils must understand that rusting and burning involve a reaction with oxygen’ 
(pll).
At level 6 the corresponding statement requires that:
‘pupils understand oxidation processes, including combustion, as reactions with 
oxygen to form oxides (pi2).’
Neither of these statements of attainment necessarily involves any understanding of the 
nature of science. I will argue in Chapter 5 that the topic of combustion is a rich source of 
philosophical issues if approached from an historical angle.
Pupil attainment at each of the key stages was to be assessed using Standard Assessment 
Tasks (henceforth referred to as SATs) by which pupils could be judged to be working at 
a particular National Curriculum level. The SATs at the end of key stage 3 have 
particular relevance for this research since they focus on the curriculum for pupils in Year 
9 (aged 14), the age group on which my work has been focused.
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The SATs are externally examined and the results are made available to the public. In the 
UK National Curriculum, central government has shown a clear preference for aspects of 
science which lend themselves to rigorous testing and clearly defined levels of pupil 
attainment (Solomon, 1991). Unlike the rest of the National Curriculum in science no 
effective testing of the nature of science is made in the SATs. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority reported in ‘Monitoring 
the School Curriculum’ (SCAA, 1996) that:
“Some teachers feel that some aspects of science not readily assessed by the end 
of key stage tests are becoming undervalued” (p6).
They state that “Future monitoring will include a focus on the following questions” 
amongst which is:
“How are schools ensuring a balance in their teaching between aspects that are 
tested and the development of scientific abilities which are less readily tested?” 
(p6).
Suspicion about the motives behind government-driven assessment methods related to 
performance indicators of the kind included in the National Curriculum is not restricted to 
the UK. Writing of US science education, Kyle (1997) asserts that the traditions 
associated with the evaluation of pupil performance obstruct efforts to improve science 
education. He believes that this situation has arisen since the early 1980s when misguided 
policy perspectives had a malign influence on assessment in education. In his view:
‘the premise that pupils and teachers lack the ability or will to engage in focused 
education has resulted in the imposition of external standards, which are used to 
gain control of the classroom and encourage compliance’ (p851).
This reflects a lack of confidence by government in teachers’ professional ability to 
achieve what they see as desired outcomes and a belief that those outcomes can be
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achieved by compulsion.
Kyle goes on to say that:
‘the insistence upon identifying quantitative measures of school effectiveness 
through economic and business analogies such as performance indicators and 
accountability has reduced the process of learning to narrow, testable, 
standardised, superficial, and easily forgotten outcomes and de-emphasised the 
value of schooling in other areas’ (p851).
The Nature of Science is clearly one of the ‘other areas’ and it is my contention that it has 
become one of the casualties of this assessment policy. My general thesis is that it ought 
to be given greater emphasis within the UK science curriculum. Some concession was 
made to teachers’ demands with the inclusion in the original National Curriculum 
document of Attainment Target 17 in which specific and detailed statements of 
attainment were made indicating a clear commitment to this aspect of the curriculum. 
However, subsequent references to the Nature of Science (ScO) in more recent versions of 
the NC have been subject to a reappraisal in which the statements of attainment are more 
general and less onerous, pointing to a subtle reduction in status. Conversely, the 
investigative strand of the NC, Scl, is now established as an essential part of the 
curriculum, developing into assessed GCSE coursework in Years 10 and 11. Ironically, in 
my opinion, Scl does not usefully reflect the Nature of Science since its apparent purpose 
is to suggest a unique format for scientific method in the face of the consensus of current 
philosophical opinion which denies the existence of one ‘fool-proof method. This 
contention is supported later in this chapter by Professor Lewis Wolpert, a representative 
of ‘real’ science, who comments: ‘I don’t think we know how science is done’.
Kyle believes that the pupils have been the losers in this quest for control by government. 
It has resulted in the severe limitation of pupils’ understandings of science and the nature 
of science as well as education in general. Instead of constraining the curriculum to 
testable items Kyle suggests that assessment should be oriented toward that which is
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valued. He recommends that pupils be engaged in the kind of intellectually stimulating 
and invigorating assessments that further contribute to their understandings of science. 
The National Curriculum (DESAVelsh Office, 1989) itself points to the changes required 
in assessment methods when it draws on current practice in the teaching of history to 
make the following recommendation:
‘Modern history teaching depends heavily on the examination of primary sources 
such as pictures and written accounts. Here, too, science teachers can learn from 
collaboration with their colleagues’ (pF4).
I contend that such recommendations will only be taken up by science teachers when 
examination papers contain questions that test the skills associated with the use of source 
material. In Chapter 6 1 suggest a format of examination question which illustrates this 
method of assessment (pi 23).
I concede that understanding o f ‘the Nature of Science’ is relatively difficult to examine 
but I contend that that fact alone should not justify its exclusion from school tests. (It is, 
after all, a difficulty inherent in many other subjects, such as history, forming part of the 
school curriculum). In a crowded curriculum the fate of all non-examined items is that 
they are given passing reference or, more likely, neglected altogether. This danger is 
given added emphasis by the competitive edge that the publicity surrounding the SATs 
has brought. In the desire for success and recognition the temptation for schools is to 
‘teach to the tests’. I believe that i f ‘testability’ is discarded in favour of less superficial 
pedagogical criteria like ‘motivating power’ or ‘capacity to facilitate critical thinking’ a 
strong case can be made for a ‘frontline’ role for the Nature of Science.
c) Comparison of summative assessment in GCSE Histoiw and GCSE Science
At this stage I think it is appropriate to consider the kind of formal examinations that 
pupils such as those who took part in the historical case studies described in Chapter 5 are 
faced with at 16+. I now present some recent GCSE science questions which I believe are 
typical and fairly representative of those used by GCSE boards. I compare these with
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typical GCSE histoiy questions to show that the science questions are focused narrowly 
on content whereas the history questions address ‘the nature of history’.
The pupils who took part in the classroom research (Chapter 5 - investigating the 
historical perspective in teaching and learning Atomic theory and the Periodic Table) sat 
GCSE examinations in June, 1999. All pupils at that school sit the OCR Science syllabus 
B (Suffolk): Double award. Pupils are entered for one of two tiers (Foundation or Higher) 
on the basis of their attainment in Science in Years 10 and 11. The majority of pupils in 
the Year 9 research target groups (Final Form Group and Historical Theme Group) of 
academic year 1996/1997, were entered for the Foundation tier in GCSE science in the 
June, 1999 examinations. The distribution of marks available in this tier is shown in Fig. 
2.a:
Fig. 2.a -  Distribution of marks in GCSE science examination, June 1999
Assessed component % Total 
mark
Year 10 examination 25%
Coursework -  Sc 1 - Science investigation 25%
Sc 2 - Life and Living Processes 16.6%
Sc 3 -  Materials and their Properties 16.6%
Sc 4 -  Physical Processes 16.6%
Total 100%
There were three Terminal Examinations in science. The second of these (Sc 3) took 
place on 14^ June, 1999 and consisted of questions related to chemistry. There were ten 
questions in this section, divided into sub-questions, each requiring a short answer in 
spaces provided on the question booklet. The time allowed was 1 hour 15 minutes. The 
marks available for each short answer were shown in brackets, the highest bracketed 
mark being 4. The total number of marks for the paper was 70. The distribution of marks 
(out of a total of 70) was as shown in Fig 2.b:
Fig. 2.b -  Marks available for each question in GCSE science, June 1999
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Question number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Marks
available 8 7 9 8 3 9 3 6 10 7
The answers require no interpretation. There is clearly a correct answer for each question 
with no alternative answer possible. Fig. 2.c shows question 1 which relates to the 
Periodic Table, a copy of which was printed on the back of the question booklet for the 
benefit of candidates.
22
Fig. 2.C -  Example of GCSE chemistry question -  1.
1 Chris and Phil have three unknown compounds B, C and D.
They want to identify lithium, sodium and potassium in the compounds. They use a flame test,
(a) Look at their results in the table.
Complete the table. Choose your answers firom sodium, lithium and potassium.
Compound Flame colour Metal present
A Green/blue Copper
B yellow
C lilac
D red
[2]
(b) There are 8 groups in the Periodic Table.
In which group of the Periodic Table is sodium? [1 ]
(c) Sodium must be stored under oil. It cannot be stored in the open. 
Explain why. (Two lines available for answer) [1 ]
(d) Compound B is dissolved in distilled water.
A few drops of silver nitrate solution are added. A white solid is formed. 
Write down the name of the halide ion present in compound B.
Choose fl-om
Bromide
Chloride
Iodide
[1]
(e) Look at the table below.
It shows some substances and their uses. 
Complete the table.
Choose from
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Antacid 
Fertiliser 
Filling balloons 
Hydrochloric acid 
Iodine
Photography
Substance use
chlorine Killing bacteria in water
Sodium chloride Flavouring
Potassium nitrate
Antiseptic
Silver bromide
[3]
All the sub-questions in question 1 require the candidate to recall facts. In three of the 
sub-questions above a limited choice of facts is given and the candidate need only choose 
from the given range. Only one sub-question requires an explanation. No interpretation of 
data is called for. In the entire paper, there are a total of 56 sub-questions requiring short 
answers and 53 require recall o f  specific, detailed and unrelated facts ’ (Millar and 
Osborne, 1998/ The word ‘explain’ appears in 3 sub-questions only. In my view this 
illustrates clearly how current methods of assessment have ‘reduced the process of 
learning to narrow, testable, standardised, superficial, and easily forgotten outcomes and 
de-emphasised the value of schooling in other areas’ (see pi 3).
Fig. 2.d shows Question 3 on the same paper, which also relates to the Periodic Table:
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Fig. 2.d -  Example of GCSE chemistry question -  2.
The question is as follows:
3. This question is about metals and non-metals.
Use the Periodic Table to help you answer these questions.
(a) Write down the names of two elements which are metals. [ 1 ]
(b) Write down the names of two elements which are non-metals. [ 1 ]
(c) The element selenium has the symbol Se.
Find Selenium on the Periodic Table.
What type of element is Selenium? [ 1 ]
(d) Write about the differences in properties between metals and non-metals.
Write about both physical and chemical properties.
( 10 lines available for answer) [4]
(e) When copper (Cu) is burnt in oxygen (O2), eopper oxide (,CuO) is made.
Write a balanced symbol equation for this reaction. [2]
These sub-questions provide scope for alternative answers from a limited range of 
properties. None of the questions tests candidates’ understanding of the theory of 
periodicity or how the theory was developed. In my view none of the answers would 
constitute an explanation.
The pupils from the classroom research groups who had also opted for history as a GCSE 
subject studied the ULEAC (University of London Examinations and Assessment 
Council) Syllabus D1328. Fig. 2.e summarises the method of assessment:
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Fig. 2.e -  Distribution of marks in GCSE history examination, June 1999
Assessed Component
% Total Mark
Paper 1 
2 hours 
45%
American West 25%
Crime, Punishment and Protest 20%
Paper 2 
1 hr 45 mins
Source based investigation on Crime, 30%
Punishment and Protest
Coursework Two units of 1250 -  2000 words each 25%
Total 100%
The examination in History (D 1328 -  Paper 2) took place on the morning of Thursday, 
17* June, 1999. This was a source-based examination and each candidate was given a 
booklet, separated from the question paper, containing thirteen separate sources. These 
consisted of drawings, paintings, photographs, magazine articles, prison inspectors’ 
reports, gaol records and excerpts from textbooks. Pupils are asked to answer all 8 
questions using the answer booklet provided. Each question requires the candidate to 
study a source or combination of sources and to use them to answer the question. Each 
calls for a more extended answer than those required for the science examination. Every 
question contains the words 'Explain your answer using this source (these sources)’ (my 
italics). The marks available for each question is shown in brackets. The distribution of 
marks (out of a total of 60) is shown in Fig 2.f;
Fig. 2 .f-  Marks available for each question in GCSE histoiy, June 1999
Question
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Marks available
4 6 6 6 9 10 9 10
Consider the question in Fig. 2.g below:
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Fig. 2.g Example of GCSE history question
7. Study sources 10, 11, and 12.
SOURCE 10. A page from the record book o f Huntingdon County Gaol. This nine year old boy 
was sentenced to 21 days hard labour in the gaol followed by four years in a reformatory. He had 
stolen a loaf o f  bread and some oranges and nuts.
HUNTINGDON COUNTY GAOL
6™ January 1874 
Particulars of person convicted of Crime specified in the 20* Section 
of the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871
Name..........................
And
Aliases..........................
........ Dennis Fairey
Age ( on discharge).............. ......... 9 years
Height.................................. ............ 3ft9ins
Hair...................................... .............. Brown
Eyes...................................... ..............Blue
Complexion......................... ..............Pale
Where bom........................... .............Huntingdon
Married or single.................. .............Single
Trade or occupation.............. ..............School Boy
Any other distinguishing mark........... none
Place and date of conviction............... Huntingdon 19* December, 1876
Address at time of apprehension............. ......Huntingdon
SOURCE 11. From a history o f Victorian and Edwardian Crime and Punishment, written by 
Richard Whitmore in 1978:
Improvements in the treatment o f child offenders were slow. It had been urged since the beginning 
o f the century that children should be kept separate from adults. A system ofjuvenile 
reformatories was set up in the 1850s. Between 1850 and 1900 the most common sentence given
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by the courts to children was a short period in prison to be followed by the rest o f their sentence in 
reformatory. But many youngsters actually spent their whole sentence in adult prison.
SOURCE 12. Extractfrom the rules o f a reformatory school in 1870
HARWICK REFORMATORY SCHOOL
RULES AND REGULATIONS
RULES:
Every encouragement will be given to boys to reform themselves
Every boy must be clean in his habits. No swearing or fithy language will be allowed
Silence must be kept at Prayer time and in the Dormitories after they are locked
No play will be allowed in the Dormitories at any time
REWARDS:
The Committee will give a reward of five shillings to each boy who keeps for a year the first work 
placement found for him.
Question 7.
How useful are these sources for a historian trying to find out how far the treatment o f children in 
prisons had improved by the end o f the nineteenth century? Explain your answer, using these 
sources.
The question requires the selection of evidence from the sources, two of which are 
contemporaneous and one of which is from a modern textbook. It also seeks to assess 
candidates’ understanding of what an historian is looking for when doing research. That 
is, the question demands not only an understanding of an historical episode per se but 
also how an historian approaches the study of such an episode. Its aim is to test pupils on 
their understanding about history as an activity as well as their knowledge o/history. 
From this evidence it seems that the nature of history is being addressed in history 
examinations.
In contrast, the nature of science is not being addressed in science examinations. In my 
opinion the nature of science will continue to be more talked about in science education 
journals than taught in classrooms as long as examination papers fail to include questions
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on it. Millar and Osborne (1998) report that there is a consensus that one of the purposes 
of assessment is to ‘exert a positive and benign influence on the teaching and learning of 
science’ (p2025). The evidence of questions on the GCSE Science terminal examination 
(like examples 1 and 2 above) indicates that, in regard to the nature of science, current 
assessment is neglecting this aim. Millar and Osborne recommend that:
... the assessment system should encourage the development of skills and 
capabilities which will be required for future employment in the 2C‘ century. That 
is, rather than emphasising the recall of specific, detailed and unrelated ‘facts’, 
any new framework should give greater weight to an assessment of a holistic 
understanding of the major scientific ideas and a critical understanding of science 
and scientific reasoning. More attention therefore should be devoted to the 
assessment of those skills and competencies that are required in adult life both at 
work and for ‘lifelong learning’ -  that is, the ability to read and assimilate 
scientific and technical information and assess its significance (p2025).
Millar and Osborne call for assessment to test pupils’ ability to recognise the role of 
evidence in resolving competing arguments between differing theoretical accounts:
At the heart of scientific rationality is a commitment to evidence. Contemporary 
science confronts the modern citizen with claims that are contested and uncertain. 
Questions based on historical or contemporary examples can be used to 
investigate pupils’ understanding of evidence in determining the significance of 
scientific claims (p2013).
In Chapter 6 1 have designed a model science question using the source-based history 
questions as a guide (Fig. 6.a). I offer this as a possible model for a new kind of science 
question which aims to test pupils’ understanding of the evidence for change in theory as 
well as an understanding of current theory.
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d) The importance of the nature of science
Attainment target 17 was included in the original version of the National Curriculum in 
recognition of aspects of scientific understanding which are less easy for pupils to 
develop from direct experience. The non-statutory guidance (DESAVelsh Office, 1989) 
acknowledged that:
‘pupils need to understand how scientific ideas have developed in response to 
different needs and under the influence of different cultures; how newly accepted 
theories have changed people’s ideas about nature; how scientists have carried out 
their work and how new ideas have been applied to social problems’ (pFl).
Collectively, these aspects of science were commonly referred to as the ‘nature of 
science’. More significantly for this research there was recognition that:
‘Learning about these aspects of science may well draw upon historical material, 
illustrating the development of scientific ideas at other times and in other cultures’ 
(pFl).
Unfortunately, Attainment target 17 was not tested in SATs and suffered the fate of all 
such non-examined material in the pressurised atmosphere of examination courses. 
School science departments gave it little consideration. The inferior status of the ‘nature 
of science’ relative to the other attainment targets was signified by its ‘bolt-on’ character, 
little attempt having been made to integrate the subject matter into the curriculum content 
(Solomon, 1991). One of the aims of my research is to contribute to the integration of this 
aspect of science within the curriculum.
The original non-statutory guidance appended to the curriculum warned against 
considering Attainment target 17 as a ‘history of science’. It states that:
‘Knowledge about the history of science is only important here insofar as it helps 
to develop an understanding of the nature of science’ (pF2).
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I agree with this statement but I feel that the word ‘only’ tends to minimise the potential 
that selected historical cases have in achieving that aim. My research shows that these are 
a powerful means of achieving a range of fundamental understandings.
The guidance also warns against the use of Attainment Target 17 as an introduction to 
the philosophy of science (DESAVelsh Office, 1989 F2). The argument is that doing 
science, taking part in scientific investigations and trying to formulate explanations for 
them, is the essential first step for most pupils. The guidance advises against the teaching 
of philosophical principles even at levels 8, 9 and 10, in the belief that examples and 
stories are more appropriate. The advice given is that:
‘few pupils would be able to consider more generalised questions about the nature 
of scientific knowledge’ (F2)
My research leads me to disagree with this statement and my opinion is supported by 
other commentators, for example Hodson (1986), who contend that not only do pupils 
need to understand the principles and subject matter of science but that they also need to 
appreciate how science is done, how we reached our present state of knowledge and what 
philosophical issues need to he considered (my italics). In Chapter 3 I will argue that a 
more explicit approach to philosophical questions at secondary school level is justified.
e) The contribution of the Nature of Science to scientific literacy
Bybee’s (1991) case for an increased emphasis on the nature of science arises fi’om his 
definition of scientific and technological literacy:
1. The scientifically literate person understands the nature of modern science, the 
nature of scientific explanation, and the limits and possibilities of science.
2. The technologically literate person understands the nature of technology, the 
nature of technological solutions to human problems and the limitations and 
possibilities of technology.
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3. The scientifically and technologically literate person understands that the natures 
of science and technology as well as their interrelationships have changed over 
time.
4. The scientifically and technologically literate person understands that science and 
technology are products of the cultures within which they develop.
5. The scientifically and technologically literate person understands that the roles 
and effects of science and technology have differed in different cultures and in 
different groups within these cultures.
6. The scientifically and technologically literate person understands that technology 
and science are human activities that have creative, affective, and ethical 
dimensions.
7. The scientifically and technologically literate person bases decisions on scientific 
and technological knowledge and processes (p i50).
It is my contention that the understandings (1-7) listed above cannot be achieved by 
school pupils if their science curriculum is restricted to the ‘rhetoric of conclusions’. As 
Kyle (1997) puts it:
‘Students ought to experience the how of scientific enquiry, rather than merely 
being exposed to what is known about and by science’ (p852).
My interpretation of the ‘how of scientific enquiry’ includes the intellectual struggles 
faced by scientists within the appropriate historical context. My proposal is that items 3, 
4, 5, and 6 can be realised most effectively using historical cases and that some of these 
cases could contribute to the achievement of item 7.
f) The future direction of the science curriculum
During the five-year moratorium on curriculum change set up by Sir Ron Dearing in 
1994, the Association for Science Education carried out a wide-ranging consultation 
process amongst its members about science education for the year 2000 and beyond (ASE 
publication, 1998). Their proposed revisions strengthen the position of the ‘nature of
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science’ and, in several areas, specifically recommend the use of historical case studies. 
The following extracts of their report are relevant to this research. I have added emphasis 
(in bold) where appropriate to indicate the most significant phrases:
‘Investigative work should include...practical problem-solving exercises and 
historical case studies’ in order that ‘this range of activities give learners the 
opportunity to recognise and explore the tentative nature of scientific 
evidence’. In regard to ‘Knowledge and Understanding’ the core content in 
science should be of:
Human and Philosophic significance:
• Contributing to learner’s understanding of the world
• niuminating the way that scientific ideas develop over time
• Showing the impact of scientific ideas on cultural development
Scientific significance:
• The range of ideas chosen should include those currently being used by the 
scientific community and should also reflect the history of science.
The identification of key scientific ideas should:
• Map progression in a core of knowledge and understanding that enables 
children to understand how ideas develop.
In this context the recommendation is that ‘a number of the key scientific ideas benefit 
from being developed through a stoiyline approach’ (p20).
In regard to ‘The place of science in our lives’ there were consistently strong opinions 
amongst the membership that this dimension encompasses a holistic view of science 
education. It will enable learners to:
• Participate fully in a technological society as informed citizens, who
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understand the nature of scientific ideas and activity and the basis for 
scientific claims...
Under the same heading the report states that:
‘this dimension of science education needs strengthening in schemes of work, 
teaching and learning strategies and assessment methods by encouraging 
contexts for learning activities which emphasise the cultural, historical, and 
ethical aspects of science’ (pi 8).
All of this adds up to a much greater role for the nature of science in the school science 
curriculum. In particular, it is clear that well designed historical case studies will be 
needed to illustrate the issues itemised in the above report. In my research into the use of 
historical material in secondary school science textbooks in Chapter 4 1 will make the 
case that, until recently, text book writers and publishers have had no incentive to 
develop such materials since there has been no guarantee that they would form a 
compulsory and assessed part of the curriculum. There is, therefore, a scarcity of 
thoroughly researched historical material in school science and it is the intention of this 
research to focus on this problem by investigating the extent to which historical case 
studies can bring about an improvement in pupils’ perception of the nature of science.
g) The case for scientific literacv
There is no universal agreement that scientific literacy is essential (Millar, 1996). The 
journalist, Simon Jenkins, writing in the Times, argues that:
‘the world does not require deep knowledge of maths and science’ (p7).
It is certainly true that it is not necessary to understand electromagnetic radiation to be 
able to use a microwave oven or operate the remote control of a television. As Wolpert 
says in ‘The Unnatural Nature of Science’:
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‘the whole of science is totally irrelevant to most people’s day-to-day lives’ (pi 6). 
But he goes on to say that ‘On the other hand, science can enormously enrich 
one’s life and in modem society knowledge is essential for innumerable policy 
decisions that affect our lives’ (pi 6).
A recent editorial in a senior science education joumal (USE, 1997) states that:
‘one of the significant factors in the next century is the likelihood of continued 
and perhaps increasing changes resulting from the impact of science on society’ 
(pi 115).
The editorial claims that:
‘... .the level of public understanding of science in the community is a significant 
determinant in the public’s ability to participate in dialogue about the role of 
science in society, and the directions of social change brought about by the 
application of the new technologies. Indeed, vigorous and open debates, in which 
citizens can participate in resolving societal issues created by a rapidly changing 
relationship between science and society, seem essential if democratic societies 
are to flourish’ (pi 115).
I suggest that, for most of those citizens, the principal opportunity to gain an 
understanding of science will be through their school science education.
The exclusion of most of the population from organised science can have serious 
consequences. Asimov (1984 in Jenkins, 1994) has asserted that:
‘Without an informed public, scientists will not only be no longer supported 
financially, they will be actively persecuted’ (p615).
Jenkins (1990) writes:
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‘that greater scientific literacy may act as a counter to the unrealistic expectations 
encouraged by past triumphs i.e. a greater understanding of science and, more 
particularly, of its limitations, might diminish the risk of widespread 
disenchantment with, or even hostility towards, science’ (p45).
A good standard of scientific literacy seems essential, therefore, if science is to retain 
public sympathy.
h) What level of scientific literacv is being achieved at present?
The literature reveals a plethora of research on understandings of the nature of science 
and scientific knowledge. Millar (1996) states that ‘Whatever the shortcomings of the 5- 
16 curriculum in educating future scientists there is considerable evidence that the goal of 
scientific literacy across the general population is not being achieved.
‘The APU studies showed that only around 35% of 15 year olds could apply 
scientific knowledge to simple problem situations. Research into students’ 
learning in specific science domains points in the same direction: very few young 
people by the age of 16 have a solid grasp of even the most basic scientific facts, 
principles, concepts and ideas. Ideas like the particulate theory of matter, the 
scientific model of the solar system, gas exchange in plants and animals -  all are 
poorly understood and there are many common misconceptions’ (p7).
Millar (1996) cites Claxton (1991)) whose criticism of school science education is blunt. 
With reference to the content of the science curriculum he writes of his:
growing realisation that we do not have a problem with science education; we 
have a disaster with it. Reading the literature, talking to teachers and students, 
and sitting in lessons,... it becomes obvious that what was being offered missed 
the mark of what the majority of students needed and wanted to know, not just by
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a bit but by a mile (p8).
Matthews (1992) reports that ‘scientific illiteracy’ is regularly rated at 90% of the general 
population. He writes of the ‘massive misconceptions’ held by science graduates and 
believes that Ernst Mach’s assessment of the understanding of science by science 
students made 100 hundred years ago still holds true:
‘ What they have acquired is a spider’s web of thoughts too weak to furnish sure 
supports, but complicated enough to produce confusion’ (p213).
My hope is that the study of historical cases will help establish surer and longer lasting 
supports for scientific knowledge and help clarify some of its major themes.
Meichtry (1993) concludes from her research that the majority of school pupils possess 
an inadequate understanding of science. She says that current reform recommendations 
are calling for the development of curriculum materials and the use of instructional 
methodology as a means of facilitating student understanding of the nature of scientific 
knowledge. However, she points out that these recommendations are not based on 
research. She calls for research to substantiate the use of a recommended curriculum.
Two key questions to be answered are:
1. What is the relationship among the nature of science, scientific literacy of 
citizens, and the curricula that support such scientific literacy?
2. What are the instructional practices that facilitate students’ understanding of 
the nature of science? (p441).
My intention is to help answer the second question by focusing on historical episodes in 
science as a vehicle for teaching and learning essential aspects of the nature of science.
i) What constitutes scientific literacy?
A consensus view of scientific literacy is given by Jenkins (1990) in which he cites the
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work of Thomas and Durant (1987, in Jenkins, 1990) who identified the following eight 
characteristics of scientific literacy.
1. An appreciation of the nature, aims and general limitations of science; a grasp of the 
‘scientific approach’- rational arguments, the ability to generalise, systematise and 
extrapolate the roles of theory and observation.
2. An appreciation of the nature, aims and limitations of technology, and of how these 
differ from those of science.
3. A knowledge of the way in which science and technology actually work, including 
the funding of research, the conventions of scientific practices and the relationship 
between research and development.
4. An appreciation of the inter-relationships between science, technology and society, 
including the role of scientists and technicians as experts in society and the structure 
of relevant decision-making processes.
5. A general grounding in the language and some of the key constructs of science.
6. A basic grasp of how to interpret numerical data, especially relating to probability 
and statistics.
7. The ability to assimilate and use technical information and the products of 
technology; ‘user-competence’ in relation to technologically advanced products.
8. Some idea of where and from whom to seek information and advice about matters 
relating to science and technology (p46).
Hodson and Reid (1988 in Jenkins, 1990) outline a curriculum embracing scientific 
knowledge and its applications, the skills and tactics of science, the interaction of science 
with technology, the history and development of science and technology, and a study of 
the ‘philosophical and sociological concerns centring on scientific methods, the role and 
status of scientific theory and the activities of the community of scientists’ (p47).
Arguing that the school science curriculum is ill-suited to the needs of pupils Millar, 
Osborne and Nott (1989) say:-
Individuals need to be able to understand the methods by which science derives
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the evidence for the claims made by scientists; to appreciate the strengths and 
limits of scientific evidence: to be able to make a sensible assessment of risk: and 
to recognise the ethical and moral implications of the choices that science offers 
for action (pi 9).
They cite examples of contemporary science which are uncertain and contested, such as 
the lack of a good model for the mechanism of the transmission of BSE, to justify this 
assertion and they conclude that:
what most non-scientists need to know in order to make informed public 
judgements about science would include studies about * science and scientists as 
well as the study of science per se. Currently, insufficient attention is given to 
what we term ‘ideas-about-science’ and the social nature of science itself, 
knowledge that is essential for interpreting scientific reports in the media (p i9).
(* my emphasis)
In Chapter 3 I will argue that the science curriculum has retained its original character as 
a training for future scientists and needs to cater more appropriately for the needs of the 
majority of pupils who will not become scientists.
j) Which philosophical issues are relevant to the nature of science?
1. The legacy of the logical positivists
One of the problems teachers have in introducing philosophical issues into school science 
education is that modem curriculum developments have seriously neglected current 
philosophical thinking. Philosophical issues are not uppermost in the minds of science 
teachers but where they do subscribe to a particular philosophical stance it is often that of 
the out-dated logical positivists whose views prevailed in the first half of this century 
(Lakin and Wellington, 1991).
The accepted view of the scientific method at that time was that the scientist begins by 
making careful observations at some point on the frontier between existing knowledge
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and ignorance. The scientist accumulates a wealth of reliable data at which point general 
features begin to emerge and a hypothesis can be proposed -  an explanation relating all 
the known facts. Further evidence is then found to verify this hypothesis. Repeated 
verifications of the hypothesis justify its status as a scientific law, which can then be 
applied to accumulate more knowledge. This method of induction distinguished science 
from non-science. Scientific statements, being based on observational and experimental 
evidence had greater certainty than statements based on authority or emotion or tradition, 
all of which made them liable to prejudice. The growth of science consisted in the endless 
process of adding new certainties to the body of existing ones.
In Chapter 3 this thesis will be critical of the logical positivist philosophy for its negative 
effect on science in that it sought to decontextualise scientific theories by disengaging 
them from their historical origins. I will argue that the positivist model of scientific 
progress is at odds with the historical record with its accounts of psychological struggles, 
personal prejudices, cultural influences and sheer luck which are characteristic of many 
scientific advances. The ‘knock-on’ effect on school science was to legitimise the 
‘discovery’ method of learning, which is now largely discredited (Driver, 1985).
2. Popper’s philosophy
Popper (1972) rejected this view of the growth of scientific knowledge. In particular he 
rejected the principle of induction as a logical fallacy. According to his account scientists 
start with a problem situation -  perhaps an unexplained observation. They tentatively 
propose a theory to account for the observation. This might arise from imagination, 
intuition or inspiration but the source of the hypothesis is not important. As a result of the 
theory predictions can be made which can be tested. If the theory passes the tests then 
scientists regard it as corroborated but any number of verifications does not ‘prove’ the 
theory. At best it attains a high degree of corroboration but any instance of its being 
rigorously refuted leads to the rejection of the theory and a search for a better one. Popper 
stresses the asymmetry between verification and falsification as a strength of his 
philosophy.
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For Popper, the best theories were those which have the greatest content, which forbid 
most and which make bold predictions about observations yet to be made. He maintained 
that the strongest theories invited refutation. His rejection of the traditional view of 
science did not mean that he scorned the value of tradition in science. He admired the 
advances made in scientific knowledge but he denied that progress is made by accretion -  
by the accumulation of observations giving rise to new laws. In his view there has been 
much less accumulation of knowledge than revolutionary changes of scientific theories. 
He replaced the principle of accretion by his philosophy of conjecture and refutation by 
which existing theories are critically examined and replaced by better theories that 
account for more phenomena and succeed where the previous one failed.
Popper maintained that clinging on to out-dated theories is akin to the tenacity with 
which men have clung on to religious beliefs. All theories should be regarded as ‘the best 
we can find’. On the other hand, the fact that scientists regard all theories as tentative 
does not mean that they should be abandoned easily. Attempts at falsification should be 
made with the same degree of scepticism and rigour as attempts at verification. The 
alternative would lead to an unstable world in which nothing could be relied on as the 
basis for future action. So at a philosophical level Popper could be described as a naïve 
falsificationist but in terms of methodology he was a highly critical falsificationist.
In regard to absolute truth Popper accepted its existence as a possibility but believed that 
scientists have no way of attaining it. He believed that if scientists ever did reach the truth 
they would never know it.
Popper denied that there was any certainty of knowledge but he believed that scientific 
knowledge could be regarded as objective knowledge, capable of existing without a 
knower. Scientific knowledge arises fi’om conjectures that make no claims to certainty 
but have been through the process of critical examination and may well have competed 
with other theories for their status as knowledge. The rationality of science lies in this 
critical discussion and comparison of theories and as such provides a far more certain
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guide to the future than our commonsense knowledge. The latter often arises from 
misconceptions.
3. Kuhn’s philosophy
In his studies of historical episodes in science Kuhn (1970) came to the conclusion that 
the image of continual attempts at falsification of theories did not reflect the methodology 
used by working scientists. He maintained that revolutionary overhaul of theories was 
relatively rare and that, during periods of normal science, scientists worked within 
accepted theory to solve their ‘puzzles’. For the framework of theories used in any branch 
of science Kuhn coined the term ‘paradigm’. It was only when anomalous observations 
were made which could not be explained by existing theory that scientists could step 
outside the paradigm. This corresponded to ‘extraordinary science’ and the process could 
be described as revolutionary.
The revolution results in the formation of a new paradigm in which even the terms of 
reference take on a new meaning. Scientists have to switch to a new ‘world view’ which 
is ‘incommensurable’ with the old view. Kuhn believed that the rationality of science 
presupposes the acceptance of a common framework and that it depends on a common 
language and a common set of assumptions. This commonality does not exist across the 
whole of science. It can only be said to be the property of specialist groups and it is 
dependent on the cultural and historical setting of those groups. According to Kuhn there 
is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant scientific community. Therefore, 
whether one theory is better than another is to be judged relative to the standards of that 
community. Kuhn even suggested recourse to psychology or sociology for investigating 
the means by which scientists choose between theories. Popper maintained that there are 
absolute standards that must be upheld and he rejected the relativist stance.
Kuhn did not accept that scientists are directed towards an absolute truth but Popper 
regarded this as a denial of the whole aim of science which is to get closer to the truth 
though we may not know what that truth is. Popper rejected the need to switch to a new 
‘world view’ when adopting a new theory but believed that the old ‘world view’ could
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Still be evaluated in the light o f the new one.
4. Lakatos’s philosophy
Lakatos modified the naïve falsificationism of Popper so that it became more reminiscent 
of Kuhn’s normal science (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). According to Lakatos being 
falsified is equivalent to being superseded by a theory with a higher corroborated content. 
In effect there is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory. He accepted that 
theories can always be made to agree with factual propositions with the help of auxilliary 
hypotheses. If the adjustment results in a new theory having at least as much content as 
the unrefuted part of its predecessor then scientific progress has been made. Any 
scientific theory adjusted in this way must be appraised along with its predecessor so that 
the overall appraisal is of a series of theories rather than one isolated theory.
Lakatos’s term for a series of theories was a ‘research programme’. In practice the 
research programme consists of a ‘hard core’ which is shielded from refutation by a 
‘protective belt’. Anomalies can lead to changes only in the protective belt of auxiliary 
hypotheses but the hard core would be abandoned only if the programme ceased to 
accommodate novel facts.
5. Feverabend’s philosophy
Feyerabend (1979) agrees with Kuhn that a logical comparison of two rival theories is 
impossible. When a revolution in science takes place (as with the overthrow of the 
phlogiston theory by the oxygen theory) the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
theories are ‘incommensurable’ in that even the terms of the theories have different 
meanings. (For instance, words like ‘mass’, ‘element’ and ‘compound’ undergo changes 
in meaning after a revolution so that the new language can only be learned by living and 
working in the new paradigm.) But Feyerabend believes that the impossibility of a logical 
comparison does not rule out every other kind of comparison. He feels they can be 
compared by assessing to what extent each of them deals with a selection of observable 
situations interpreted in their own terms. They can be compared as to their internal
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coherence or whether they are daring or safe. Feyerabend thinks the choice of criteria is 
ultimately subjective and propaganda plays a role in it. What remains after removing the 
possibility of logical comparison are aesthetic judgements, judgements of taste, 
metaphysical prejudices, religious desires etc.
Feyerabend detects some arrogance in the way that some methodologists take for granted 
that science constitutes the paradigm of rationality. Having accepted Kuhn’s assertion 
that scientific historians ‘rationally reconstruct’ science to make it a coherent and logical 
process Feyerabend then suggests that they take for granted the superiority of science 
over other forms of knowledge without adequately investigating those other forms. He is 
not prepared to accept this assumption. Neither does he accept that there is a universal 
scientific method to which all forms of knowledge should conform especially since the 
method usually cited is some crude empiricist or inductivist one. In regard to scientific 
method his philosophy is that ‘anything goes’.
Feyerabend believes that individuals have the right to choose between science and other 
forms of knowledge. He contends that the institutionalisation of science in society is 
inconsistent with the humanitarian attitude. School pupils are not allowed to choose 
whether they have science or not and he feels that the science they do receive is an 
inflexible orthodoxy. In Feyerabend’s image of a free society science should not be given 
preference over other forms of knowledge or other traditions. He believes that science 
should be studied as a historical phenomenon and its ideology should not be imposed.
6. Medawar’s contribution
Medawar was a research scientist with an interest in philosophical issues. As a working 
scientist he took a practical interest in the application of philosophy and came to the 
conclusion that the direction of growth of scientific knowledge was determined by the 
likelihood of success (Medawar,! 968). There was no point in carrying out research in 
areas where the state of knowledge was very limited if there was little probability of 
solutions being found. It was Medawar (1963 who pointed out that the typical scientific 
paper was often a fraud. He said that scientists went to great lengths to conceal the actual
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business of their research by reporting it according to a traditional methodology that had 
its origins in the era of logical positivism.
7. The influence of constructivism
Constructivism has had a great impact on both the epistemology and the pedagogy of 
science. Its supporters emphasise that science is a creative human endeavour which is 
historically and culturally conditioned, and that its knowledge claims are not absolute. 
According to Glaserfeld (1990) in Matthews (1994):
‘Knowledge is the result of an individual subject’s constructive activity, not a 
commodity that somehow resides outside the knower and can be conveyed or 
instilled by diligent perception or linguistic communication’ (p i39).
Constructivists, therefore, deny that truth is discovered but believe that we construct 
viable explanations of our experiences -  a view vehemently refuted by Wolpert’s avowal 
of commonsense realism later in this chapter. Constructivism embraces empiricism and 
includes two main schools of thought. The first, psychological constructivism, focuses on 
the activity of the individual in constructing their own understanding of the world. The 
second, sociological constructivism, claims that scientific knowledge is socially 
constructed and validated. The latter view maintains that social circumstances determine 
the belief of individuals. The implication for science education of constructivism is that 
the didactic method of teaching, with its emphasis on transmission -  filling an empty pot, 
is inadequate.
k) How far should the school curriculum mirror the nature o f ‘real’ science?
In my MA dissertation (Irwin, 1993) I wrote:
‘The philosophy of science has played only a minor role in science education. It 
has generally been invoked by science educators in piece-meal fashion to lend 
support to contemporary methodology without providing any real foundation on
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which to build. Amongst philosophers of science there has been a vigorous debate 
in recent years concerning the nature of science and how scientific knowledge 
develops. Despite this, much teaching practice is still informed by an out-dated 
science philosophy.’ (piii)
It has been said that science education lags behind the philosophy of science by as much 
as 20-30 years (Hodson, 1986). In fact modern pedagogy places much more emphasis on 
the efficient acquisition of knowledge rather than conveying an acceptable view of the 
nature of science or developing desirable attitudes. If any philosophical stance is apparent 
to pupils it is through implicit messages rather than a planned and explicit approach. 
Hodson advocates a much more prominent role for philosophical considerations and 
urges the design of learning experiences with explicit ‘curriculum messages’ about the 
nature of science. The problem with implicit messages is that they are conveyed by 
science teachers, most of whom:
‘...are themselves products of a science education system that places a high 
premium on scientific knowledge and pays lip-service to the history and 
philosophy of science (and) share with scientists a scant understanding of the 
nature of scientific knowledge’ (p216).
Hodson cites evidence that indicates many teachers subscribe to an inductivist view of 
science, a view long since abandoned by philosophers. There is therefore a danger that 
pupils will pick up implicit messages based on out-dated or discredited philosophies of 
science.
Writing of the period between 1960 and 1985 Duschl (1985) complains of 25 years of 
mutually exclusive development between science education and philosophy of science. 
He contends that during this period epistemological issues derived from the history and 
philosophy of science were not considered in science curriculum development projects. 
This casts doubt on the ability of such curricula to convey adequately the nature of 
science as an essential component of scientific literacy as described above.
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Hodson acknowledges that there is a wide range of philosophical perspectives but he 
feels that there is a measure of agreement on a number of points relevant to the school 
science curriculum:
1. Observations are dependent on our sometimes inadequate sense perceptions and, 
therefore, may be unreliable and fallible.
2. Observations are theory dependent and theory often, though not always, precedes 
observation.
3. Science often utilises indirect observation which, in turn, depends on a theory of 
instrumentation.
4. Observations do not provide automatic access to secure factual knowledge; they 
must be interpreted in the light of current theoretical beliefs.
5. Concepts and theories are produced by creative acts of abstraction and invention. 
They do not arise directly fi*om observations by a process of inductive 
generalisation.
6. Theories are often justified post hoc by experimental evidence, but for a theory to 
be accepted there must be (conceivable) supporting evidence.
7. Competing theories may give rise to non-identical observations when confi'onting 
the same phenomenon.
8. Scientific knowledge (observational data and theories) has only temporary status. 
Concepts and theories change and develop; some are discarded.
9. Induction is inadequate as a description of scientific method and so the discovery 
learning methods often employed by science teachers project a distorted image of 
science (pp216-217).
The point is that pupils ought to form an accurate, undistorted view of science in order 
that they have a realistic view of its power and its limitations. Given that they have no 
meaningful access to ‘real’ science their image of science will be formed partially by 
their incidental exposure to scientific material in the media but more significantly by their 
experience of school science. Science items in the media range fi-om the responsible and
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informed to the more sensational, alarming or ‘off-beat’ stories more reminiscent of 
science fiction. Kyle (1995) believes that what the public learns from the media is what 
sells:
what is sensational... what is startling... what is revolutionary... what is on the 
frontier... and finally, what is corporate rhetoric (p552).
In Kyle’s opinion the implication for science educators is that there needs to be a closer 
relationship between what transpires in the classroom and science itself. He believes that:
Science education needs to more closely reflect the nature of science today vs. the 
nature of science a few decades or centuries ago (p552).
He argues for popular culture as a pedagogical vehicle to the extent of integrating the 
media into the fabric of science education. He believes that, by this means, science 
educators will be able to address the everyday concerns of youth. Kyle maintains that 
today’s science education reflects a history of science, not science and that the emphasis 
needs to be shifted towards up-to-date science. I disagree. My research leads me to 
believe that modem science education presents the products of the history of science 
devoid of their historical context. In order that pupils understand the changing nature of 
science they need to learn about the ways in which science has been done as well as the 
ways in which it is being done. This does not preclude the integration of today’s science 
news into school science if that helps pupils to adopt a suitably critical stance to the more 
sensational kind of news articles. (A recent example of the latter is the irresponsible 
description of genetically modified crops in the tabloid press as ‘Frankenstein foods’.)
In an investigation into the influence of popular news reports of science on high school 
students Phillips and Norris (1999) concluded that:
‘The majority of students deferred to the reports by readily accepting the 
statements of the reports and implicitly tmsting the authors. Only on rare
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occasions did students challenge the authority of the reports or the authors’ 
(p325).
If such an uncritical stance to news items is so widespread then many school pupils run 
the risk of assimilating a distorted view of science. A basic understanding of how 
scientific knowledge develops would encourage more critical appraisal.
When I ask pupils making the transition from Key stage 2 to Key stage 3 science to draw 
a scientist the most common picture is still that of the eccentric, bespectacled, balding 
and white-coated male surrounded by fuming test tubes. I believe that this stereotype is 
the result of a deeply held misconception about science in the population at large that is 
fostered by popular films, comics and science fiction novels. (In Chapter 4 1 will argue 
that textbook authors ought to counteract this image.) Although the stereotype seems 
harmless I believe it represents a perception of science which is impersonal and 
unattractive and one with which pupils fail to identify. I contend that science education’s 
portrayal of scientific practice, past and present needs to take account of this 
misconception and help replace it with an image of science more in sympathy with the 
‘all too human’ activity which it actually is. Secondary school science education, 
therefore, has a major responsibility to present a mature view of science and scientists, 
since for many fiiture citizens, it will be their major, formal contact with science. My 
contention is that this should include a balanced philosophical position, making clear 
what counts as science and describing the efforts scientists make to ensure that the 
knowledge they produce is reliable.
1) The relationship between ‘personal science’ and ‘public science’
Einstein (in Holton, 1988) made a distinction between the kind of science involved in 
“the personal struggle” and science as public knowledge when he wrote:
“Science as an existing, finished corpus of knowledge is the most objective, most 
unpersonal thing human beings know, but science as something coming into
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being, as aim, is just as subjective and psychologically conditioned as any other of 
man’s efforts...”(p6).
Holton distinguishes between two kinds of science, which he calls SI and S2. SI is 
science in its ‘nascent phase’. It concerns itself with the individual psychology of 
scientists including their temperament, their motivation and their passion. SI 
acknowledges the luck, inspiration, and ‘unscientific’ preconceptions often associated 
with individual creativity. It includes the habits of mind which form a barrier to progress 
as well as the intuitive leaps which result in an individual scientist breaking fi-ee from the 
constraints of current theory (Margolis, 1993). Holton maintains that this aspect of 
science has largely been neglected by historians of science because it does not accord 
with the image of S2, the public and institutional aspect of science, which is concerned 
with the quest for certain knowledge.
The image of S2 is one of authority, rationality, infallibility and rigid honesty, which 
maintains the high status of the scientific community. It has not been in the interests of 
that community to admit to mistakes or lapses from a high moral and ethical code. For 
‘real scientists’ acceptance and approbation comes from the community of scientists by 
which their published work is judged and validated. They are concerned not with their 
own thought processes but with the process by which their work is justified -  that is by 
the ‘context of justification’ rather than the ‘context of discovery’. The whole point of S2 
is that it is ‘dry-cleaned of the personal element’ (Holton, 1988) and that any new 
knowledge is recorded as objective knowledge. The ‘knock-on’ effect in school science 
has been to mirror S2, the public and institutional aspect of science and to suppress SI, 
the human element. My research will show that SI is the very aspect of science which is 
essential for attracting the interest of the average pupil.
Popper (1972) distinguishes between three different worlds -  the world of material things 
(World 1), the subjective world of our minds (World 2) and the objective structures, 
which are the products of our minds (World 3). It is this third world which is subject to 
criticism and evaluation by other people. Included in it is our whole cultural heritage as it
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exists in our brains, books, films, pictures and other records. The point of World 3 is that 
it exists independently of any knowing subject and therefore is to a large extent 
autonomous. It includes not only science but also ideas of all kinds including art and 
ethics -  all of them creative activities. World 2 contains the objects of personal belief 
resulting from the intellectual struggles of individual scientists. As such, it is akin to 
Holton’s SI but Popper stresses the greater importance of World 3 and de-emphasises 
World 2.
Solomon (1994) sees three advantages for science education arising from a shift in 
emphasis to World 2 -  that is to the greater recognition of the social and psychological 
influences at work on individual scientists:
• It permits description of the almost scandalously person-related images of 
scientific knowledge that pupils hold, that may now be considered as integral 
parts of their epistemologies.
• It allows pupils to use their much better developed understanding of social 
interaction and human intentions for constructing an understanding of 
scientific epistemology by means of stories about scientists.
• By removing the specially privileged status of scientific knowledge, it makes 
the study of scientific content more accessible.
I believe an additional advantage is that it reduces the alienation that pupils feel from a 
subject in which there are few personalities with which they can identify.
m) Towards a convergence of history and philosophy of science and science 
education
A helpful consensus position taken by educationalists on a range of philosophical issues 
was included in Chapter 1 oï Science for All Americans, published as part of Project 2061 
a major study of science education in the USA (Matthews, 1994). Matthews writes:
‘ It is intended as a starting point for reflection and it clearly requires that 
teachers and decision-makers be comfortable with philosophising about science’
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(p41).
I include it as an example of the convergence possible between history and philosophy of 
science and science education:
• Realism
There is an existing material world apart from, and independent of, human experiences 
and knowledge. This is in contrast to empiricism which denies the existence of any entity 
which is not immediately observable by the senses.
• Fallibilism
Scientific knowledge approaches the truth ever more closely whilst acknowledging that 
such knowledge is imperfect. It is opposed to relativism, which contends that no reliable 
comparison can be made between competing theories but it is also opposed to absolutism, 
which contends that current theory consists of absolute, unimprovable knowledge.
• Durability
Falsification of theories is not achieved easily. This is in accordance with the idea of 
research programmes as described by Lakatos with the impenetrable hard core 
surrounded by a protective belt of theory that can change to accommodate new data. It 
rejects the Popperian view of naïve falsificationism.
• Rationalism
This philosophical stance holds to the view that scientific knowledge can be derived from 
a few a priori premises by a process of rational inquiiy. The report holds to a modified 
form of rationalism which states that ‘sooner or later scientific arguments must conform 
to the principles of logical reasoning -  that is to testing the validity of arguments by 
applying certain criteria of inference, demonstration, and common sense.
• Methodology
There is no single method of scientific discovery. There is no set of fixed steps that lead 
unerringly to scientific knowledge. The creative aspect of science is pre-eminent.
• Demarcationism
There are distinctive features of science which allow it to be distinguished fi-om non- 
science. Popper, (1970) used the criterion of falsifiability -  non-science can always
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account for new data by accommodating it in existing theoiy.
• Predictability
The best scientific theories not only account for known phenomena but also predict 
phenomena not yet discovered.
• Qbiectivity
Complete objectivity is unattainable. Scientific progress relies largely on human 
creativity and is therefore subject to bias. However, the possible sources of bias must be 
clearly stated and scientists must always aim for impartiality.
• Moderate Externalism
There are external influences on the direction of research whether financial or political. 
Science does not operate in a vacuum. Additionally, the personal and social interests of 
scientists will determine the direction as well the judgement as to which areas of research 
are likely to prove most fruitful.
• Ethics
Two aspects of scientific research need to be considered. Firstly, there must be clear 
guidelines about what is a legitimate area of research. (Compare heart transplant research 
with Euthanasia). Secondly, the conduct of research must be ethical. This applies in 
regard to honesty, openness and replication, as well as the treatment of the subject of 
research e.g. animals (p37).
I view the positions described above as a suitable background stance for modern-day 
science teachers as long as they avoid the temptation to inculcate pupils with a fixed 
philosophical position.
n) The problem of teaching scientific method
The National Curriculum (DES/ Welsh Office, 1991) programme of study relating to 
Attainment target 1 (Science investigation) at Key Stage 3 requires that the pupils be 
given activities that should encourage the ability to plan and carry out investigations in 
which they;
i) ask questions and manipulate variables;
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ii) interpret their results and evaluate scientific evidence (p23).
This format implies that it is possible to encapsulate a definable hypothetico-deductive 
scientific method that can be applied in all scientific investigations. This is at odds with 
the consensus view in the literature (Conant, 1948, Hodson, 1986, Wolpert, 1993), which 
is that there is no universal scientific method and that scientists have used many methods 
in different contexts. Only Feyerabend, however, has gone as far as saying that there is no 
scientific method and that science has no privileged route to reliable knowledge 
(Feyerabend, 1979). Wolpert’s (1993) suggested recipe for scientific investigation is:
Try many things; do what makes your heart leap; think big; dare to explore where 
there is no light; challenge expectation; cherchez le paradox; be sloppy so that 
something unexpected happens, but not so sloppy that you can’t tell what 
happened; turn it on its head; never try to solve a problem until you can guess the 
answer; precision encourages the imagination; seek simplicity; seek beauty... One 
could do no better than try them all (pi 08).
This many faceted activity is evidently more complex in ‘real’ science than the restricting 
and narrowly defined format described in the National Curriculum. Yet, according to 
research carried out by Lakin and Wellington (1991) into the views held by science 
teachers regarding the nature of science, there was a general feeling that the scientific 
method ‘is the pinnacle of methodologies ... a paradigm for other disciplines to follow ’ 
(pi 6). Despite this belief they were unable to define precisely what that method was. 
Clearly, there is a gulf between the perception of the scientific method as understood by 
teachers and those that are actually practised by scientists. This brings into question the 
extent to which pupils can gain an accurate reflection of the methods o f ‘real’ science.
A major consequence of the belief in a unique scientific method was that scientists felt 
the need to conform, at least superficially, to this misconceived notion. Medawar (1963) 
pointed out that scientific research papers were written as if the method of inquiry 
followed a logical and formal series of steps whereas, in fact, the whole research process 
bore little relation to that suggested by the format of the paper. The ‘knock-on’ effect in
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science education was that for decades school experiments were written up using the 
familiar steps of ‘Introduction’, ‘Method’, ‘Results’ and ‘Conclusion’. So, in attempting 
to mirror ‘real’ science, school science conveyed a misleading message about the nature 
of science.
This error was compounded in the 1960s and 1970s when the prevailing pedagogical 
approach was the ‘discovery’ method of learning. The Nuffield courses reinforced an 
inductivist view of science and, with the emphasis on ‘doing’ science, the historical 
aspect of science was neglected. As a result, pupils were given a false impression of how 
scientific knowledge had actually been obtained.
o) Mirroring the social aspects of science
The growth of group work has been instrumental in representing science as a social 
activity in which ideas are shared and communicated. But the practise of school science, 
usually carried out in a laboratory, leads to misconceptions about how far real-world 
problems can be removed from their contexts and analysed in isolation. There are crucial 
differences between science in the laboratory and in the real world. In the laboratory, 
situations are simplified, so that one entity in the situation can be isolated from the 
interference of others, and hence understood. Real world situations, however, are 
invariable messy and complex. So there is always some uncertainty about how (or even 
whether) the laboratory findings apply; and about what weighting to give to different 
pieces of evidence. And, in most cases of dispute, forms of knowledge other than 
scientific knowledge, including values, are relevant to the decision-making process. This 
kind of science can be represented only by discussing ‘real world’ scientific work, be it 
contemporary or historical.
p) The views of representatives o f ‘real’ science and school science
In order to explore the interrelationships between ‘real science’ as it is practised, school 
science and the history and philosophy of science, I sought the views of people who 
could represent one or more of these fields. My first discussion took place in February, 
1997, with Professor Lewis Wolpert. As a research biologist in the field of embryology, I
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felt he could provide an up-to-date view of a successful ‘real scientist’ in a field of 
science which has entered the arena of public debate (embryology). In his book ‘The 
Unnatural Nature of Science’ he professes dissatisfaction with the public image of 
science and with much of the writing about science in the media as well as that by 
academics including philosophers and sociologists. He is concerned that the nature of 
science is so widely misunderstood and that non-scientists have so much difficulty 
understanding scientific ideas. His emphasis on scientific understanding for non-scientists 
accords well with my own belief that too little account has been taken of the needs of 
future non-scientists in the design of the National Curriculum in science. He has distinct 
views on philosophy, psychology and history and has propounded those views in print, on 
radio and on TV.
My aim was to improve the understanding of the nature of science at secondary school 
level using historical case studies so it was essential that I seek the opinions of teachers 
using curricular developments linked to the history of science. My second interview, 
therefore, consisted of a three-way discussion with the heads of the history and science 
departments at a school in Surrey, who had collaborated on a curriculum link. Despite her 
involvement in this curriculum development I detected in the head of the science 
department a strong identification with science as a distinct discipline characterised, in 
part, by an enthusiasm for the latest technology and a ‘hands-on’ approach to learning. I 
sensed that, for her, the study of science entails a commitment to science by potential 
future scientists, implying a corresponding lack of commitment by them to the study of 
humanities. (I have detected this form of parochialism in some other science teachers 
during my career.) I believe that this kind o f ‘hidden message’ is one which pupils pick 
up and which leads many to decide against extended study of the subject, leaving them 
with a sense of alienation from science. The interview suggested to me that secondary 
school science (and teachers) can be ‘unfriendly’ to future non-scientists in this sense and 
wondering whether a shift of emphasis towards the more humanistic aspects of science 
could counteract this tendency. I include this interview in Chapter 3 to shed light on the 
use of history in science teaching from the perspective of classroom teachers.
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My third interview (by e-mail) was with Dr. Clive Sutton, who is representative of 
science education research with particular reference (in this context) to the history of 
science. I was familiar with two major articles by him as well as a text book, Words, 
Science and Learning, 1992.1 met Dr. Sutton at a meeting in July, 1997 of the British 
Society for the History of Science. He is responsible for science education courses at a 
major British university and supports the movement towards a greater emphasis on the 
historical perspective in science teaching. Dr. Sutton argues for a reinstatement of words 
as instruments of understanding (as opposed to, for instance, practical work), and focuses 
on the role of language in the growth of science itself, in the growth of learners’ ideas, 
and in classroom practice. In his view the historical approach to science teaching affords 
pupils the opportunity of understanding the thinking behind the original choice of key 
scientific words and metaphors. I will use this interview in Chapter 3 as commentary on 
the rationale for the history of science in secondary school science education.
Intem ew  1. What value does a research scientist see in the use of history and 
philosophy in science education? - The views of Professor Lewis W olpert University 
College, London.
Support for teaching the history of science on the supposition that it can illuminate the 
philosophy of science is not universal. There are eminent modern-day scientists who have 
scant regard for the philosophy of science and believe it has little to offer the scientific 
enterprise in its efforts to make progress. Professor Lewis Wolpert is one such scientist 
whose views represent a sceptical position in regard to the current thinking on the 
philosophy of science. I think his scepticism affords a useful starting point from which I 
can argue a case for a consensus view of the nature of science. The following is a record 
of a discussion with Professor Wolpert that I have supported with extracts from his book 
‘The Unnatural Nature of Science’. I contrast his views with the more mainstream 
thinking of current commentators on the philosophy of science like Matthews (1994), 
Hodson (1986), Millar (1996), and Osborne (1996) in order to illustrate the present 
consensus on a number of key issues such as scientific method, realism, constructivism.
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determinism, creativity and fallibility. I have added my own views gained partly from 
recent research and partly from my experience as a science teacher.
I began by outlining my work as a basis for discussion. When I mention to most people 
that I am doing research on the history of science in science teaching they assume that my 
aim is merely to make it more ‘human’. My aims go frirther than that. I am trying to 
dispel the idea that science is some kind o f ‘gospel’. It is often presented in textbooks as 
if it has already attained its ‘final form’. This approach disguises the developmental 
nature of science. Neither does the typical textbook approach give any impression of the 
fallibility of science. References to mistaken theories are rare. The result is that school 
pupils receive a distorted image of science. In my opinion the subject often appears 
authoritarian. For instance the words ‘it has been scientifically shown that’ immediately 
signal that the subsequent statement cannot be challenged. I suggested to Professor 
Wolpert that a move away from the dogmatic approach to a more human and tentative 
approach was overdue. I said that I wanted pupils to regard science as being in flux rather 
than a fixed body of knowledge. Also, I believe they should have a less rigid and 
constricting view of scientific method. For instance the idea of investigations proceeding 
with a set format including prediction, method, results and conclusions is really only one 
idealised way of doing science and bears little resemblance to how science has actually 
been done.
In the following interview AI is the author of this thesis and LW is Professor Lewis 
Wolpert. His comments are in bold to make the conversation easier to follow. Relevant 
excerpts from the literature are printed in italic. I begin with LW’s response to my views 
as expressed above:
LW: I think I disagree with quite a lot of what you have to say. While there is uo 
question that science is in flux, most of science is not. I think one’s got to be very 
careful about throwing out the baby with the bath water. It is perfectly true that 
things have changed but I would say as of this moment that 90% of chemistry is 
right and DNA is the genetic material and so that’s the way it is. Water is H2O . I
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think to give the idea that everything in science is just sort of in temporary flux is 
totally and grotesquely misleading. Archimedes has been right for the last 2000 
years.
AI: What about something like the Phlogiston Theory?
LW: I think one has got to be very careful as to how typical is the Phlogiston 
Theory. I can only speak about biology and I cannot see much that has been thrown 
out this century. On the whole, things have made progress and have been 
incorporated. If you say something is scientific it means that it has been put through 
a particular process that is internally consistent and, on the whole, checks with the 
real world. I think you are taking too soft a line.
This accords with Wolpert’s comments in his book, ‘The unnatural nature of science’. He 
writes;
It is the very progress o f science that presents the basic problem. I f  science provides the 
best understanding o f the world, how should one regard, fo r example, the ideas about 
phlogiston that were held before the discovery o f oxygen and the understanding ofits role 
in combustion? I f  those who believed in phlogiston could be so wrong, how can we be 
sure that the same upheaval will not occur in current areas o f science? The whole history 
o f science is filled with new discoveries and the overthrow or modification o f  ideas that 
were held to be true. So in what sense, then, is scientific knowledge a true description o f  
the world, and what right have we to call it ‘privileged'?
The vast majority o f scientists would not be interested in such problems. They would 
probably just argue that the older theories were the best available at the time, and almost 
always some, perhaps many, features o f  an old theory will be incorporated into its 
successor. Scientists have to accept the possibility that their most strongly held view may 
turn out to be wrong, but some concepts have been so widely tested that it is extremely 
unlikely that they will suffer this fate. Even those who are dubious about the privileged 
nature o f science do not direct their criticisms at the results o f science itself -  that the
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earth goes round the sun, that water is made o f  two hydrogen atoms and one o f oxygen, 
or that DNA is the genetic material The attention o f the philosophers, rather, is focused 
on the nature o f  scientific knowledge and how it is acquired (pi 01).
According to this excerpt Wolpert is suggesting that the philosophy of science is of 
academic interest only and that scientists are too preoccupied with the business of science 
to reflect on the nature of science. It may be that scientists ‘cannot see the wood for the 
trees’. For non-scientists I believe the larger picture is of more concern. With reference to 
secondary school science Hodson (1986) writes:
It has been claimed that teachers place much more emphasis on goals related to 
the acquisition of knowledge than they do on those related to understanding the 
nature of science or to the development of attitudes. If this is the case, then it is 
the relatively unplanned aspects of the science curriculum (- the hidden science 
curriculum) that carry the major message about the nature of science and 
scientific activity and may be the principal factor influencing attitude to science 
and recruitment to optional science courses. Such a state of affairs is regrettable.
If children are to acquire a proper understanding and appreciation of such matters, 
it is necessary that philosophical considerations are afforded a much more 
prominent role in the design of learning experiences’. He suggests that ‘an attempt 
is made to focus the attention of science teachers more sharply on issues in the 
philosophy of science that have a direct bearing on science curriculum design, in 
the hope that ‘curriculum messages’ about the nature of science and the activities 
of scientists will become more faithful to actual scientific practice’ (p.215).
Hodson continues:
Science curriculum development has been uninformed by developments in the 
philosophy of science and the views of science implicit in many recent curriculum 
proposals have been confused, often contradictory and based on ‘dubious or 
discarded philosophies of science’. There is an urgent need for a reconsideration 
of the epistemological basis of the science curriculum in the light of contemporary 
views on the philosophy and sociology of science, and an urgent need for much
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greater consideration of philosophical issues in teacher education programmes
(p216).
Hodson is arguing here for giving pupils the opportunity to discuss what it is about 
science that makes it a distinct discipline. In my view, this is basic to an understanding of 
the subject. That understanding cannot be achieved if teachers themselves have an 
inadequate grasp of the philosophy of science.
Hodson not only believes that philosophical considerations are important but also thinks 
that science teachers should be much more explicit about presenting them. It is not 
enough to leave pupils to assimilate their ideas on the nature of science through implicit 
messages given by the teacher’s style or the character of practical work. The danger here 
is that they can pick up inappropriate messages from teachers whose own background in 
the philosophy of the subject is weak or out of date. Hodson’s recommendation is that 
more emphasis should be given to this aspect of the subject during the training of teachers 
and that a more deliberate means of delivery is designed.
My belief is that philosophical considerations are more important at the secondary school 
stage to future non-scientists because they will never have the opportunity of considering 
issues relating to the nature of science from ‘inside’ science. The views of future 
scientists, on the other hand, will ultimately be moulded by their participation in the 
whole enterprise of research. Wolpert’s negative assessment of the relevance of 
philosophy of science to ‘real science’ may have some substance from his perspective 
but, in my opinion, the goal of scientific literacy for school pupils should entail a wider 
perspective. The classroom research I describe in Chapter 5 will indicate that it is 
possible to debate philosophical issues with pupils aged 14, albeit at a rudimentary level.
My view of the authoritarian nature of school science led me to seek Wolpert’s 
agreement in emphasising to pupils that scientific knowledge must be regarded as 
tentative;
AI: Would you accept that there are two kinds of science -  if you like, ready-made
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science and science-in-the-making?
LW: There are not two kinds, it’s just that at the edges things will be challenged.
I’m not interested in absolute truth. Science is the best way to understand the 
world; there is no other way.
In Wolpert (1993) he says:
Science is a complex social process, and no simple-minded description in terms o f  
Kuhn's paradigms or Popper’s falsification will provide an adequate description. The 
demarcation problem is real only in the sense that science is rich, varied, heterogeneous 
and complex. Its edges may be blurred, but the core is solid (pi 08).
In my opinion this view is appropriate for the vast majority of working scientists making 
up ‘normal science’ but it also runs the risk of discouraging the exceptional scientist who 
might challenge accepted doctrine and bring about a revolutionary change in theory. 
Since the exceptional scientist of tomorrow is part of the school population of today it is 
important that the status of scientific knowledge is made clear to school pupils. It is 
knowledge that people can have confidence in but it is not above criticism and it can be 
challenged.
In the next section I probed Wolpert’s views on some of the major influences on the 
philosophy of science:
AI: So how much of Thomas Kuhn’ do you accept?
LW: I think he is fundamentally wrong. He talks about incommensurability. There 
is no question that paradigms are different but what happens is the new paradigm 
incorporates the old; you cannot abandon it.
AI: There is no such thing as a fresh start in regard to scientific theory?
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LW: Well, I very much douht it and I think (with reference to the effect on 
Newton’s Law of Gravitation of Einstein’s theory).... It certainly put Newton in a 
very different context. Nevertheless, if you go to any university in this country where 
they teach physics and they will not start off with Einstein -  they will start off with 
Newtonian mechanics. So that would be my view. I suppose I have a particular view
of science that science does not fit with commonsense. One of the reasons I think
students have difficulty with science is that, unlike the arts, their opinions are of no
interest whatsoever They have nothing to contribute towards it -  zero. The most
they can do is recognise that the world is built on a veiy odd basis and amazingly we 
understand a little bit.
AI: Where do you stand on Popper?
LW: Absolutely against it. Total distortion of the way science is done.
In ‘The Unnatural Nature of Science’ Wolpert acknowledges Popper’s contribution to the 
philosophy of science viz:
‘7/ is to the philosopher Karl Popper's great credit that he has emphasised the 
imaginative nature o f  scientific thinking
However, he finds fault with the criterion of falsification as a means of drawing a line of 
demarcation between science and non-science. Using Popper’s own example of the 
sighting of a black swan as a means of falsifying the theory that ‘all swans are white’, 
Wolpert says it suffers from the same fallacy as the inductivist philosophy which Popper 
himself rejects. He contends that the single sighting of a black swan is not enough to 
falsify the theory. 'No scientist would give up a life-long allegiance to a theory on the 
strength o f  one contradictory example \ He says that 'Popper’s approach thus avoids the 
whole question o f  how scientists decide whether or not a theory is refuted or verified \ 
Wolpert does accede to Popper’s belief in the importance of conjecture: thus, 'emphasis 
on bold conjecture points to a feature o f science on which all scientists would agree:
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science is notjust the growth o f organisedfactual knowledge but is a creative endeavour 
that aims at understanding ’ (p i05).
AI: You are more in favour of a puzzle-solving approach?
LW: I don’t think we know how science is done. The point that you made earlier is 
that there are many ways of doing science. Some people made discoveries; some 
people are good experimentally; some people are theoreticians. It is a funny mish­
mash. I f you look at how science is done....we do it in large groups; you look at the 
papers -  five or six people on a paper with all sorts of different contributions and we 
try and falsify; we try to validate; we try to discover ... I think it is very 
complicated.
AI: Which explains your comment about philosophy. In fact, you don’t think there is a 
philosophy of science.
LW: And certainly the philosophers of science have contributed nothing; nothing; 
zero. They have nothing to say.
In his book Wolpert says:
It might be thought that either philosophers or sociologists would have been able to 
illuminate the nature o f science and why it has been so successful Alas, not only have 
they failed to do so but some have instead provided what they regard as good reasons fo r  
doubting whether science really does provide an understanding o f the way in which the 
world works. Fortunately fo r  science, these philosophical claims have no relevance to 
science and can be ignored. There are numerous styles for doing science: the only 
constant is the need to measure one's ideas against the real world (pxiii).
AI: In that case how do you think, in general, that science makes progress?
LW. By testing against reality and being internally consistent -  it’s a peculiarity.
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Wolpert again asserts that there is no unique scientific method and supports Medawar’s 
claim that the scientific paper is a fraud with its highly ordered format often 
misrepresenting the way in which the work was actually done. Writing in this form, he 
says:
I f  science is an unnatural process, quite differentfrom ordinary thinking, it might be 
thought possible to state clearly what the nature o f  science is and to define scientific 
method. I f  only this were so! In fact, defining the nature o f science and scientific method 
with rigour and consistency turns out to be extremely difficult. It is even doubtful that 
there is a scientific method except in very broad and general terms. Perhaps scientists 
themselves have helped to create the illusion that method in science is highly ordered, fo r  
they write almost all their papers as i f  there were a scientific method. There is a format o f  
Introduction ’followed by 'Methods ’ then 'Results ’ andfinally the 'Discussion But, as 
Peter Medawar pointed out, the scientific paper is a kind offraud, fo r  its neat format 
bears no relation to the way in which scientists actually work: imagination, confusion, 
determination, passion -  all the features associated with scientific creativity have been 
purgedfrom it (p 101 ).
AI: But the first thing would be their hunch?
LW Absolutely not. Sometimes they just don’t have a hunch at all, they’re just 
interested in what the problem is. I mean I know how I’ve done science - 1 would 
puzzle and puzzle and eventually you come up with an idea but you don’t start off 
with a hunch.
Again his writing supports this claim:
There is no easy road to understanding science, the more so because there is no formula 
fo r scientific method. The best and probably the only way to understand science is to do 
scientific research, but that clearly is notan option to improve public understanding. 
However, it may well be that science education should take into account the unnatural
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nature o f  the subject. Instead o f  teaching science only as a rigorous, self-contained 
subject, it may be beneficial to compare commonsense ideas about the world with 
scientific views. Studies already show that children do better at science i f  they acquire 
some understanding o f independent variables, fo r example. But perhaps that is not 
enough. They need to appreciate just how different scientific thinking is and how much 
more natural were Aristotle’s ideas as compared to those o f  Galileo and Newton (pi 77).
Aristotle’s science was sometimes misconceived but could be regarded as arising from 
the commonsense view. His explanations for phenomena started with the familiar in the 
belief that deductions in science can proceed from principles intelligible in themselves. 
Considering a plurality of views including the commonsense view and others which may 
be historical, fits in with Monk and Osborne’s scheme for the role of history in teaching 
and learning science concepts which I describe in Chapter 3.
AI: Sir Peter Medawar said that science moved in the direction of problems it seemed 
possible to solve (Medawar, 1968).
LW: Well that’s the nature of science. He did say that science was the art of the 
possible but that’s not being different; he’s really saying there’s no point in taking 
on the problem if it’s too difficult -  that part of the trick of doing science is to take a 
problem and solve it. It’s a compromise of course. Every now and then someone has 
to take a leap and do something that other people would not do hut the cleverness of 
the research worker is to take difficult problems and find some way of solving them.
AI: But there is still a place for originality?
LW: Tremendous, sure.
AI: We’re not talking about just puzzle solvers who beaver away?
LW: Don’t be snooty about puzzle solvers. There’s quite a lot in that process.
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AI: So you’re saying that if we are teaching historical aspects of science -  if we’re doing 
a developmental approach it is as part of our cultural background?
LW: You know you are teaching it to give some indication as to how difficult science 
is and how it actually has made progress. You might get some insight into the nature 
of the process of science. I think that’s very important.
AI: I’m not so concerned about this for future scientists -  I’m talking about the general 
population.
LW: I would like them to have some sense of what it is like to be scientists and the 
best way is to choose some nice historical examples. The historians ....they’re all 
relativists and I’m very hostile to them.
Wolpert gives a damning view of historians of science in ‘The Unnatural nature of 
science’. Citing Kuhn (1970) as the prime example he says the following:
'Kuhn’s views on incommensurability, with his emphasis on social processes determining 
the acceptance o f  a theory, can lead one to a relativistic view o f science. For i f  there is 
no rational way o f choosing between rival theories, fo r choosing between one paradigm 
or theory and another, then it seems that science may be a mere social construct and that 
a choice o f scientific theories becomes like fashion, a matter o f taste. I f  this were really 
true then scientific ideas would be merely a reflection o f  a particular set ofsocial and 
cultural conditions, and science could not merit the so-called privileged position 
assigned to it. But such a conclusion is not valid. Although social processes play a role in 
science, scientists change theories because the new ones provide a better correspondence 
with reality; because, like Darwin’s theory o f evolution, they provide a better explanation 
o f the world. While the initial stages o f acceptance o f one or other o f competing theories 
may have a strong social aspect that involves fashion, power groupings and so on, the 
main criterion will eventually be how well the theory explains the phenomena ’ (pi 03).
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Wolpert suspects that historians have neglected progress in biology and been unduly 
influenced by progress in physics. (Kuhn’s scientific background is largely in physics):
‘As the American evolutionary biologist Ernst May r has emphasised, it is probably true 
that philosophers o f  science have ignored advances in biological science, to their cost. By 
almost always drawing their examples from physics, they have missed out on revealing 
examples o f scientific progress in other fields, particularly molecular biology (pi 04).
AI: We have this thing called the National Curriculum which is massively packed with 
facts, theories, whatever and there isn’t time to talk about how we arrived at them.
LW: I think probably the National Curriculum tries to teach too much science.
AI: You are suggesting that we teach less but teach it better?
LW: I would much prefer that - otherwise it means nothing.
Little would be lost i f  less science were taught but some insight were gained into the 
process o f  science. Learning about creativity in science, with an emphasis on psychic 
courage andfailure, may well be much more valuable than some o f  the science itself. 
Wolpert quotes Hilts (p74) ‘the chief experience o f science is failure ’ (pi 77).
There is broad agreement amongst educationalists that depth of understanding has been 
sacrificed for breadth of content in the National Curriculum for science. Evidence is 
provided by the Assessment of Performance Unit (in Millar, 1996) of an inadequate grasp 
of basic scientific principles by a majority of ninth year pupils. Millar makes this point:
‘Given the evidence of students’ lack of understanding in so many basic areas, the 
guiding principle as regards curriculum content must surely be; do less but do it 
better. It is almost a commonplace to observe that the science curriculum is 
overloaded. As a result, it is unclear about its priorities; students (and perhaps also
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teachers) are unable to see the wood for the trees. The plethora of textbooks, 
curriculum packages and syllabuses conveys an impression of lack of consensus 
about priorities, and about structure. What is central? What really matters? (pi2).
My own view is that the congested science curriculum is a consequence of emphasising 
content at the expense of a broad framework of understanding, including an 
understanding of the nature of science.
AI: The problem is of course that whatever we teach them we have no idea what 
scientific issues are going to confront them in their lifetime.
LW: I don’t think that matters. I think they need to have some feel for the 
processes.
AI: 1 read an article in the School Science Review which suggested that the processes 
were overrated. You know, kids naturally observe. (1 was thinking of an article by Millar 
(1996) in which he said:
‘Children come to science at age five, already able to observe, classify, 
hypothesise, predict, compare ‘fairly’ and so on, with high levels of skill in 
contexts where they see the purpose in doing so. There is no need to spend lesson 
time ‘developing’ these capabilities’ (pi 5). )
LW: That’s ruhbish. My whole thesis is that you will never arrive at science by 
observation. Never. You have to adopt a veiy curious and peculiar attitude and my 
whole line is there is only one society that ever did science and that was the Greeks. 
Everything we know about science comes from the Greeks -  no Greeks, no science.
Wolpert pays tribute to Greek science in his book:
Finally, we should always remember the origin o f science in Greece. Even though we do 
not understand why it should have had its origins there, the Greek commitment to free
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and critical discussion was essentialfor science to flourish. And the same is true today. 
While at present science flourishes we must he aware how easily it might wither: witness 
the disastrous effects Lysenko’s dogmas, supported by the state, had on Soviet genetics. 
Those who dislike the ideas o f science and think they have had a malevolent effect on our 
spiritual life should realise that once one rejects understanding and chooses dogma and 
ignorance, not only science but democracy itself is threatened. Science is one o f  
humankind’s greatest and most beautiful achievements andfor its continuation, free and 
critical discussion, with no political interference, is as essential today as it was in Ionia 
(p l78).
AI: But in fact the Greeks didn’t do experiments -  they just talked about science.
LW: Well, but they thought theory and that’s a good beginning. If you really want 
to understand the underlying principles, the idea that children are natural scientists 
is rubbish.
My own view is that pupils are ‘natural scientists’ in the sense of ‘naturally curious’ and 
in the sense of forming their own commonsense explanations for phenomena where none 
other is available. Popper (1963) thought that there was a human tendency to ‘jump to 
conclusions’ without necessarily being able to justify them. However, pupils are not 
‘natural scientists’ in the sense of adopting disciplined methods to arrive at reliable data 
and making reasoned conclusions from those data. Driver found that it was unreasonable 
to put pupils in the position of being a scientist (Driver, 1983). On the one hand pupils 
would be expected to explore a phenomenon for themselves by collecting data and 
making inferences from them and, on the other hand, the process would lead them to the 
currently accepted law or principle. It is unrealistic to think that most pupils could make 
that connection.
AI: So we do have a role in teaching them that there is scientific thought?
LW: Science is different and there are real things in the world. There’s nothing in 
our day-to-day expectations that will ever lead to molecules or DNA and Newton’s
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Laws of Motion -  never. That force causes acceleration and the natural state of a 
body is movement. Come on.
AI: One of the interesting things I heard you say was that, if Shakespeare hadn’t been 
around, if he hadn’t been bom, we wouldn’t have had all his works and of course we 
would have missed that. If somebody like Darwin hadn’t been around then somebody 
else would have come up with his theory of evolution (‘Start the Week’-  Radio 4). So 
your approach seems to me to be very determinist.
This idea is reaffirmed in Wolpert’s book (1993) when he states:
‘I f  Watson and Crick had not discovered DNA one can be virtually certain that other 
scientists would eventually have determined it. With art it is quite different. I f  
Shakespeare had not written Hamlet, no other playwright would have done so ’ (p86).
LW: Totally. You see, unlike you, I think there is a real world out there. I don’t 
believe science is constructed. It’s a real world that has certain laws that we try to 
understand.
His rejection of relativism is explained in his book:
The issues with respect to both relativism and the importance o f  sociological influences 
on science might be encapsulated by asking i f  one could have had a different science i f  
historical conditions had differed. Would a physics have evolved that is not based on 
what we now consider to be a set o f basic forces? Would a biology not based on cells and 
DNA have been possible? Would the Periodic Table or Carbon Chemistry never have 
emerged? To the relativists the answer must presumably be ‘yes ’, but then the onus is on 
them to demonstrate the validity o f their position. To me the answer is an unequivocal 
‘no the course o f science would have been very different, but the ideas would have 
ended up the same. In my view science, despite blips and errors, more and more provides 
an understanding o f the world (pi 20).
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The influence of social factors is again minimised:
Persuasion ultimately counts for nothing i f  the theory does not measure up to the 
required correspondence with nature. I f  it does not conform with the evidence, i f  it is not 
internally consistent, i f  it does not offer an adequate explanation, the authority and all 
the other socialfactors countfor nothing: it willfail. Such a failure is undoubtedly 
culturally determined, the culture being one that adopts a scientific approach (pi 18).
AI: Do you agree that we have to construct science within individuals themselves?
LW: No
Anti-realists deny that science makes discoveries about a human-independent world, 
including the world of unobservable entities (Harre, 1986). They allege that it is 
individuals who construct, on the basis of their experience and theorising, the 
unobservable items making up theories.
Bas Van Frassen (1980) is a leading philosopher of science who advocates ‘constructive 
empiricism’. His view is that scientists aim for models that are only required to fit the 
observable phenomena. Thus Wolpert would point to the reality of genes whereas Van 
Frassen would hold that such entities should be considered as models only. From my 
perspective as a science teacher the point is not which position is more correct but that 
pupils are at least made aware of the conflicting views and can appreciate the diversity of 
opinion on a central issue in relation to the nature of science.
The issue is important because it lies at the heart of science as a form of knowledge. As 
Osborne (1996) writes:
Put simply, the justification of the place and time for science education on the 
curriculum lies in the claim that the methods of science and scientists produce
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reliable knowledge, that is, that its epistemology is superior to that of astrologers 
and even sociologists. Thus, any account of science requires a clear and well- 
defined understanding of the nature of the knowledge claims that science makes 
(p56).
In his book Wolpert says that scientists can be proud to call themselves naïve realists but 
claims a ‘commonsense realist’ position for himself. Realists claim that science makes 
discoveries about a human-independent world including the world of unobservable 
entities such as gravitation or electric charge although most would admit that we are 
fallible and may not always be right about what exists in the unobservable realm. 
Commonsense realists maintain that there exist objects, events and processes in the world 
which are independent of all human perception and all thought or theorising about them. 
They are independent in the sense that if there were no humans around to perceive or 
think about them then they would still exist. They are not simply constructs of ours. 
Realists maintain that science has discovered (not constructed) items such as electrons 
even though scientists have been mistaken about some items like phlogiston in the past. It 
is this realist philosophy that Wolpert subscribes to with his repeated assertion that water 
is H2O and that DNA is the genetic material. The very success of science has been used 
by realists as evidence of the strength of their position. Hacking (in Matthews 1994), used 
the example of the electron as a graphic illustration of this:
“You cannot spray electrons around unless they are really there” (pi 76).
It may be that Wolpert’s strongly realist position is the result of the great successes 
achieved in his own field of molecular biology during his lifetime.
My own position corresponds more closely with the ‘modest realism’ described by Harre 
(1986) in Varieties o f Realism. The historical cases I have studied lead me to believe 
that scientific ideas and theories are often human constructions in the first instance (as 
instanced by the Greeks’ instrumental use of the concept of the atom and Dalton’s 
assumption that atoms of different elements combine in small, whole-number ratios). If
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the accumulated effort of other scientists results in overwhelming evidence in favour of 
those theories then scientists can have confidence in their reality, always remembering 
that mistakes can be made. (In 1808 Gay-Lussac announced his discovery of a simple 
regularity in the combining proportions of gases, leading to a sounder basis for the 
establishment of molecular formulae. This corroborated Dalton’s ‘rule of greatest 
simplicity’. Avogadro’s contribution, that equal volumes of all gases at the same 
temperature and pressure contain equal numbers of molecules and the realisation that 
some gaseous elements had polyatomic molecules, left little doubt as to the ‘reality’ of 
Dalton’s original ‘construction’).
The acceptance of an independent reality does not signify that the absolute truth about 
that reality is attainable -  simply that scientists can strive to achieve a closer 
understanding of it. The increasingly sophisticated picture of the atom described by 
Dalton, Rutherford and then Bohr leading to the present day exemplifies this point.
AI: How do you view the idea that even pupils who have had no science before they 
come to school have got some preconceptions, some of which will be misconceptions?
LW: I don’t think they’ve got misconceptions. I don’t think they have any interest 
whatsoever. I don’t believe there is a child that arrives at your school who has ever 
thought why, when he drops a cricket ball, it goes to the ground. If you find me one 
child who’s really worried about that I’ll eat my hat.
The case for the constructivists has been made by Osborne and Monk (1996) who have 
proposed a model for incorporating the history and philosophy of science into the school 
curriculum by requiring that past scientist’s views on natural phenomena are set 
alongside those of students’ views as other perspectives for consideration, making the 
history and philosophy of science a central feature of mainstream science education. In 
other words they make the assumption that school pupils do have preconceptions which 
attempt at understanding natural phenomena, however naïve these may be. They contend
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that:
‘the consequent shift to a plurality of viewpoints has two benefits. First, the 
consideration of alternative interpretations of evidence demands comparison and 
contrast, forcing science teachers to raise the epistemological questions -  “How 
do we know?” and “What is the evidence for... ?” Second, the need for alternative 
explanations for the phenomena under investigation provides a natural means for 
science teachers to elicit students’ prior knowledge, an action central to any 
notion of a constructivist pedagogy. Subsequent introduction of modern textbook 
accounts for the natural phenomena can then build upon this epistemological 
openness. It is our contention that such a pedagogic strategy, whose focus is 
always the conceptual explanation and its justification, would not only support the 
learning of science but learning about science (p406).’
AI: So from that point of view the constructivist approach 
LW: Is junk.
AI: So how would you feel about the tabula rasa view - that we’re simply filling an 
empty pot?
LW: Well there may be some naïve notions as to why things happen but I wouldn’t 
waste my time on that. I would tell them that all their ideas about the nature of the 
world are false. Every single one. Not one of the ideas that they have about the way 
the world works is correct. But I don’t think they’ve ever thought about it. They’ve
never thought about why or how we inherit the colour of our parents Maybe I’m
wrong. It’s jnst not the sort of thing children talk about.
There is evidence (Gallagher in Monk and Osborne,! 997), that for many secondary 
school teachers, science is perceived as an established body of knowledge and techniques 
that require minimal justification (p407). They focus on ‘what we know’ rather than ‘how 
we know’. Monk and Osborne make the point that:
75
‘for teachers of science, only the development of an understanding of science 
concepts and the nature and methods of science are internal to an education in 
science. The rest lie beyond the boundary of “what we now know’” (p407).
For such teachers the education process is biased in favour of transmission rather than 
construction.
AI: My view is that we’re producing from schools a lot of people whose scientific 
literacy is poor. There are even individuals highly educated in the humanities, who 
actually glory in their ignorance of scientific knowledge.
LW: I know. But they are humiliated by their ignorance.
AI: You quoted Lionel Trilling in the USA -  about the wound to his self-esteem.
Trilling commented on the difficulty non-scientists have in understanding science: ‘This 
exclusion o f most o f  us from the mode o f thought which is habitually said to be the 
characteristic achievement o f the modem age is bound to be experienced as a wound to 
our intellectual self-esteem ’ (pxi).
AI: Fm trying to convince pupils who are not going to become scientists that science is 
not external and separate to their existence.
LW: Science is external to their existence. Scientific ideas are very different from 
their day-to-day experiences.
In fact one o f the strongest argumentsfor the distance between commonsense and science 
is that the whole o f science is totally irrelevant to most people’s day-to-day lives. One 
can live very well without knowledge o f Newtonian mechanics, cell theory and DNA and 
other sciences. On the other hand, science can enormously enrich one ly life, and in 
modern science knowledge is essential for innumerable policy decisions that affect our 
lives {^\6).
76
This concludes the discussion I had with Professor Wolpert at University College. 
Several passages of our discussion gave me food for thought. As a working scientist 
Wolpert professes contempt for the views of philosophers and historians of science as 
indicated by the following selection of quotes from the discussion:
(i) ‘The historians ... they 're all relativists and I ’m very hostile to them. ’
(ii) ‘And certainly the philosophers o f science have contributed nothing; zero. 
They have nothing to say. ’
(Hi) On Popper’s philosophy -  ‘Absolutely against it. Total distortion o f  the 
way science is done. ’
(iv) On Kuhn -  7 think he is fundamentally wrong. He talks about
incommensurability. There is no question that paradigms are different but 
what happens is the new paradigm incorporates the old; you cannot 
abandon it. ’
Wolpert is equally scathing about the preconceptions children bring with them to school 
about how the world works:
(vi) 7 would tell them that all their ideas about the nature o f  the world are 
false. Every single one. Not one o f their ideas about how the world works 
is correct. ’
(vii) 7 don’t think they’ve got misconceptions. I  don’t think they have any 
interest whatsoever.
(viii) With reference to the constructivist approach to teaching science -  ‘ju n k’.
(ix) On the rationale for teaching science -  ‘...you are teaching it to give some 
indication as to how difficult science is and how it actually has made 
progress. Your might get some insight into the nature o f the process o f  
science. I  think that’s very important. ’
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Wolpert’s views are formed from his comprehensive knowledge of the world of higher 
education in science and of scientific research. They make discouraging reading for a 
science teacher, like myself, committed to the education of future non-scientists as well 
as future scientists. I believe that future non-scientists, in particular, need a broad picture 
of the epistemology of science drawn from its history and philosophy in order that they 
can feel comfortable with the uncertainty and conflict of modern science.
I was alarmed by Wolpert’s outright dismissal of pupils’ preconceptions on how the 
world works. This is directly at odds with pedagogic principles by which pupils’ own 
ideas are valued and often used as a starting point from which more scientific ideas 
emerge. The fact that there is no easy relationship between science and commonsense 
should not mean that science is alien or inaccessible. In my opinion this view of science 
education has played a large part in turning pupils away from science. One of the 
messages I have tried to convey to pupils is that, despite the magnitude of the 
achievements of past scientists and their intellectual brilliance, science is an activity in 
which they can all participate.
Wolpert’s forthright and often scathing view of the philosophy of science and his 
denouncement of historians of science as ‘relativists’ provide a convenient starting point 
for my argument that the history and philosophy of science are essential factors in pupils’ 
understanding of the nature of science. My research will focus on the following issues;
(i) The extent to which historical material in textbooks enables teachers to 
adopt a genuinely historical perspective in their approach to units of study.
(ii) The extent to which historical episodes can incorporate instructional 
practices which facilitate pupils’ understanding of the nature of science.
(iii) To what extent the needs of all pupils can be met in understanding the 
nature of science with particular reference to those for whom secondary 
school science will be their last contact with science in a formal sense.
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(iv) To what extent the views of teachers and researchers inside education
match those of Professor Wolpert on the use of the historical perspective 
in science teaching.
In Chapter 3 I will explore the rationale for the use of historical case studies as a means 
of teaching some aspects of the ‘nature of science’.
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CHAPTER 3. Rationale for the history of science in science education
(i) Introduction
In this chapter I argue against the perpetuation of a cultural gap between science and 
‘humanities’ in secondary school education. The judicious use of the history and 
philosophy of science can help form a bridge between the two disciplines. Not only are 
history and science compatible but the former can play a valuable role in teaching pupils 
the nature of science. By choosing appropriately balanced accounts of historical episodes 
in science pupils can be taught to appreciate the cultural achievement science represents. 
I recommend a move away from science as a ‘rhetoric of conclusions’ and the restoration 
of an historical perspective as a means of providing a stronger grasp of concepts. I 
contend that future non-scientists have most to gain from this perspective in dealing with 
science-related issues in adulthood. The story-line approach has a role to play in relating 
scientific knowledge to real-life contexts. I seek the views of practising teachers on my 
thesis and I conclude with the perspective of a researcher in this field.
(ii) Seeking a bridge across the ‘two cultures’ divide
The artificial barrier that has grown between science and the humanities is usually 
regarded as an obstacle to a liberal education (Matthews, 1994). It is rare to find scholars 
fortunate enough to be equally at home in both camps. Koestler (1959) is one such 
individual who saw the impact which sciences have had on the humanities and lamented 
‘the wrongheadedness of erecting academic and social barriers between the two’. He 
attempted a survey of man’s changing vision of the universe with the aim of illustrating 
the psychological process of discovery rather than charting a series of historical events in 
a chronological order. In the process he dispelled the myth that ‘Science is a purely 
rational pursuit, that the Scientist is a more ‘level-headed’ and ‘dispassionate’ type than 
others;’ He warned that:
‘...no branch of science, ancient or modern, can boast freedom from
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metaphysical bias of one kind or another. The progress of science is generally 
regarded as a kind of clean, rational advance along a straight ascending line; in 
fact it has followed a zigzag course, at times almost more bewildering than the 
evolution of political thought. The history of cosmic theories, in particular, may 
without exaggeration be called a history of collective obsessions and controlled 
schizophrenias; and the manner in which some of the most important individual 
discoveries were arrived at reminds one more of a sleepwalker’s performance 
rather than an electronic brain’s.’ (p ll)
Koestler shared a conviction with Butterfield, a Professor of Modern History, that this 
‘age of specialists’ was in need of ‘creative trespassers’ as a means of ending the ‘cold 
war’ between the two cultures. Butterfield (1949) had attempted to bridge the gulf by 
writing the Origins o f Modem Science, in which he set out the aim of the historian;
The whole fabric of our history of science is lifeless and its whole shape is 
distorted if we seize now upon this particular man in the fifteenth century who 
had an idea that strikes us as modern, now upon another man of the sixteenth 
century who had a hunch or an anticipation of some later theory -  all as if one 
were making a catalogue of inventions or of maritime discoveries. It has proved 
almost more useful to learn something of the misfires and the mistaken 
hypotheses of early scientists, to examine the particular intellectual hurdles that 
seemed insurmountable at given periods, and even to pursue courses of scientific 
development which ran into a blind alley, but which still had their effect on the 
progress of science in general, (pix)
Writing at a time which pre-dated Kuhn’s The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions (1970), 
Butterfield was concerned particularly to take note of:
‘those cases in which men not only solved a problem but had to alter their 
mentality in the process, or at least discovered that the solution involved a change 
in their mental approach’ (pviii).
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He underlined the importance of making the effort to understand ‘men who were not 
like-minded with ourselves’ and not fall into the trap of regarding the scientists of 
previous eras as merely the victims of ignorance or superstition.
The popular image of science and scientists has not been helped by the form of writing 
employed in scientific papers and scientific textbooks. Bearing in mind that much of this 
writing has been done by scientists for other scientists or students of science, the form has 
been functional but dull. The implication is that creative writing is the sole preserve of 
the humanist. A professor of English Literature (Carey, 1995) attempted to dispel this 
myth by compiling an anthology of writing on scientific topics by scientists and non­
scientists that belied this general conclusion. The collection contains some historical 
pieces like the description of the discovery of X-rays by Roentgen and the account of 
Kekule’s realisation that carbon atoms form rings as well as chains. Both pieces arouse 
admiration and pleasure by the style in which they are written quite apart from the events 
they relate. There are evidently scientists whose creative writing can match the best of 
their humanities counterparts. His contention is that:
If young people are to be wooed back to science, it will not be done by telling 
them that if they continue to spurn it, Britain will face economic decline (true as 
that may be). But if scientists demonstrate by their writing that... promises of 
pleasure and self-fulfilment are true, they will not lack recruits (P.xxvii).
Almost fifty years after Snow’s (1959) Rede Lecture on the ‘Two Cultures’ it is still 
possible to identify two distinct academic traditions in operation in the secondary school 
system. The separation is perpetuated by teachers who are steeped in the traditions, the 
epistemology and the pedagogy of their chosen disciplines. In my opinion the gulf 
between the two cultures is not constructive since, at school level, it encourages early 
specialisation and therefore premature loss of contact with one or the other culture.
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(iii) Are the disciplines of history and science compatible?
On first inspection history and science as academic pursuits appear to be incompatible. 
The historian is a divergent thinker looking for a richness of detail in a subject that is by 
nature imprecise. The scientist is a convergent thinker who ignores all extraneous 
material in a methodical search for the ‘right answer’ (Bush and King, 1972, in 
Matthews, 1994). The disparity between the two is highlighted by the modem historian, 
Scharma, whose philosophy of history is evident in the introduction to his account of the 
French Revolution (Scharma, 1989):
‘What follows (I hardly need to say) is not science. It has no pretensions to 
dispassion. Though in no sense fiction (for there is no deliberate invention), it 
may well strike the reader as story rather than history. It is an exercise in animated 
description, a negotiation with a two-hundred-year memory without any pretence 
of definitive closure. And both the form of its telling and its chosen subject matter 
represent a deliberate turning away from analytical history towards Events and 
Persons, both long forbidden, or dismissed as mere froth on the great waves of 
history’(p6).
Clearly, S charma is advocating the restoration of the human actors in the writing of 
history. I make a similar plea in regard to the teaching of secondary school science.
Scharma laments the methods of previous historians by which:
‘scientific... history had arrived and with it the demotion of chronicle to 
anecdotal unimportance. So for a long time, cloaked in the mantle of rigorous 
objectivity, historians have busied themselves with pie charts and bar graphs, 
semiotics and anthropologies... ’ (p6) In his estimation, ‘to write history without 
the play of imagination is to dig an intellectual graveyard’ (pxix).
This is a clear rejection of the scientific approach to history. Is the historical approach to 
science equally distasteful? My belief is that, since all human knowledge has its origins in 
individual intellectual struggles, it is important to emphasise the human element
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(Holton’s SI) as I discussed on page 49. The process of derivation of scientific 
knowledge by purely objective means starting from empirical observations and leading to 
indisputable conclusions through a strict process of rationality has been discredited by 
Popper amongst others. Hanson (1958) said that there can be no theory-free observations 
and that human fallibility cannot be detached from the growth of scientific knowledge. 
The best that scientists can do in making claims of new knowledge is to adhere to the 
moral order (Harre, 1986) in ensuring that their theories conform to the evidence, that 
they are internally consistent and that they provide an adequate explanation of the 
phenomena. The presentation of school science as an ahistorical, decontextualised set of 
conclusions sends a message to pupils that science is not a humanity and that its growth 
has had more to do with ‘discovery’ than creativity. Despite his low opinion of historians 
Wolpert does support the use of historical examples in giving pupils some sense of what 
it is like to be scientists (see page 66). My thesis is that the historical perspective has a 
vital role to play in restoring the human agent as the source of scientific knowledge.
Any version of history involves selection, which carries with it the risk of bias towards a 
particular viewpoint. My contention is that, as long as the criteria on which selection is 
made are clear and explicit and as long as they give a perspective that is neither idealised 
nor unsympathetic, then the use of historical case studies is valid. In my opinion those 
who criticise the historical approach to science teaching on grounds of potential bias must 
apply that criticism, equally, to the content of the science curriculum, the design of which 
poses similar questions of priority and balance.
(iv) The views of teachers
At this stage it seems appropriate to consider the second part of the data I have collected 
in the course of this research and shown on page 13 -  the view from ‘the chalk face’.
The following discussion took place in December 1997, at a large, oversubscribed mixed 
comprehensive school in Surrey, which was highly placed on the government’s league 
table of successful schools. It consists of an edited transcript of a conversation I had with 
the Head of History (HoH) and the Head of Science (HoS) at the school, who had been 
working on curriculum links between their departments. I was drawn to this cross­
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curricular initiative because the two heads of department were trying to forge a practical 
link between school science and humanities as a means of counteracting the tendency of 
pupils to see these as independent and unrelated disciplines. I chose to collect data from 
this school in the hope that this might demonstrate how the gulf between science and 
humanities was artificial and unnecessary. I preface these remarks with some excerpts 
from a 1980 USA report by the Commission on Humanities (Bybee, 1991) in ‘The 
Humanities in American Life’.
The humanities are an important measure of the values and aspirations of any 
society. Intensity and breadth in the perception of life and power and richness in 
works of the imagination betoken a people alive as moral and aesthetic beings, 
citizens in the fullest sense.... They can use their scientific and technical 
achievements responsibly because they see the connections among science, 
technology and humanity (pi45).
The report stressed that:
‘science and technology have been a domain of the humanities in Western culture 
since its Greek origins’ (p i46).
In conclusion it recommended that:
‘Courses in humanities should probe connections between the humanities and 
other fields of knowledge. For example, humanistic questions are inherent in -  
and should foster an awareness o f -  the moral dimensions of science and 
technology. Teachers and students should consider the human purposes of 
scientific discovery and scientific invention.’(pi46)
It seems clear from these statements that there is a sense in which science is a humanity. 
My expectation of Interview 2. was that this assertion would be confirmed.
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Interview 2. The views of teachers collaborating on a curriculum link between a 
historv department and a science department
(In the excerpts from Interview 2. below AI is the author. HoH is the Head of History and 
HoS is the Head of Science in the school-based discussion.)
The discussion took place at the school in a science laboratory at the end of a normal 
school day and lasted for about one hour. I recorded the conversation and I have set out 
below a selection of comments from the transcript. I prefaced the conversation with a 
description of the purpose of my work. I explained that I was carrying out research into 
the effectiveness of historical case studies in the teaching and learning of science, with 
particular emphasis on bringing about an improved understanding of the nature of 
science. Much of the conversations consisted of a description of the shared activities of 
the two departments and general agreement that the historical aspects of science could be 
a means of inculcating desired dispositions to science. We agreed, for instance, that a 
respect for the achievements of past scientists combined with a healthy scepticism 
towards knowledge claims would be two such desirable outcomes. However, the 
following comments were selected because they demonstrate that, although the two 
teachers believe that cross-curricular co-operation is constructive and beneficial, their 
fundamental assumptions betray a strong identification with one or other of the two 
disciplines. I concluded that the integration of history and science at secondary school 
level faces major obstacles inherent in the educational background of teachers of history 
and science, notably their identity as specialists. The conversation is interspersed with my 
critique on their comments.
HoH; (also an examiner of history examination papers for an examination board) ‘It’s 
interesting. I’ve just finished marking the Advanced level paper. It is called “Historical 
perspectives” and it’s on change from 1740 to 1980 on which there are eight questions. 
The eighth question is always ‘the impact of science’ and I’ve had over six hundred 
responses from centres all over the country and not one centre has tackled it.’
HoS: They (candidates) probably think it’s something that they won’t understand. It
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will scare them.
HoH: I’ve seen only one answer on ‘science and technology’ in two years of setting that 
paper.
AI: So, are we still battling against the kind of two culture divide in that these pupils
see themselves as historians who would not touch science and scientists who 
would not touch history?
The implication, for me, is that students of history steer clear of science wherever they 
find it. These comments are supported by Matthew’s (1994) contention that;
‘the history of science has fallen between two stools. Arguably, the greatest 
achievement of Western civilisation, and that which has undoubtedly been 
responsible in large part for the shape of Western history, is usually not dealt with 
in school (or university) history departments because it is thought too technical or 
difficult; and it is not dealt with in science departments because it is thought 
irrelevant. Bringing the history and philosophy of science into science 
programmes can in part rectify this situation. It can spur co-operation between 
school history and science departments. It can assist the integrative goals of 
education’ (p43).
HoS: I think if a teacher decided that they wanted to do an historical perspective... to 
introduce it.. .they would find themselves quite hard pushed to find resources that would 
be useful to deliver it. It would have to be researched and resourced in a particular way 
because I don’t think the students would expect it (the historical approach).
This comment indicates to me that the Head of Science feels that students would not take 
easily to the historical perspective because they have clear ideas about what a science 
lesson should entail. In the words of a science teacher interviewed by Lakin and 
Wellington (1991);
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“They (pupils in school science) don’t expect reading and discussion or drama 
and role play -  they do expect Bunsen burners and practical work. They don’t 
want to find out that science is not a set of facts, that theories change and that 
science does not have all the answers -  they want the security of a set of truths 
that are indisputable. They see no place for their own interpretation or theories but 
want to know what should happen in a particular investigation and what this 
proves” (p i7).
This argument was reinforced later in the conversation;
HoS: Don’t you feel that it will be more attractive or persuasive for somebody to do
science if it were more technologically advanced because kids want to be up with 
the latest technology. Instead of looking at historical things you use a lot of 
IT...you use more up-to-date things.
AI: What’s ‘cool’ is IT? Well, I think that would be pretty damning for a historian to
hear -  if they’re not interested in the past that wipes out history. I think there are 
some aspects of the nature of science that can be more easily brought out using 
the historical angle rather than the latest technology. (Here I was thinking of the 
major advances in science that had been made using ‘thought experiments’, 
dependent solely on human intellectual capacity -  for example, Galileo’s free-fall 
experiment.)
HoS: I just feel that if you if you spoke to a teenager they would want to know what’s 
going to happen in the future.
AI: I support that absolutely. But I don’t think the two are mutually exclusive.
It is possible that the Head of Science might have misunderstood my intentions in regard
to improving the science curriculum. It has never been my intention to convert secondary
school science into a ‘history of science’ course. It is my intention to research the use of 
carefully designed historical case studies to increase the variety and efficiency of 
teachers’ ‘armoury’ in teaching pupils the nature of science. I hope also that it will 
improve their understanding of some science concepts. There is evidence that pupils 
respond positively to some teaching approaches and negatively to others but that their 
response is dependent on the individual pupil (Driver, 1996). Therefore, a range of 
teaching methods and skills is called for. My thesis is that the current emphasis on the 
content, processes and technology of contemporary science restricts the access of many 
pupils who would respond more positively to a narrative approach.
HoS: I am not disagreeing with you at all about that. I’m just thinking that, if I were a 
thirteen-year-old..., what would I like to be doing? It’s quite amusing because 
when we have a ‘New Intake’ evening they go straight to the computers. They 
look at ordinary bench stuff... and it looks old-fashioned to them. It worries me 
intensely that all the primary school students are going to be so technologically 
advanced that we will need to be very careful how we present the subject to them.
AI: I honestly do think that lots of people -  even highly educated people in other
fields, humanities people, still have a fear of science. If you like, a dislike of 
science because of the way they were taught it at school.
HoS: But then we scientists would probably have a dislike of other subjects, wouldn’t 
we?
The anxiety felt by the Head of Science in keeping pace with the high technology skills 
of the ‘New Intake’ pupils betrays a lack of understanding of the fundamental aims of 
education. Writing in the Times Educational Supplement ‘Opinion’ column (2000) Her 
Majesty’s Chief Inspector for Schools warns against transforming our schools into 
“cyber-leaming organisations for the techno-generation”. He mocks the kind of education 
which abandons the formality of the classroom and the conventional curriculum in which 
the traditional virtues like the ability to memorise, to think sequentially and to write good
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prose are considered irrelevant. In his view the purpose of education is the same in the 
21 century as it was in the 19^  ^and 20^:
“to initiate the young into those aspects of our culture upon which their (and our) 
humanity depends” (p i3).
In my opinion the kind of science education I am advocating, with its emphasis on the 
intellectual struggle for scientific knowledge resulting in the outstanding cultural 
achievements made to date, is far more important than the transitory technological skills 
associated with an ‘up-to-date’ science department. That is not to deny the usefulness of 
those skills as an aid to learning. It is simply a plea that information technology skills 
ought not to be confused with knowledge of the significant ‘aspects of our culture’.
The last comment from the Head of Science suggests that she believes that people fall 
neatly into the categories of ‘scientist’ or ‘humanist’ and that there exists a natural 
antagonism between the two. It ignores the fact that, for decades, the structure of 
secondary education required that pupils make an early choice (usually at age 14) 
between a science education and an ‘arts’ education regardless of the possibility that they 
may have been equally interested and talented in both. That is, the British education 
system fostered this dichotomy in the interests of maintaining high standards in a limited 
range of subjects rather than breadth and balance across a broader range. The dangers of 
early specialisation were recognised and there were attempts to restore the balance using 
compulsory ‘liberal studies’ courses but, by that time, pupils were usually committed to 
either of the two branches of education.
From this discussion I was left with the impression that a more humanistic approach to 
science would be easier to talk about than to put into practice. Despite their praiseworthy 
intentions in seeking closer departmental collaboration the comments of the two heads of 
department betrayed close identification and loyalty to their subjects that would not easily 
be breached. I detected some resistance to my suggestions that historical aspects of 
science be incorporated in the science curriculum not because they would be irrelevant
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but rather because they might not fit easily into science teachers’ vision of science as a 
discipline. From my experience as a Head of Science it is one thing to incorporate new 
aspects of science into a school curriculum and another thing to gain the genuine backing 
of teachers in teaching it.
I therefore reached the conclusion that the kinds of changes I am suggesting would 
involve teacher education and persuasion as much as curricular innovation. This 
realisation provided the background for my next consultation with Dr. Clive Sutton, a 
prominent figure in the field of teacher education, who gives a view from the field of 
research into the history of science in science education.
M  The views of a researcher in science education
Here again I present a small section of data gathered during this study. I was familiar with 
Dr. Sutton’s work through reading several publications of his and through attending a 
meeting in July, 1997 of the British Society for the History of Science in which he is an 
influential figure. Dr. Sutton is responsible for science education courses at a major 
British university and supports the movement for the use of the history of science in 
science teaching. He has published widely and is particularly interested in how teachers’ 
use of language influences pupils’ understanding of the status of scientific knowledge. 
We corresponded by e-mail in August, 1998. The advantage of this means of 
communication over the discussions I recorded in the earlier research was that Dr. Sutton 
had more time than my previous subjects to consider his answers. The correspondence is 
set out below in full. My commentary has been added using Dr. Sutton’s own published 
work and the work of others in this field.
Interview 3. The view of a researcher in science education -  Dr. Clive Sutton, 
Leicester Universitv.
(In this interview Dr. Sutton is indicated bv CS and the author is AT)
(CS’s comments are in bold type to make the conversation easier to follow)
AI: What do you see as the main benefits of using an historical perspective in teaching
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science?
CS: To know that scientific ideas have a history is necessary for a proper 
understanding of what scientists do. Without this awareness, teachers and pupils are 
liable to misunderstand the nature of science as an activity AND the scientific 
knowledge, which is the outcome of that activity. There is a lot in school experience 
and the media which encourages such misunderstanding - e.g. too much emphasis 
on experiments and not enough on thinking, and a greatly over-simplified idea of 
what ‘discovery’ involves.
In his publications Sutton rejects the ‘commonsense’ view of science as the ‘discovery’ 
of scientific knowledge from facts obtained by observation and experiment. He cites 
Selley (in Sutton, 1996) who pointed to the widespread misconception amongst pupils 
that ‘truth pre-exists its discovery’(p2) and ‘that there is a simple logical path from 
evidence to theory’. Sutton feels that traditional practical work directed at ‘describing 
what you see’ or ‘saying what happens’ results in pupils perceiving the purpose of 
experimentation as a way o f ‘reading the Book of Nature’ directly. According to Sutton, 
the time would be better spent looking into the views of other people and then using 
bench work to look for reasons for preferring one view to another. Instead of 
indiscriminate involvement in practical work Sutton believes ‘we should be getting them 
to think more about the ideas and suggestions of some author, known or unknown’. This 
accords with Wolpert’s suggestion that pupils compare Aristotle’s ideas with those of 
Galileo and Newton.
AI: How much history do you think would be appropriate and how do you think it ought 
to be included in the secondary school science curriculum?
CS: ‘How much’ is a difficult question. Do we answer in pints or reams or 
kilogrammes or megabytes? I favour re casting the science teacher’s STANCE so 
that ALL topics are in some sense historical. Each topic should include the 
questions: ‘How did people come to think about the topic this way? What was their
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evidence? Why were they interested? Was there ever any dispute about how to think 
about it?’
Sutton’s position is that an historical perspective should pervade the science curriculum 
as a whole. Other commentators favour the use of historical development of theory as 
central themes in a few selected case studies. Russell (1981) suggests that:
‘Perhaps one major topic in every science course should be taught from accurate 
historical materials, and relevant methodological issues treated directly’ (p61).
According to Mach (in Matthews,1994):
‘every young student could come into living contact with and pursue to their 
ultimate logical consequences merely a few mathematical or scientific 
discoveries. Such selections would be mainly and naturally associated with 
selections from the great scientific classics. A few powerful and lucid ideas could 
thus be made to take root in the mind and receive thorough elaboration’ (p99).
Sutton (1996) believes that concentrating on the ‘end-product’ of science as a set of 
uncontroversial ‘findings’ is a misrepresentation. He assert that most ideas in science 
have stages of development which can range from controversial claims to ‘accepted facts’ 
and even on to ‘tacit knowledge’, when their status is so universally accepted that it is no 
longer necessary to state the idea because it is so obviously ‘part of what everybody 
knows’ (p9). Sutton feels that the success of terms like ‘molecule’ as scientific entities 
has obscured the doubt and tentativeness expressed when the terms were first used. 
Unfortunately, the transmission of science as ‘end-products’ emphasises the status of 
such entities as ‘near-certainties’ and ignores the process by which the scientific 
community debated the idea -  and weighed up the evidence for and against. 
Consequently, the impression formed by the pupil is that the growth of scientific 
knowledge is one of uncontroversial ‘fact-finding’.
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He contends that the undue focus on the end-product results in a too-ready acceptance of 
ideas as literal truths when in the original tentative knowledge claim terms were used 
figuratively as a means of interpretation rather than labelling. Phrases like ‘the orbit of 
the electron’, which originally was a figure of speech, by constant use becomes a label for 
reality. By this means ‘familiarity engenders reality’. The perception of terms like ‘orbit 
of the electron’ as reality reinforces the image of science as discovery.
Sutton recommends that science education discard the well-established practice of 
detaching scientific knowledge from particular individuals in an attempt to achieve a 
spurious ‘objectivity’. By returning the focus to the original idea and its proponent pupils 
can see how the figurative nature of the terms is used to persuade others of the validity of 
the idea. (eg. a scientist’s use of the phrase ‘orbit of the electron’ encourages others to 
adopt the planetary model of the atom).
AI: Is there a particular age group for which the historical approach is most suitable?
CS: (I am trying to answer your question in a week when I am working with able 
ten-year olds and we have just visited Isaac Newton’s birthplace). I think my answer 
is that it is necessary at ALL ages and the earlier you start the better.
Newton is not an easy person to empathise with. His various activities as a child and 
as a man, set in narrative form, or in dramatic re-creation alongside real practical 
work with prisms and imaginative ‘practical work’ with flying stones and space 
rockets can certainly engage children of this age, hut for a full working out of the 
significance of the experience I would want to see them again at age 17.
The reason for my asking this question was that several researchers in science education 
have pointed out that the psychological preparedness of the pupils is an important factor 
in their ability to understand science concepts. Matthews (1994) writes that mature 
scientific thinking requires formal thought processes in the Piagetian scheme of 
sensorimotor, pre-operational, concrete operational and formal operational modes of 
thinking. He cites a survey by Black and Lucas (1993) in which it was estimated that less 
than 20% of 16 year-olds in the UK are in the formal stage of reasoning. This would
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suggest that, in the early stages of science education, the approach be as 
phenomonological and concrete as possible, and for explicit attention to be paid to the 
promotion of formal and abstract reasoning.
In her research. Driver (1996) characterised the reasoning ability of pupils according to 
three categories viz. Phenomenon-based reasoning. Relation-based reasoning and Model- 
based reasoning. In general, phenomenon-based reasoning was characteristic of younger 
pupils, (9-11), who observe phenomena directly and who look upon enquiry as providing 
direct access to knowledge of the world as it is. Pupils who use relation-based reasoning 
distinguish between evidence and explanation and make generalisations either in the form 
of correlations between variables or in the form of cause-and-effect. Her research 
indicated that this was the most prevalent form of reasoning in the 12-16 year-old age 
group. Only a minority of pupils at age 16 used model-based reasoning, which is a 
capacity to express a theoretical conjecture in a different language from that used to 
describe the observations and to evaluate the conjectured model in the light of evidence. 
Driver was unable to determine whether the scarce use of model-based reasoning was a 
result of pupils’ inability to use it or because they were simply unaccustomed to using it.
It was important for my own research to keep in mind the likely reasoning ability of 
pupils at age 14 as they traced the development of (for instance) atomic theory. I was 
interested to read of a call by Leisten (1995) to familiarise primary pupils with the simple 
Daltonian atom and to teach them the basis of the Periodic Table. This seemed to indicate 
that the concepts involved in my research on the historical development of atomic theory 
ought to be within the range of 14 year-olds.
AI: What kind of history of science should teachers aim for? Kuhn exposed the typical 
text book history as a distortion.
CS: I think that’s true. Is it necessary? i.e. can you become a scientist without this 
distorted view of history? I think you can, but I do recognise that some recruitment 
to science is based on the distorted view of history.
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The ‘distorted view of history’ refers to that which reflects a neatly cumulative growth in 
scientific knowledge. It is a Whig version of scientific history (see p66). The omission of 
mistakes and excursions up ‘blind alleys’ leaves an impression of uninterrupted progress, 
imbuing science with an infallibility and authority which sets it apart from other areas of 
human endeavour. The danger then is that science is seen as elitist and that it could attract 
adherents as a result of its (perceived) superior status.
AI: Brush (1974) suggested that it might be inadvisable to use accurate and authentic 
historical accounts.
CS: Yes, you might actually put off some future scientists. Is that a tragedy? Maybe 
not, given the complexity of our current thinking about whether it can really be 
taken for granted that more science is always a good thing.
It was Brush’s view that more candid versions of historical episodes in science might 
damage the prestigious image of science by undermining the foundations on which its 
reputation has been built. Brush (1974) cites the case of Einstein who refused to let 
experimental ‘facts’ shake his belief in the validity of relativity theoiy. Einstein thought;
‘it was quite wrong to found theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality the 
very opposite happens. It is the theory which decides what we can observe’ 
Cpll67).
Brush fears that such revelations might damage the very notion of objectivity on which 
the integrity of science is based. In support of Einstein’s position he doubts that any 
practising scientist would reject a theory simply because it fails to agree with all the 
experimental facts.
AI: Are science teachers justified in using history to suit their own purposes?
CS: Some science teachers are just ‘producing future scientists’ and their
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perspective matters. My own perspective, that we are mainly educating the 
citizenship as a whole, also matters! So, teachers ARE justified in making their own 
decisions as educators, hut especially as professionals charged with coming to some 
judgement about such things (not technicians doing the hid of the government). I 
hope we can persuade more of them to judge that they need the history of ideas!
My motive for asking this question was to seek clarification on the pedagogical goals 
sought by science teachers when teaching the historical aspects of science. Science 
teachers are not historians. Inevitably, choice of historical material will involve some 
selection and simplification according to the age and sophistication of the pupils. 
Matthews (1994) believes that the pedagogical task is:
‘to produce a simplified history that illuminates the subject matter and promotes 
student interest in it, yet is not a caricature of the historical events’ (p80).
He concedes that there is a possibility that science teacher’s presentation of history could 
reflect a biased view of their beliefs about the nature of science. He acknowledges this as 
a potential problem that needs to be addressed.
Driver (1996) acknowledges the advantage of historical case studies over current science, 
in that the scientific knowledge is usually less advanced and therefore more accessible to 
pupils. However, she also points to the disadvantages, as she sees it, in using historical 
case studies. She points to the difficulty of giving due credibility to the theory that 
eventually was discarded because pupils have the benefit of hindsight, making it difficult 
for them to regard the ‘losing’ theory with due respect. Driver recognises that the 
historical development approach may involve the learning of scientific ideas which are no 
longer accepted. Koertge (1969) -  in Hodson (1988) - goes even further and declares that;
‘ we must be prepared to include in the curriculum an intensive and sympathetic 
study of scientific systems that are scientifically unacceptable today. Students 
must become knowledgeable phlogistonists or caloricists or Lamarckians’ (p31).
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AI: Do you think teachers should consider the needs of future non-scientists and future 
scientists as different in regard to the historical approach?
CS: There is a difference, but the needs of general citizenship come first. ALL 
citizens should have a grounding in cultural science - what are the main ideas, how 
and why did they arise, what was the evidence, what were the arguments and what 
have the effects been on subsequent technology and culture?
Future scientists need extra - not indoctrination, hut certainly some direct study of 
the details of the CURRENT understanding in various topics.
This question was suggested by Kuhn’s (1970) distinction between the effects of a 
distorted history of science on pupils who would become non-scientists and those who 
would become scientists. He believed that distorted history would not have a detrimental 
effect on the latter since, ultimately, they would come to understand the nature of science 
by actually doing research. Brush (in Russell, 1981) contends that distortion is harmful to 
non-scientists, given the possible consequences of their being misled by their limited 
education in science. He argues that;
‘misunderstandings of method... are at the root of the excessive respect and the 
excessive hostility which accrue to science simultaneously in our culture’ (p60).
AI: Do you see a role for the philosophy of science in teaching science? Professor 
Wolpert had a low opinion of the philosophers of science.
CS: Yes, but not as the first focus. I see history as more important; history might 
investigate how it is that Professor Wolpert’s view became so important to him.
An aspect of history is to consider what drove people to do what they did, and their 
philosophy of science is a part of that. For example ‘natural theology’ as a motivator 
of scientists from the mid-seventeenth century onwards involves philosophy of 
science.
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Wolpert’s view is that philosophy is irrelevant to the practice of science. During my 
discussion with him he was scathing of the contribution that philosophers had made to 
science -  “The philosophers of science have contributed nothing. They have nothing to 
say”. He writes:
Tt is essential not to mix up the philosopher’s problems in dealing with truth, 
rationality and reality with the success or otherwise of science’ (pi 06).
This is not to say that philosophical issues are not important in the school curriculum, 
bearing in mind that most pupils’ views about science will be formed largely by their 
school experience. I believe that discussion of basic terms like theory, observation and 
evidence is fundamental to an education in science whether or not ‘real science’ is 
concerned with such issues.
AI: Do you see the history of science and the philosophy of science as interdependent in 
science education?
CS: NO
AI: How do you feel about the existence of science and humanities as ‘two cultures’ and 
do you see the history of science as a means of bridging the gap?
CS: Politically / emotionally (and therefore educationally) I think it is important to 
try to create a common culture yet to tolerate diversity within and alongside the 
common understandings. Hence it is important to bring all citizens to an awareness 
of one culture (“Our culture”) and to an acceptance of dissent.
My own feeling is that more could be done in education to enable individuals to ‘feel at 
home’ in both cultures by delaying specialisation. This would reduce the gulf between the 
two cultures. I know that some British schools have adopted the French baccalaureate
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system instead of traditional A levels in an effort to retain an appropriate breadth of 
studies. I sympathise with this approach.
The above discussion is a firm basis from which I can describe my own rationale for the 
role of history of science in science teaching. In particular. Dr. Sutton confirmed my view 
that failure to consider the origins of scientific concepts results in a stunted and 
inadequate understanding of those concepts. What were originally persuasive metaphors 
chosen by pioneering scientists in search of a suitable model become ‘real’ entities to 
pupils through sheer familiarity. Hence, the ‘final form’ teaching approach encourages a 
spurious realism on the part of pupils.
However, I felt that Dr. Sutton underplayed the value of philosophy of science in science 
teaching and rejected any interdependence between history and philosophy of science. In 
my view the history of science provides valuable insights into its philosophy. I begin my 
rationale with a discussion of the link between them.
(vi) The relationship between historv and philosophy of science
Much science teaching up to the present day has focused on ‘what we know’ rather than 
‘how we know’, that is on the ‘context of justification’ rather than ‘the context of 
discovery’. There has been a move away from science teaching as the transmission of a 
body of knowledge justified by the authority of the subject and the teacher toward a 
negotiation between teacher and pupil. In the latter pedagogical approach knowledge is 
constructed. Pupils’ existing conceptions (which may well be misconceptions) are used as 
a starting point from which more scientifically justified explanations can be reached 
through dialogue. Science education now prefers that pupils come to hold their own 
reasoned views on the subject rather than accept passively the views of their teachers 
(Driver, 1996).
At the secondary school level the philosophical questions could be as basic as ‘What 
counts as science? or ‘What counts as evidence for a knowledge claim?’ These sorts of
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questions provide secondary school science teachers with the opportunity of contributing 
to a wider educational goal -  that of inculcating critical thinking and reflective 
scepticism. The fact that the answers to many such questions are not clear-cut and that 
philosophers have disagreed about them ought not to stop pupils considering them and 
forming their own reasoned opinions. Philosophers of science like Popper and Kuhn 
formed their views from historical examples of the growth of scientific knowledge. It 
should be possible, therefore, to use suitable historical episodes to illustrate philosophical 
positions in science for school pupils, making due allowance for their level of maturity 
and the extent of their knowledge and understanding.
According to Project 2061 (AAAS, 1989):
‘generalisations about how the scientific enterprise operates would be empty 
without concrete examples. Consider, for example, the proposition that new ideas 
are limited by the context in which they are conceived; are often rejected by the 
scientific establishment; sometimes spring from unexpected findings; and usually 
grow slowly, through contributions from many different investigators. Without 
historical examples, these generalisations would be no more than slogans, 
however well they might be remembered’ (p ill) .
In regard to the interdependence between history and philosophy Lakatos (in Matthews,
1994) said, recalling Kant’s aphorism:
‘Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science 
without philosophy of science is blind’ (p41).
I think these comments neatly summarise the link between history and philosophy and 
give appropriate emphasis to the latter, notwithstanding Wolpert’s disdain for 
philosophers and Sutton’s belief that the former is more important.
The question then becomes ‘How far can historical examples go in formulating
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philosophical positions?’. This is a ‘chicken and egg’ problem. A philosophical answer to 
the question ‘What counts as science?’ is needed before appropriate historical episodes 
can be identified. Some demarcation criterion like Popper’s falsifiability has to be 
established in order to answer that question. Yet Popper used historical examples to 
decide on this criterion. Likewise Kuhn’s concept of paradigms and the shift from the old 
to the new was formed only after a detailed study of historical cases. Matthews (1994) 
maintains that the relationship between history of science and philosophy of science has 
to be interactive. He contends that:
‘Philosophy is required to begin writing history, but it should be capable of being 
transformed by historical study’ (p42).
(vii) The use of the historv of science to teach the cultural significance of science
Millar (1996) argues that the achievements of science have an intrinsic cultural merit in 
the same way that the products of art and literature are justified on cultural grounds. He 
suggests that science is not just a major cultural achievement but the defining product of 
our culture:
‘It surely would be a strange culture that did not wish to pass on its most 
characteristic thought-system for new generations’ (p i2).
By this argument scientific achievements like the law of universal gravitation, the 
discovery of microbes and the discovery of the role of oxygen in combustion would be 
taught as cultural landmarks quite apart from their usefulness as knowledge or their role 
in the development of theory.
In support of the ‘do less but do it better’ curriculum movement Millar recommends a 
few powerful mental models both for their cultural significance and for underpinning 
understanding of current issues. They are:
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a) The atomic/molecular model of matter
b) Models of the Earth-moon and Earth-sun systems, of the solar system, and of the 
universe
c) The source-radiation-receiver model of interactions at a distance (leading to a ray 
model of light and vision).
d) The field model of interactions at a distance (gravitation, magnetism, electric 
fields)
e) The germ theory of disease
f) The gene model of inheritance
g) Darwin’s theory of evolution of species
h) Models of the evolution of the earth’s surface (rock formation, plate tectonics) 
(pl4).
The full impact of the cultural , significance of these models cannot be conveyed without 
addressing their historical context. For instance the radical nature of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution can be fully appreciated only against the historical context in which the 
religious account of creation was predominant. The currently accepted model of the 
universe has gained prominence only after centuries of intellectual, religious and political 
struggles. All of these models had to compete with rival theories to gain acceptance. 
Pupils cannot appreciate fiilly the achievement made in each case without their being 
aware of the historical perspective.
The cultural significance of science provides a link with the wider culture. Millar (1996) 
points to the danger caused by the fact that science in the twentieth century has become 
increasingly abstruse and technical and therefore difficult to understand. This has tended 
to widen the gulf between science and the rest of our culture, which he regards as 
unhealthy. In my opinion this is where the science writing championed by Carey (1995) 
(in the story-line approach below) has a role to play in making science’s cultural 
achievements accessible and intelligible to the mass of the population.
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fviii) The role of historv of science in teaching science concepts
Gallagher (in Monk and Osborne, 1997) asserts that, where teachers do accept that there is 
place for the history of science in the science curriculum, it is for the purpose of 
‘humanising’ science and for fostering positive attitudes towards science. My experience 
is that these considerations become expendable when weighed against the heavy burden 
of curriculum content required by examination courses, which leaves little time for 
‘optional extras’. The potted biographies and human-interest material found in current 
science textbooks comes firmly into this category. However, there is a powerful case to 
be made for inclusion of historical material as an integral part of science topics in order to 
improve the learning of science concepts.
Monk and Osborne argue that:
‘Courses that emphasise the products of science place an unjustified emphasis on 
the ‘survey of facts’ in the science curriculum which effectively introduces 
children to the ‘topology of the scientific landscape without exploring any of the 
underlying geology that accounts for why the landscape is the way it is... ’(p410).
They recommend a shift in emphasis towards ‘how we know’ rather than ‘what we 
know’. They maintain that the trend toward teaching science as a means of inculcating 
‘content transcendent’ skills gave rise to the popularity of courses emphasising science as 
a process. These courses stressed the methodological component of the subject, typically 
espousing the classical hypothetico-deductive method leading to a singular interpretation 
of the evidence. (If that evidence is not forthcoming the teacher ‘tells the pupils the 
answer’. That is, the scientific explanation is justified by the teacher’s authority.)
This teaching format neglects to consider alternative interpretations of the evidence 
which Monk and Osborne consider an essential step in reinforcing the idea that there 
need not be one unique explanation of a phenomenon. (According to the Quine/Duhem 
thesis (Quine, 1953) there is always more than one theory that can account for the
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evidence). They suggest a teaching scheme comprising six steps:-
a) Presentation of the phenomenon
b) Elicitation of pupils’ ideas
c) Historical input by teacher presentation or pupils’ research
d) Devising experimental tests
e) Teacher presentation of the scientific idea
f) Evaluation and discussion of the evidence (p415)
Monk and Osborne’s point is that the study of scientific ideas in their original context 
will help to develop pupils’ conceptual understanding and they give three reasons for 
their claim.
(a) Historical thinking often parallels their own -  (see section on parallelism 
below)
(b) The now accepted scientific ideas were often strongly opposed for similar 
reasons to those proffered by pupils.
(c) Historical thinking highlights the contrast between thinking then, and now, 
bringing into a sharper focus the nature and achievement of our current 
conceptions (p409)
According to Monk and Osborne it is the interpretation of evidence and the reasons for 
preferring one view to another, including the reasons suggested in the appropriate 
historical context that gives this pedagogical scheme its strength. They contend that the 
conflict between a plurality of interpretations leads to resolution and consensus. More 
than this, a consideration of an historical viewpoint on an equal footing to the pupils’ 
own, counteracts the condescending attitude taken by some pupils towards previous 
scientists -  an attitude which I detected myself during my classroom research as reported 
in Chapter 5. Monk and Osborne believe that pupils will be persuaded that:
‘historical thought cannot be considered ignorant or stupid, for they too have had
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similar ideas’ (p420).
Ultimately, this method focuses on what scientists think now, supported by up-to-date 
evidence and experimental testing. But pupils can also see the creative thinking and the 
transcendence of commonsense thinking that was essential in reaching our present state 
of knowledge.
Mayr (1982), in The growth o f  biological thought, (in Matthews, 1994) supports the 
Monk and Osborne thesis:
I feel that the study of history of a field is the best way of acquiring an 
understanding of its concepts. Only by going over the hard way by which these 
concepts were worked out -  by learning all the earlier wrong assumptions that had 
to be refuted one by one, in other words by learning all past mistakes -  can one 
hope to acquire a really thorough and sound understanding. In science one learns 
not only by one’s own mistakes but also by the history of the mistakes of others 
(p51).
(ixl Establishing an authentic version of the growth of scientific knowledge
At the end of the nineteenth century several important and speculative theories had been 
developed. These included the theories of evolution and natural selection, 
thermodynamics, kinetic-molecular theory, the existence of the atom, and the physics of 
atomic particles. A group of scientists and philosophers centred on Vienna were sceptical 
of the confidence that could be placed in theories that were based on unobservable data. 
Their response was to promote a philosophy of science called positivism that attempted to 
frame logically consistent rules showing how theoretical statements could be derived 
from observational statements. The motivation was to establish confidence in the 
knowledge claims being generated by scientists and to place them on a solid foundation. 
Instead of the unsubstantiated speculation of many knowledge claims the intention was to 
link new knowledge claims to empirical data by strictly rational means. Despite their
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efforts theoretical speculation was continuing unabated (including Einstein’s theory of 
Relativity and Wegener’s theory of continental drift). If anything, theoretical speculation 
was dictating observation rather than the reverse (Duschl in Gabel, 1994) .
Out of the different versions of positivism there developed a means of testing new 
hypotheses. This came to be known as the hypothetico-deductive method and many 
science teachers would recognise it as the classical form of scientific method :-
1. Select a hypothesis
2. Conduct observations
3. Collect data
4. Test hypothesis
5. Reject or accept hypothesis (p445)
The important features of positivism were its rationality and the independence of theory 
from observation. Kuhn’s investigations into the history of science have since called into 
question the rationality of science and it is now generally accepted that observations can 
never be made without making some theoretical pre-suppositions (Hanson, 1958). 
According to Hanson ‘what we see is determined by what we know’. That is, 
observations can never be completely objective. Kuhn’s work revealed that dynamic 
change and alteration of scientific theories were the rule rather than the exception. The 
view of science as an inductively logical process -  a process of moving from empirical 
fact to the development of scientific theory -  was a myth. All this left the philosophy of 
positivism with little credibility.
However, the idea that the growth of scientific knowledge could be governed by a set of 
rules was so tenacious that it continued to effect science education into the 1970s and 
1980s. The combination of this positivist legacy and the ‘child-centred’ approach to 
pedagogy as espoused in the Plowden Report spawned the ‘discovery’ method of learning 
in science education (Edwards and Mercer, 1987). Courses like Nuffield sciences were 
dominant for two decades despite the fact that they were based on a discredited
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philosophy. Not only did the ‘discovery’ method have dubious value in itself (Driver, 
1983) but it also reinforced the notion of the single, ‘fool-proof scientific method. Yet 
the study of the histoiy of science shows that all aspects of science, including its methods, 
are subject to change and development and cannot be fitted into the straitjacket of 
positivism. I believe that historical case studies can help establish a more authentic 
version of scientific epistemology by emphasising the diversity of methods used.
(x) What kind of historv of science should be taught?
The opening sentence of Kuhn’s ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ reads:
‘History if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could 
produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now 
possessed’ (pi)
To the extent that it is an authentic version of events he compares the contemporary mode 
of history employed by science textbook writers to the validity of a tourist brochure as a 
genuine reflection of a nation’s culture. The rational reconstruction of current textbooks 
creates an impression o f ‘development-by-accumulation’. It is common, for instance, to 
find questions like ‘When was oxygen discovered?’ bringing forth an answer consisting 
of a simplified and neatly arranged account. However, the question itself betrays the 
motive of the questioner in seeking to assess the permanent contribution of an older 
science to our present vantage. These naïve historical accounts would likewise label the 
oxygen theory of combustion as ‘scientific’ and consign the earlier phlogiston theory to 
the ‘scrap heap of history’ as a myth.
On closer analysis, historians like Kuhn have found that so-called ‘myths’ like the 
phlogiston theory have been produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same 
sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. In other words they cannot be 
regarded as unscientific merely because they have been overtaken by more satisfactory 
theories. Kuhn felt that a more authentic version of history would be produced by
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sh o w in g  th e h istorical integrity o f  th e sc ie n c e  in its ow n  tim e.
The traditional view of the history of science was that it was a record of the process of 
accumulation of positive knowledge, taking into account errors and confusion along the 
way but identifying them clearly as such. This approach accords with Gillespie’s view 
(Brush, 1974) that science progresses by ‘objectivity’ to separate truth from error. But it 
seems that this objectivity is highly suspect since it is now widely accepted that scientists 
operate in a subjective way and that experimental verification is of secondary importance 
compared to philosophical arguments. Brush foresees dangers if the traditional approach 
is replaced by one that gives;
‘simply the most accurate or authoritative account of the way a discovery was 
made, a theory was developed and accepted or rejected by scientists, and the 
mutual influences of research in different areas of science or of science and other 
kinds of human activity (pi 166)’
He feels that historians must do more than apply objectivity to scientific problems. They 
must consider the philosophical, psychological and sociological aspects of the episode. 
They must be prepared to explain how certain problems came to be regarded as scientific 
and how particular standards happened to be accepted for evaluating solutions to those 
problems. They may also have to account for scientific change in terms other than those 
of linear progress from error to truth. Hitherto unquestioned standards like the personal 
honesty and integrity of scientists might be legitimate targets of historical research. 
Revelations that scientists like Dalton might have ‘cooked’ his data or that Pasteur 
ignored contradictory evidence could lead to a less naive and less reverential view of 
science and scientists. In my view these are appropriate dispositions for pupils to adopt 
and should be welcomed since they contribute to a more mature understanding of the 
nature of science.
Brush’s investigations into scientific behaviour also reveal that the objective standard of 
direct experimental tests of hypotheses is often given less weight than conformity with
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more general or prestigious theories in related fields. According to the evidence available 
to Brush the accurate historical record falls short of the standards implied by historical 
material in textbooks. He fears that more candid versions of history might turn idealistic 
young minds away from science.
‘(The writings of contemporary historians)... do violence to the professional ideal 
and public image of scientists as rational, open-minded investigators, proceeding 
methodically, grounded incontrovertibly in the outcome of controlled 
experiments, and seeking objectively for the truth, let the chips fall where they 
may (p 1164)’
I believe the greater risk is that, if the historical record maintains the pretence of an 
idealised version of science, pupils will experience disillusionment with ‘real science’ 
when it falls below those standards. (In our discussion Dr. Sutton gave his support to this 
claim.)
Brush’s fear is that authentic history could subvert the aim of training scientists in the 
approved methods of research (although Kuhn maintained that pupils who become 
scientists will eventually be inducted into the ‘real-life’ scientific world and can gauge 
the standards for themselves). He does not concern himself with the majority of pupils 
who will not become scientists and for whom formal school science will have a 
proportionately greater influence on their view of the nature of science.
(xi) The problem of the Whig interpretation of historv
The term ‘Whig interpretation of history’ was coined by Butterfield in the 1930s to 
characterise the kind of history written by political historians in which good ‘forward- 
looking’ liberals (Whigs) were continually struggling with bad, ‘backward-looking’ 
conservatives (Tories). The term has been applied to the history of science to describe 
accounts of scientific progress that judges every scientist by the extent of his contribution 
toward the establishment of modem theories. According to Bmsh (1974);
110
‘such an interpretation looks at the past in terms of present ideas and values, 
rather than trying to understand the complete context of problems and 
preconceptions with which the earlier scientist himself had to work (pi 169)’
In a seminar on the History of Physics Education, MIT, 1970, Klein said (in Brush, 
1974):
“History and Science are inherently different kinds of disciplines; bringing them together 
is likely to do violence to one or the other’ pi 166.
Brush (1974) contends that the scientist:
wants to get at the essence of a phenomenon, and to do so he must strip away all 
complicating features or contingencies peculiar to time, place and the personality 
of the observer. Yet for the historian those are the essence of history; if the detail 
of past events were to be eliminated, nothing significant would be left. Again, 
when the science teacher introduces historical materials, he must do so in a very 
selective way, since his real purpose should be to teach modem theories and 
techniques more effectively; he can only take from the past that which seems to 
have significance in the present. The result may be a series of fascinating (and 
often mythical) anecdotes, but it is surely not history as the historian understands 
it (pi 166j.
Bmsh is referring here to the idealised history perpetuated by science textbooks. It was 
Kuhn (1970) who brought to the attention of scientists the distortion of histoiy that was a 
feature of most of the books written for students of science. He said that:
‘ Characteristically, they contain just a bit of history either in an introduction or, 
more often, in scattered reference to the great heroes of an earlier age’ (pi 3 7).
I l l
He felt that this treatment was enough to convince scientists that there was a well- 
established historical tradition in science in which they were participants.
As a result of his studies of the major upheavals in science, for which he coined the term 
‘scientific revolutions’, Kuhn discovered that scientists re-write the history of the subject 
after each revolution from what seems a secure contemporary position. The prevailing 
philosophy, influenced considerably by the logical positivists, was that scientific theoiy 
could be justified on the basis of evidence that was independent of historical context. 
Kuhn writes:
‘Partly by selection and partly by distortion, the scientists of earlier ages are 
implicitly represented as having worked on the same set of fixed problems and in 
accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in 
scientific theory and method has made seem scientific’ (p 138).
The result is that an accurate historical record is sacrificed for a logical development of 
knowledge. In some respects this tendency to ‘clean up’ the historical record seems 
harmless enough since the main aim of the textbooks has been to initiate the student into 
the methods and theory of science. By this means the ‘training in science’ aim for those 
pupils destined to become scientists, is satisfactorily achieved. But this practice ‘short- 
circuits’ the history of the struggle for dominance of currently accepted theories and the 
human dramas that were played out. Consequently, it fails to convey the cultural 
achievement that those theories represent. This rational reconstruction may well serve the 
purposes o f‘real science’ by ensuring a supply of suitable recruits but it also denies 
pupils valuable insights into the philosophy of science. My thesis is that all pupils, 
regardless of their future role in society, need to consider these aspects of the history of 
science if they are to appreciate fully the part played by science in their culture.
I am not suggesting that teachers abandon the ‘logic of the discipline’ and adopt a purely 
historical approach. This would be too time-consuming. My preferred approach would be 
to integrate the logical approach with the historical aspects at least in a few selected case
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studies. It would serve no great purpose to teach everything about the historical context of 
the development of theoiy and forget about the logical development of the subject.
The weakness of the Whig approach was summarised by the historian, D.S.L. Cardwell 
(in Brush, 1974) who wrote:
If the history of science is to be used as an educational discipline, to inculcate an 
enlightened and critical mind, then the Whig view cannot do this. For it 
emphasises the continuities, the smooth and successive developments from one 
great achievement to the next and so on, and in doing so it must automatically 
endow the present state of science with all the immense authority of history 
(pi 171).
The consequence of this idealised notion of the growth of scientific knowledge is that the 
pupils leave school with an unwarranted view of the authority of scientific knowledge. 
The result is that science is given more than its fair share of the credit for material 
progress but takes a correspondingly disproportionate share of the blame when things go 
wrong.
(xii) Support for the Whig interpretation -  dealing with the knowledge explosion
Harding and Vining (1997) have argued that the ‘cleaned-up’ versions of science 
contained in educational textbooks are a logical response to the ever-increasing new 
knowledge which has to be coped with. They reject the fashionable emphasis on 
scientific methods and problem-solving skills rather than scientific knowledge itself. The 
rationale for such an approach is that, since old knowledge is being replaced by new at 
such a rapid rate, existing knowledge is transient so that process skills are paramount. 
Using the expanding field of biology as their example they do not accept that new 
theories replace old ones in a revolutionary fashion. They deny that the subject has gone 
through a series of revolutions in which older paradigms have been overtaken by new 
ones. Instead they argue that there has been an opening up of knowledge, as equipment
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and techniques have allowed scientists to study organisms in new ways. Focusing on 
biology, they contend that the term ‘revolution’ refers to a knowledge explosion in terms 
of a rapid increase of available information rather than the complete overthrow of ideas.
According to Harding and Vining(l 997) scientists handle new knowledge by integrating 
new discoveries and theories into the existing fabric of knowledge in a way that 
condenses and clarifies fundamental concepts, and leaves out the unimportant details. 
This process enhances the value of scientific knowledge so that basic theories and 
concepts last for a long time. Once a subject has been fairly well established within the 
scientific community, it is not the fundamental principles that change over time, but 
scientists’ sense of which supporting examples and evidence are crucial for understanding 
the fundamental principles. Later, when much more evidence has accumulated, and as the 
principles become better accepted within the scientific community, it no longer seems 
necessary to support all statements with evidence. Understanding can be derived better if 
details of the local situation are omitted. Theory is based on the existence of the 
phenomenon, not on the local experimental data (Nickles, 1990). Once experimental data 
show that the phenomenon exists, it is logical to forget the methods and results because it 
is easier to see the relationship between concepts by ignoring all the distracting details 
(Nickles, 1989). Nickles contends that scientists clarify a theory for others by describing 
it in such a way that the phenomenon stands out and the experimental methods disappear. 
This process is called ‘cleaning up’ the data for presentation. As part of the process, 
scientists write scientific papers giving a logical explanation rather than a historical 
account of their activities.
Medawar’s (1963) view is that this practice o f ‘rational reconstruction’ is a pernicious 
activity, aimed at concealing the historically accurate version of events, reflecting an 
idealised version of scientific method. Nickles’s interpretation of this practice is more 
generous - to the extent that it seems almost benign. According to the latter version the 
scientific apprentice is initiated into the business of science in the quickest and most 
efficient way and his/her understanding of the nature of science will be assured in due 
course by actually doing research as part of a scientific career. The problem for the future
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non-scientists is that they need, not only a basic grounding in scientific concepts, but also 
an appreciation of the nature of science, since they are unlikely to gain such an 
understanding after they leave school. By short-circuiting the ‘zig-zag course’ of the 
growth of scientific knowledge the textbook writers ensure that the majority of pupils 
assimilate the idealised version of the nature of science which is portrayed in the 
textbooks. It is not difficult to see how, in later life, this gap in their understanding could 
leave people ill-equipped to deal with the problems of conflicting expertise, priority 
disputes and sheer incompleteness of knowledge which are features of many modern-day 
scientific issues. How, for instance, does the average citizen reconcile the certainty and 
authority conveyed by school science with the contradictory opinions o f ‘experts’ 
regarding the potential risks of genetically modified foods?
Unexpurgated accounts of the development of scientific theories in all areas of the school 
curriculum would be impractical. ‘Cleaned-up’ versions of historical episodes are, to 
some extent, unavoidable. I recommend a compromise position be reached. In my 
opinion there needs to be a greater acknowledgement of the deficient image of the nature 
of science that historically abridged versions of science make inevitable and a deliberate 
effort made to restore an appropriate historical perspective in a few selected cases.
fxiii) The use of the historical record to counteract dogmatism
Griffith and Benson (1994) contend that positivism has had a major impact on how 
scientists see the world. The philosophy of positivism presented science as a completely 
rational endeavour, where the ideal being pursued is a finite, static universe consisting of 
heirarchically arranged scientific facts, with the resulting truth claims becoming absolute. 
As a consequence science is understood to move inexorably closer to the truth. The 
results of science could therefore be taken to be certain (Griftrth and Benson, 1994). So 
one of the outcomes of logical positivism is that it presents scientific thought as dogma. 
According to Wade (in Griffith and Benson, 1994):
logical positivism ‘deliberately ignores the historical context of science as well as
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the psychological factors which many people would consider important in 
science, such as intuition, imagination, and receptivity to new ideas’.
The process of inductive logic has been shown by Popper (amongst others) to be flawed 
and this weakened the whole positivist philosophy (Popper, 1963). Likewise, the claim to 
rationality has been brought into question by the views of scientific historians like Kuhn 
(1970). It was Kuhn’s investigations into the history and sociology of science in The 
Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions that exploded the myth of rationality by exposing the 
degree to which the collective psychology of the scientific community was responsible 
for the acceptance or rejection of theory. Kuhn pointed to the disparity between the logic 
of scientific research and its practice. In particular, he rejected the idea of the classical 
scientific method as the only guarantee of truth or credibility.
According to his version of events the lifetime of a theory is limited by the extent to 
which it can account for known phenomena. Sooner or later, an anomaly is found which 
the best efforts of the community of scientists are unable to explain. If the problem 
persists then, ultimately, the existing theory will be superseded by another theory that 
does provide an explanation for the anomaly. The point is that the adoption of the new 
theory owes as much to the ability of an individual scientist to adopt a fresh mental 
approach and to persuade the rest of the community of scientists of its superiority as it 
does to the theory’s internal logic. The new theory prevails only for as long as it can 
account for new phenomena. The process, therefore, is never-ending and destroys the 
modern myth of science as ‘the department of everlasting truths’ (Terhart, 1988).
Griffith and Benson (1994) make a case for a dialectical process in understanding the 
world. They contend that positivism has not only focused science too narrowly but has 
also caused a general misunderstanding of the nature of thinking. They say that too often 
in the past has truth been synonymous with the directly observed. Too often has a theory 
been labelled as eternally true; and too often have people been led to believe that 
solutions to problems have final and conclusive answers. For Griffith and Benson the 
development of thought is expressed in a dialectic of process, an historical dialectic
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which incorporates the ideas of the past into the process of thought in the present to 
produce a synthesis. They use the example of the Ptolemaic view of the universe as the 
thesis, the Copernican view as the antithesis and the resulting new understanding, 
incorporating aspects of each (even though the Copernican view was the more 
acceptable), as the synthesis. Instead of a clear-cut winner there is a synthesis of the past 
and present. In effect Griffith and Benson are arguing for human thought and 
understanding being dependent on past ideas and therefore our current understanding of 
the past being influenced by theories which have been overtaken by time.
According to Griffith and Benson the dialectic process allows people to know about the 
process of thinking, as opposed to knowing a specific idea or a thought from a particular 
time. They can know that they think about ideas in terms of an ongoing process. But they 
cannot express these ideas in terms of absolutes. Their thinking can never result in 
dogma. The process is a way of knowing in which a person must know why one has 
come to know and how the past and the present interact in understanding. As such, this 
knowledge is neither static nor localised; instead it is dynamic and contextualised in both 
the past and present. At no time can there be a complete explanation, nor can there be a 
beginning or an end to the process which they call the dialectic method. At best there will 
be an understanding. The latest attempt to provide understanding will be just that. It will 
always be the culmination of all the previous attempts at understanding and will follow 
necessarily from those attempts.
All of these post-positivist philosophies of science highlight the inadequacy of teaching 
‘final form’ science or science as a ‘rhetoric of conclusions’. At best the pupil gets a 
‘snap shot’ of what scientists think now but gets no idea of why they think as they do. The 
danger is that the pupil is left with the impression that no alternative theories have even 
been considered let alone been judged against the received explanation, thereby 
conveying a false epistemology of science and reinforcing its image of infallibility. The 
value of the historical perspective was summarised eloquently by Ernst Mach (in Brush, 
1974) when he wrote;
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‘They that know the entire course of the development of science, will, as a matter 
of course, judge more freely and more correctly of the significance of any present 
scientific movement than they, who, limited in their views to the age in which 
their own lives have been spent, contemplate merely the momentary trend that the 
course of intellectual events takes at the present moment’ (pi 165).
Pupils can be made aware that choices had to be made and that there was no pre­
determined inevitability about the course of events. This rationale for the use of the 
history of science is at odds with the determinist view of Professor Wolpert who asserted 
that different historical conditions would have led to the same scientific outcomes. He 
writes (Wolpert, 1993):
‘... the course of science would have been different but the ideas would have 
ended up the same (p 121 ).
According to Terhart (1988) the historical dimension allows science teachers to break the 
‘power’ of the successful traditions in science and to broaden the view so that the 
historical alternatives (which are suppressed by the successful traditions) and the actual 
ones are visible again. In doing so science teaching gains a critical capacity, which is 
absent from the Whig version of history.
fxiv) The importance of the historical perspective for the future non-scientist
By the time pupils in the UK mature to full citizenship they will all be called upon to take 
their place in a democratic society which will include the right to take part in decision­
making on matters relating to science. This would appear to leave the non-scientists 
dependent on scientists since they will have limited resources to make direct judgements 
of science knowledge claims. Munby (in Norris, 1995) argued that one of the goals of 
science education was to inculcate ‘intellectual independence’. By this he meant that:
“the individual has all the resources necessary forjudging a knowledge claim
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independently of other people” (p210).
Norris argues that where the knowledge claim involved substantive science content non­
scientists would be unable to make a direct judgement. Their sole recourse would be to 
defer to experts in the field, which then entails that they make judgements on the relative 
merits of those experts. (This also applies to experts in any particular field of science 
since they need to rely on the expertise of other scientists when making judgements in 
areas unrelated to their own.) The concept of intellectual independence for non-scientists 
seems, therefore, like an unrealisable aim.
If intellectual independence seems unattainable Norris (1997) asks:
‘What is the nature and extent of the critical assessment that non-scientists can 
make of scientific knowledge claims and of their application? To what extent can 
science education promote such critical assessment?’ (p252)
He maintains that even if intellectual independence is not possible, a less ambitious but 
valuable alternative is attainable -  that o f ‘epistemic distance’. By this he refers to a 
cognitive distance between hearing a claim to scientific knowledge and believing that the 
claim is warranted; zero distance implies believing what is heard; infinite distance 
implies believing nothing. An appropriate position would be somewhere between these 
unacceptable extremes.
Norris (1997) contends that there are a range of views on science which non-scientists 
might hold that could constitute an appropriate epistemic distance:
For instance, that not all of it can be believed; that there is always significant 
debate in science; that no scientific statement is completely clear in its meaning; 
that scientific knowledge usually involves approximation and compromise; and 
that scientific theories are built upon idealisations of real phenomena. Creating 
distance also involves adopting a variety of beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions not
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covered by intellectual independence. It is more akin to critical thinking. The 
dispositions might include being circumspect about science and approaching it 
with reflective scepticism. These dispositions belong in the category of 
metascience (p253).
In addition to these qualities the non-scientists must know how to make judgements of 
credibility, and how to exercise their circumspect and sceptical dispositions. To do this 
they need to know the criteria forjudging experts and how to apply them: the role and 
weight of consensus; the role and weight of prestige in the scientific community; the role 
and weight of publication and successfiil competition for research grants; and so on. As 
part of learning to live with science, pupils would need practice in judging the credibility 
of scientific experts. Norris thinks that this practice should be based on real-world 
problems that currently affect their lives.
Collins (in Driver, 1996) also contend that the nature of science can being taught using 
contemporary scientific issues alone without any need for a historical perspective. The 
rationale for this view is that it avoids the ‘cultural determinism’ of current knowledge by 
looking at ‘facts and ideas’ while they are being formed, before they have become ‘set’ as 
part of anyone’s natural (scientific) world. He argues for the contemporaneous study of 
contemporary scientific developments as the sole means of tracing the development of 
science without the benefit of hindsight and before ‘the dust has settled’. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that teachers cannot plan their approach to the issue and 
cannot guarantee that appropriate aspects of the nature of science will emerge from such 
a study. From my experience investigating science ‘as it happens’ would be a difficult 
enterprise to manage.
Millar, also, believes that preparing young people to hold an informed view on the many 
different social issues that are currently the subject of debate is unrealistic (Millar, 1996). 
He asks:
120
“ what level of understanding is necessary if we are not to trivialise the issues?”
( p l l ) .
Millar recommends that, in regard to current issues:
‘curriculum priority needs to be given to fundamental understanding on which the 
more detailed knowledge needed to grasp particular issues can be built, if and 
when it is needed’ (pll).
This seems like sound advice since it is not possible to predict what issues will arise 
during the pupils’ lifetime. Who, for instance, could have predicted a generation ago that 
BSE or cloning or genetically modified foods would have become such publicly 
contested issues? There is, therefore, a problem in finding modern-day examples of 
scientific issues in the public arena which bring out the desired concepts about the nature 
of science yet whose science content can be readily understood at secondary school level.
The scientifically literate citizen is not expected to maintain a detailed knowledge of the 
subject but will be called upon to evaluate the work of scientists and therefore needs a 
‘feel’ for what science can and cannot accomplish (Conant, 1957). It follows from this 
argument that, for the benefit of the many pupils who do not become scientists, the 
history of science cases chosen should be balanced, taking into account the appropriate 
historical context and not distorted to justify our presently held views. This was the 
philosophy behind the Harvard Case Studies in Experimental Science which were 
published under the general editorship of Conant in the 1950s. The great advantage of 
studying an episode fi'om the history of science (when the state of knowledge was 
relatively undeveloped) is that the concepts involved are likely to be within the compass 
of the student. A knowledge of the way in which the episode unfolds provides an insight 
into the workings of modem science where the student’s state of knowledge is probably 
insufficient to cope with contemporary work in the field.
In commenting on Norris (1995), Grandy (1995) asserts that to achieve epistemic
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distance learners must be provided with opportunities to understand scientific methods, 
with many of their complexities and uncertainties and the fallibility of data. He says that 
teachers must;
‘balance in pupils’ minds the power and value of science with the historical errors 
and mistaken assumptions’ (p221).
It is my contention that suitable historical case studies have the advantage over current 
real-world problems in that the scientific concepts involved are usually easier to grasp 
and the historical perspective allows teachers to make the most of the issues with the 
benefit of hindsight.
Unfortunately, the 1989 version of the National Curriculum (DESAVelsh Office) is 
disappointingly pessimistic about the ability of most pupils to achieve many of the 
understandings associated with the Nature of Science. It provides a diagram to show the 
progression pupils could make through reflection on secondary source materials (as 
opposed to first-hand practical experience in a laboratory) in Attainment Target 17 (F5 - 
see fig. 3.a).
With reference to stories about science in the past the 1989 version of the National 
Curriculum states that:
‘Pupils on level 4 may retain little except the ability to give an account of some 
colourful incident or discovery in the story. By the time they reach level 6 they 
should be able to pick out the successful prediction which helped to establish the 
new theory. It is quite possible that the other progressive features -  social and 
other effects, cultural influence and scientific controversy (levels 7, 8 and 10) 
could be extracted fi'om the same resource material by those ready to understand 
them ’ (F5) (my italics).
This guidance clearly indicates that the range of views constituting ‘epistemic distance’
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like ‘uncertainty of evidence’ and ‘significant debate’ are thought to be achievable by 
pupils at the highest levels of attainment only. Even accounts of change in theory (like 
the overthrow of the phlogiston theory) are deemed to be within the understanding of 
those pupils at level 7 minimum, which signifies high attainment at Key Stage 3. Yet 
many future non-scientists will not achieve these levels of attainment at Key Stage 3 or 4, 
suggesting that they can never establish an appropriate ‘epistemic distance’.
The gradation of understandings thought to be attainable by pupils’ reflection on 
secondary source materials is reproduced in Fig. 3.a below.
Fig. 3.a -  Progression through secondary source materials in Attainment target 17
Progression in Attainment target 17
LEVEL 4 An account of a scientific advance
LEVEL 7
LEV&L7 Account of change in theory
Evidence and imaginative thought
LEVELS Cultural and 
Historical
Alternative theories 
Past or Present
Uncertainty of 
Evidence
LEVEL 9
LEVEL 10
LEVEL 10
One of the aims of my research is to show that the average pupil studying science at Key
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Stage 3 can acquire the dispositions thought to be desirable for the future non-scientist. 
fxv) The value of the storv-line approach
Martin and Brouwer (1991) claim that one of the goals of pedagogy is to draw the content 
of the lesson into the life-world of the student and to accomplish this, context must be 
provided. Attempts have been made to provide context using a story-line approach. The 
Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science (Conant, 1957) were written for non­
science majors:
‘to assist them in recapturing the experience of those who once participated in 
exciting events in scientific history’ (pix).
The aim was to bring out the methods of science but in doing so it was inevitable that 
some knowledge of the personal circumstances and character of the main actors should be 
conveyed. The fact that, by common consent, the course was considered to be a ‘glorious 
failure’ (Stinner, 1995) reflects the sympathy which teachers have with this approach but 
also the ambitious nature of the project in organising a science course wholly on the basis 
of historical case studies.
Arons (in Stinner, 1995) recommends the use of more modest versions of Conant’s case 
histories. These smaller case histories outline in detail the historical settings of important 
discoveries and events using the story-line method as the best way to attract pupils’ 
attention. He feels that they could be infused into introductory science courses without 
seriously affecting the amount of science being covered. Stinner (1995) has evolved 
some guidelines for writing science stories which match closely the design of the case 
studies I used for my own research. His guidelines are set out below:
1. Map out a context with one unifying central idea that is deemed important in 
science and is likely to capture the imagination of the student.
2. Provide the student with experiences that can be related to his/her everyday world 
as well as being simply and effectively explained by scientists’ science but at a
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level that makes sense to the pupil.
3. Invent a story-line that will dramatise and highlight the main idea. Identify an 
important event associated with a person and find binary opposites, or conflicting 
characters or events which may be appropriate to include in the stoiy
4. Ensure that the major ideas, concepts and problems of the topic are generated by 
the context naturally; that it will include those that the student will leam 
piecemeal in a conventional textbook approach.
5. Secure the path from romance to precision to generalisation. This is best 
accomplished by showing the pupil that;
(a) Problem situations come out of the context and are intrinsically 
interesting.
(b) Concepts are diversely connected, within the setting of the story as well 
as with present-day science and technology.
(c) There is room for individual extension and generalisation of ideas, 
problems and conclusions (p562).
The guidelines above were useful in deciding on the narrative aspects of my own case 
studies, which are easily adaptable to this format. Each of the story-lines I use is 
reproduced in my research chapters.
The use of narrative reinforces the idea that scientific activity is an activity of human 
beings. There is a widespread belief amongst pupils that the Book of Nature is there to be 
read and it is just a matter of time and technology before all the truth will be uncovered. 
As a result many pupils fundamentally misconceive the origin of scientific knowledge. 
They fail to appreciate that it is the product of human imagination. Science textbooks 
reinforce this misconception (Sutton, 1996). They contain bald statements like ‘Atoms 
contain protons, neutrons and electrons’ which gives no clue as to the philosophical 
origin of the word ‘atom’ and leaves pupils with the impression that ‘atoms’ were 
discovered.
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The presentation of these ‘facts’ in school becomes misleading because there is a change 
in the generality of statements as time goes by. The early writings of scientists like 
Priestley include accounts of something done at a particular time and place where a 
known person did a certain thing. Later they get replaced by statements that aspire to a 
universal validity and are no longer about specific times, places or people. As a result 
they get cut off from human action so that the statements become dull and alienating for 
some pupils (Sutton, 1996). Consider the statement ‘Air is a mixture of gases, the main 
constituents being oxygen and nitrogen’. In one sentence a wealth of human ingenuity 
and endeavour is reduced to factual information.
Sutton argues that most new scientific ideas go through a stage when they are to some 
extent ‘on trial’, tentative, even contentious. They are regarded at this stage as ‘claims’ 
and are not to be simply accepted. If they stand up to testing within the scientific 
community they gain a wider acceptance and become part o f ‘public knowledge’. They 
are then retrospectively described as ‘discoveries’. In the ‘final form’ transmission of 
scientific knowledge the tentative stage is neglected and the idea is offered as an 
uncontroversial ‘finding’. One of the aims of the historical perspective is to bring out the 
human voice behind some major scientific ideas and to describe the argumentative 
struggles involved in their acceptance. The myth of objectivity implied by phrases like ‘It 
has been found that. . . ’ is rejected in favour of the authentic subjectivity of the original 
context. Consider the following extract from a report made by Joseph Priestley (Carey,
1995) of his investigation of ‘ dephlogisticated air’ (since re-named ‘oxygen’):
My reader will not wonder, that, after having ascertained the superior goodness of 
dephlogisticated air by mice living in it, and the other tests above mentioned, I 
should have the curiosity to taste it myself I have gratified that curiosity, by 
breathing it, drawing it through a glass syphon, and, by this means, I reduced a 
large jar full of it to the standard of common air. The feeling of it to my lungs was 
not sensibly different from that of common air; but I fancied that my breast felt 
peculiarly light and easy for some time afterwards .Who can tell but that, in time.
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this pure air may become a fashionable article in luxury. Hitherto only two mice 
and myself have had the privilege of breathing it (p43).
This original report makes no claim to objectivity. It speaks to the reader person to person 
and the observations are reported using everyday language. The author indulges in flights 
of fancy without inhibition and ends with a note of humour. Compare this report with the 
school textbook account given by Goddard and Hutton (1950) of Lavoisier’s experiment 
in which he demonstrated the equivalence of the gas used up when mercury is heated 
with the gas produced when mercuric oxide is decomposed;
Lavoisier heated 4oz.mercury in a retort, connected with air in a bell jar over 
mercury; the total volume of air in the apparatus was 50 cubic inches. Red specks 
of mercuric oxide were formed in the retort, until after 12 days no more appeared; 
the volume of the air was found to have decreased to 42 cubic inches.
Then the mercuric oxide was removed and heated by itself; it gave off 8 cubic 
inches of a gas which was found to be oxygen.
This shows clearly that the same amount of oxygen is given off on decomposing 
mercuric oxide as was taken from the air by the mercury when it burned (p20). 
(The account is accompanied by a diagram of the apparatus used.)
This version is a precis of the original account in Chapter HI of Lavoisier’s Elements of 
Chemistry (reproduced in Case 2 - The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory, Conant, 
1957). Lavoisier’s original version is a detailed and compelling description of the 
procedure given in the first person in which he refers to ‘an eminently respirable air’ but 
makes no mention o f ‘oxygen’. The school textbook version is written mainly in the 
passive form, uses the term ‘oxygen’ anachronistically and succeeds in reducing the 
passage to a dull and lifeless piece of text.
Bruner (in Stinner, 1995) finds a clear distinction between this narrative mode of teaching 
and the traditional logioscientific or paradigmatic mode. He says that:
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“a good story and a well-formed argument are different natural kinds” (p563).
According to Bruner these two modes of thought allow people to order experience and 
construct reality. He identifies the paradigmatic mode with science and relates it to the 
notion of explanation and arguments of the deductive kind. He identifies the narrative 
mode with the humanities and relates it to lifelikeness and the question of how experience 
is endowed with meaning. He says that the two modes are complementary but irreducible 
to one another. However, Olson (in Stinner, 1998) believes that the demarcation between 
the human and natural sciences is based on their object of study and not on their 
epistemologies. My sympathy is with the latter point of view and I believe that science 
teaching has something to learn from humanities pedagogy in regard to the use of 
narrative.
(xvi) The advisability of setting modest goals for teaching the history of science
To a practising science teacher like myself the ambitious nature of the goals set by 
teaching programmes like the Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science ( Conant, 
1957) is immediately apparent. Quotes like; ‘the study of a (historical) case may be to 
some degree the equivalent of... transporting an uninformed layman to the scene of a 
revolutionary advance in science’ (pix) point to an idealism which could be difficult to 
apply in a classroom situation. The rational for this approach was to convey to students 
majoring in humanities a ‘feel’ for the ‘tactics and strategies of science’ in order that they 
could take part in discussions with scientists outlining a plan for a future investigation.
Projects like this are also ambitious in the sense that the whole course is designed to be 
delivered using a historical perspective. They are one-dimensional in character and ignore 
the fact that not all pupils respond to the same pedagogical approach. Matthews (1998) 
and Monk and Osborne (1997) recommend striving for modest goals in regard to the 
historical aspects of science. Matthews feels that philosophy of science is ‘nor far below 
the surface in a science classroom’ in the sense of questions like ‘What do you mean 
by...? and ‘How do you know..?, which then involves critical and reflective thinking.
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Many of these philosophical questions are thrown up in a historical context and teachers 
should be in a position to deal with them not by supplying the teacher’s right answer but 
by encouraging and informing debate:
It is preferable for students genuinely to struggle to grasp the simple questions 
than just repeat popular nostrums, or their teacher’s prejudices, about the complex 
questions (p i69)
He recommends that things should be kept simple, concrete and focused. Questions like 
‘Is knowledge of the world truly possible?’ require sophisticated thinking. If these 
questions are to be addressed without cheapening and devaluing intellectual activity 
pupils need to be well informed about particular aspects of the history and philosophy of 
science. It may be that an interest in the questions and some appreciation of the 
complexity are as much as can be realistically conveyed to most pupils given the 
demands of the syllabus and of other subjects.
Acknowledging that the fate of most attempts to radically alter the science curriculum is 
failure. Monk and Osborne recommend the gradualist route and a focus on teachers’ 
foremost concerns which are content coverage and conceptual understanding. They 
suggest that advocates for the role of history and philosophy must use small changes in 
emphasis within curricula as a Trojan Horse to convince others of the benefits of those 
changes, ultimately leading to broader aims.
(xvii) The importance of considering the psychological development of the pupil
The parallel between the development of concepts within the individual’s own learning of 
science and the historical development of those concepts has been noted so often that it is 
now almost a cliché. The hypothesis is often stated as ‘ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny’. Several investigators have pointed to the glibness of this statement 
(Nersessian, 1989) but many researchers like Wandersee in Monk and Osborne (1997) do 
concede that children’s thinking is similar to pre-paradigmatic thinking. Hence pupils:
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‘ . often harbour misconceptions which were similar to views held at one time or 
another during historical development of that scientific concept -  thus making the 
history of science a useful heuristic device for anticipating some students’ 
conceptual difficulties’ (p413).
Aristotelian physics has features that correspond more closely to pupils’ ideas arising 
from commonsense than modern scientific theories, often arising from abstract 
mathematical reasoning, which can seem unnatural (Wolpert, 1993).
Monk and Osborne (1997) believe that pupils’ confidence will be increased when they 
realise that their own thinking is similar to that of previous scientists. This realisation will 
enhance the status of their own views and encourage them to compare their thinking with 
the modern ideas. This stimulates pupil motivation and produces a more effective grasp 
of the received scientific explanation. Also, an understanding of this genetic 
epistemology can help teachers anticipate pupils’ conceptual difficulties through 
familiarity with the conceptual difficulties experienced by earlier scientists. Bar and Zinn 
(1998) noted that some early scientists developed concepts using research methodologies 
based on technological materials with a low level of sophistication or on a reduced or 
different theoretical background compared with present. (Sequiera and Leite, 1991). 
Pupils’ alternative conceptions may be due to similar limitations.
Having established good reasons for teaching pupils selected cases from the history of 
science I now turn to the major resource available to teachers -  the science textbook. My 
e-mail correspondence with Dr. Sutton, together with my reading of his book, Words, 
Science and Learning (1992) impressed upon me the importance of language and 
imagery in the epistemology of science. Throughout the history of science, as new 
concepts have been developed, scientists have searched for the words through which they 
could describe suitable models. Textbooks, in recording those new concepts, have 
therefore had a central role to play in conveying the nature of science. My aim in Chapter
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4 is to estimate the effectiveness of modern secondary school textbooks in accomplishing 
this task with particular reference to their historical content.
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CHAPTER 4 A survey of the historical aspects of science in school textbooks
(i) Introduction
In the first two chapters I outlined the argument that both school children and 
scientifically literate citizens need to understand the nature of science as well as science 
as a body of knowledge, and that the history of science has a role to play in that 
understanding. Science textbooks have been central to the maintenance of a scientific 
tradition even if there is some question as to its authenticity. Before the 1980s the 
historical content of school science textbooks often consisted of a haphazard scattering of 
anecdotal (and often apocryphal) accounts of discovery or potted biographies of famous 
scientists. Whether any given topic was developed historically was a matter of tradition 
rather than design. Some pioneering curriculum developments in the 1980s used 
historical themes as a preferred pedagogical approach but were marketed as 
supplementary to conventional science courses. The introduction of the National 
Curriculum in 1988 seemed finally to endorse the history of science as a key element of 
the curriculum. 1 will make the case in this chapter that the National Curriculum has 
provided a conceptual framework that needs to be supported by suitable historical 
material in science textbooks and by including these aspects of science in summative 
assessments. Whilst there are healthy signs that there is a more constructive and 
purposeful use of the historical aspects of science in school textbooks, the overall view is 
fragmented rather than cohesive.
(ii) The traditional approach to writing science textbooks
As long ago as 1962, Thomas Kuhn expressed dissatisfaction with the presentation of 
science in textbooks -  still an important teaching aid. He complained that textbook 
authors systematically smoothed out the historical record by a combination of distortion 
and omission to give the appearance of an inevitable progression towards currently held 
understandings of science as if to suggest that any other interpretation had no legitimacy 
or value. The occasional revolution in scientific thinking was accompanied by a
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subsequent rewriting of the textbooks to disguise the previous ‘mistakes’.
From the Kuhnian perspective, not only are textbooks misleading, they foster an 
impression of the infallibility of science (Kuhn, 1970). Textbook science is an irrefutable 
and unchanging body of knowledge that serves the purposes of the ‘normal scientist’ well 
since it gives him all the necessary tools with which he can solve his scientific ‘puzzles’. 
However, no encouragement is give to the non-conformist who might view the position 
from a different angle and develop a novel theory at odds with the prevailing paradigm. 
Amongst non-scientists this ‘final form’ science can lead to excessive respect for, as well 
as some hostility to, science as a body of knowledge (Jenkins, 1990). It leads to a 
perception of science as dogma and of scientists as people in the privileged position of 
having all the right answers (Terhart, 1988). The case for change has been given added 
weight by a postmodernist view that questions the objectivity of science and 
acknowledges the social, cultural and political context in which scientific knowledge has 
been developed (Matthews, 1994).
Despite Kuhn’s concern, the ‘final form’ tradition has persisted. Only rarely has there 
been any treatment of historical material which emphasises the fallibility and 
‘humanness’ of scientific progress or which gives due weight to wide-spread beliefs 
which, in the event, simply turn out to be wide of the mark. Little attention has been paid 
to theories that are found to lead up ‘blind alleys’ even if they are essential forerunners of 
accepted knowledge. Where historical material is included, the patronising tone of the 
school texts often leads to a condescending attitude on behalf of pupils towards scientists 
of a different era, rather than an appreciation of the challenges and struggle for progress 
within a specific historical context (eg. the hackneyed account of Archimedes’ discoveiy 
of his principle).
(iii) The influence of positivism on school textbooks
A typical representation of the scientific method as it was understood in the 1950s and 
1960s appears in^4 School Chemistry fo r  Today, (Goddard and Hutton) first published in
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1950 and reprinted annually over the next decade. It is a textbook 1 used myself at the age 
of 14:
Summary of Scientific Method
1. Get the facts
2. Explain the facts
3. Predict other facts and test the predictions (Goddard and Hutton’s italic)
4. Modify the explanation
5. Continue experimenting.
Goddard and Hutton’s belief in the power and general applicability of their scientific 
method is encapsulated in a section entitled ‘Scientific Method in Everyday Life’:
‘It must not be thought that the scientific method can only be applied to problems 
in the laboratory. We can apply it equally well in everyday life, and indeed the 
world problems of today urgently call out for such application.
Very many questions are argued about, often with great heat, when they could be 
settled definitely by a simple experiment (“Try it and see!”). In other cases, 
enough facts are already known for the problem to be solved, but the people 
concerned remain obstinately unaware of them, and prefer to let the matter be 
decided by unreasoning prejudice and emotion.
The tremendous discoveries of the past 180 years have been due to the application 
of the scientific method to scientific matters. Surely, it is likely that equally 
startling and valuable results will follow its use in other fields as well’ (pp21-22).
Evidently, Goddard and Hutton believe the achievements in science in recent history have 
been a matter o f ‘discovery’ using a ‘fool-proof method and that scientists have merely 
to continue applying it to make further ‘discoveries’. This amounts to a travesty of the 
historical record in which no such definitive method can be identified (Kuhn, 1970).
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(iv) The neglect o f ‘personal science’ in school science textbooks
In Chapter 2 1 described Holton’s (1988) distinction between ‘personal science’ (SI) and 
‘public science’ (S2). My classroom research, as reported in Chapter 5, shows that 
integrating these two aspects of science enhances pupil motivation and aids 
understanding of concepts. One of the aims of this phase of my research is to assess to 
what degree 81 is being used in science textbooks to present a more authentic version of 
the nature of science. If it is the case that textbook authors simply respond to the demands 
of teachers and the curriculum then it ought to be possible to detect some change in 
emphasis from 82 to 81 since the introduction of the National Curriculum. That is, 
according to the requirements of Attainment Target 17 (as explained in Chapter 2), there 
ought to be material relating to;
‘case studies... focused on the life and work of famous scientists and/or the 
development of an important idea in science’
(v) The situation preceding the National Curriculum
There have been occasional attempts to use the historical development of a theory as a 
central theme in teaching some school science topics before the National Curriculum. 
From my own teaching experience I recall teaching about oxygen and its discovery using 
the Nuffield Chemistry Sample Scheme (8tages I and II: The Basic Course) in which the 
combined work of Priestley and Lavoisier in isolating oxygen can be reproduced in the 
laboratory (The Nuffield Foundation, 1966). The re-enactment of scientific discovery did 
motivate pupils but, by relegating the necessary material to a background reading book, 
the Nuffield course ‘ducked’ the opportunity to use the historical perspective to show 
how theories change (The Nuffield Foundation, 1967).
This material included a description of the long forgotten ‘phlogiston theory’ which 
proposed that every substance consists of two parts -  the calx (or ash) and phlogiston -  
and that when something burned the phlogiston escaped and the calx was left behind. In
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1772 Lavoisier’s experiments showed that when substances bum they actually gain 
weight by combining with the oxygen in the air so the phlogiston theory lost credibility. 
However, its importance lies in providing an explanation that could be tested even 
though, ultimately, it was found wanting. The merits of the competing theories and the 
story of how Lavoisier’s ideas prevailed is clearly explained in the Nuffield Chemistry 
Background Book, Burning but this, too, is merely supplementary material. The inference 
is that the struggle between competing theories is an interesting side issue to which 
reference can be made if time allows but that its inclusion on its own merits is not 
justified. Nevertheless, this is a rare example of a discredited theory being treated with 
respect.
In the middle 1980s the SATIS (Science and Technology in Society) units gained 
popularity. Again they were supplementary, designed to be used in conjunction with 
conventional science courses. In some of these units there was an essential historical 
development as well as a central figure. ‘The Story of Fritz Haber’ relates the 
circumstances of his invention of the Haber Process for making ammonia (ASE, 1986). 
Far from treating the subject in the ‘scientist as hero’ mould the unit is completely frank 
about the destructive uses to which his invention was applied, including warfare. His role 
in the use of chlorine in the First World War and in the development of mustard gas are 
also given full prominence. His futile attempt to extract gold from the sea to finance 
Germany’s war reparations is a clear description of failure. The suicide of his wife 
through her associated guilt about his part in the war demonstrates the private problems 
behind the professional scientist.
Another SATIS unit describes William Perkin’s preparation of the first synthetic dye, 
‘mauve’, while searching for a method of synthesising quinine (ASE, 1986). As he was 
heating a mixture of aniline sulphate and potassium dichromate he obtained, to his 
surprise, a black precipitate. Many people would have thrown the black mess away. 
Instead, he added alcohol to get a beautiful purple coloured material that he found could 
be used as a dye. The story shows not only that luck is a factor in scientific progress but 
that the ability to react positively to an unexpected set of circumstances is an asset to any
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scientist. The moral is brought out that ‘Chance favours the prepared mind’. These 
examples demonstrate admirably the human, social, cultural, political and technological 
aspects of scientific advance but none are used as a central curriculum theme. According 
to my survey, the use of an historical perspective is never more than an interesting 
sideshow.
(vi) The effect of current methods of assessment
I have already made the point that the nature of science suffers from the overwhelming 
disadvantage that it does not lend itself readily to rigorous assessment. When work began 
on devising a National Curriculum in science in the late 1980s it was clear from the 
outset that those aspects of science which could offer a clear gradation in levels of 
attainment would take priority. However, more recent research acknowledges the 
importance of scientific skills and understandings that are less easily defined (Millar and 
Osborne, 1998).
In Chapter 2 1 analysed what is a typical GCSE Science examination paper. I found that 
there were no questions on the paper that test pupils’ ability ‘to read and assimilate 
scientific and technical information and assess its significance’ (see p28). In my 
experience, science teachers rarely address this aspect of science. If they were to do so 
they would find little supporting material in science textbooks since the content of the 
textbooks largely reflects the currently examined aspects of the curriculum.
(vii) The effect of the National Curriculum
The ‘nature of science’ is difficult to assess but it was included as attainment target 17 of 
the National Curriculum (DESAVelsh Office, 1989). There have been several up-dated 
versions of the original National Curriculum since its first publication in 1989.1 refer to 
the original because it includes examples of cases that are omitted from subsequent 
editions. The extent of these italicised examples (more than for any other attainment 
target) perhaps reflected the curriculum panel’s recognition that science teachers lacked
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familiarity with this aspect of the curriculum. It did at least provide a basis from which 
textbook authors could develop suitable material.
The original levels of attainment (1989) were relatively detailed and precise reflecting the 
importance of accuracy of assessment. To gain level 4;
‘pupils should be able to give an account of some scientific advance, for 
example, in the context of medicine, agriculture, industry or engineering, 
describing the new ideas and investigation or invention and the life and times of 
principal scientists involved’.
Part of attainment level 6 required that:
‘pupils should be able to describe and explain one incident from the history of 
science where successfiil predictions were made to establish a new model, for 
example. The work of scientists on:
• Air-bome organisms (Pasteur)
• The evidence for atmospheric pressure (Pascal)
Level 7 was even more prescriptive:
Pupils should be able to give an historical account of a change in accepted theory 
or explanation, and demonstrate an understanding of its effects on people’s -  
physically, socially, spiritually and morally, for example, understanding the 
ecological balance and the greater concern for our environment; the observations 
of the motion of Jupiter’s moons and Galileo’s dispute with the church.
Pupils should be able to demonstrate an appreciation of differing functions of 
scientific evidence and imaginative thought in carrying forward scientific 
understanding, for example, discovery of the structure of DNA -  the different 
approach of Franklin from that of Watson and Crick.
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Despite this apparent endorsement of the history of science in the UK curriculum, Bybee 
was still able to say in 1991 that:
While educators agree that understanding issues in the history and nature of 
science and technology is critical to development of scientifically literate citizens, 
little, if any, instructional material is available for teacher use in this area. In the 
classroom, a laboratory or hands-on approach is often used to represent the nature 
of science and vignettes of scientists to represent the history of science. Nowhere 
is the student likely to encounter a cohesive view of the ways in which the 
intellectual development of the sciences and the resolution of problems by 
technology shaped history and were, in turn, shaped by it. No conceptual 
framework that describes teaching and learning strategies that would more 
accurately reflect key themes in the history and nature of science and technology 
is available to guide improvements (Bybee, 1991)
In the UK the National Curriculum for England and Wales does, however, on the 
face of it, provide the ‘conceptual fi’amework’ which Bybee is seeking. The relevant 
part of the Programme of Study in the 1988 National Curriculum in science (at Key 
Stage 3) states that:
Through their own investigations and the use of text, film, other secondary 
sources, and case studies, for example, focused on the life and work of famous 
scientists and/or the development of an important idea in science, pupils should be 
given the opportunity to:
• Study the ideas and theories used in other times to explain natural phenomena.
• Relate such ideas and theories with their own emerging technological 
understanding and knowledge.
• Compare such ideas and theories with their own emerging understanding and 
relate them to available evidence.
In principle this is admirable but unless it is supported by suitable resources both in 
science department work schemes and in science textbooks then it cannot be put into
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action.
In 1992 the outlook was bleak. When Solomon embarked on action research in the 
classroom using some aspects of the history of science to see if it improved pupils’ 
understanding of the nature of science she reported that:
‘The requirement to teach history of science found the British school system 
largely unprepared’ (p410).
Has there been any improvement since that scathing assessment was made? To what 
extent have the textbooks been successful in keeping pace with the demands of the NC in 
regard to the history of science ‘in so far as it helps to develop an understanding of the 
nature of science’? (- quote from the non-statutory guidance accompanying the 1989 
version of the National Curriculum).
My research shows that there has been some response to this requirement but not enough 
to make a general conclusion that textbooks now adequately reflect a more enlightened 
approach. The following assessment is not intended as a detailed survey of textbooks 
across the whole field of science teaching. It is my impression of the usefulness of 
historical material contained in some popular course textbooks published between the 
years 1985 and 1998, but all claiming to be National Curriculum editions. I have focused 
on Key Stage 3 mainly because there is a narrower range of popular course textbooks 
than for the profusion of courses at Key Stage 4. Also, if it is accepted that the historical 
aspects of science have a powerful motivating influence on pupils then I believe that that 
influence should be discernible in the textbooks they use at an early stage of their 
secondary school careers.
(viii) The historical content of current science textbooks
The five textbooks I chose to analyse for their historical content were chosen from those 
generally available to me as a practising science teacher in the science department of a
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mixed comprehensive school in an outer London borough during the five-year period 
between 1994 and 1999.1 have analysed each of the five textbooks for historical material. 
It seems to me that the historical material falls into three main categories:
1. Biographical narratives, usually bearing on the part played by the scientists in 
bringing about scientific advances, but fi'equently containing the ‘human interest’ 
material.
2. Accounts of discovery.
3. Accounts of changes in scientific ideas and the circumstances surrounding those 
changes.
My analysis is based on the following five series of publications:
1. The Suffolk Co-ordinated Science GCSE Introductory Book which has two 
versions -  one pre-dating the National Curriculum and another described as the 
National Curriculum edition in which there are ‘... important historical examples 
cited’.
2. The Starting Science series spans the introduction of the National Curriculum. 
Starting Science One and Two were first published in 1985 and 1986 respectively. 
Starting Science Three was first published in 1992 when it could reasonably be 
expected to contain material specifically related to Key Stage 3, especially since it 
was up-dated to include a chapter on Astronomy. The topics contain differentiated 
material and most of the historical material is rated ‘for the enthusiast’ - which 
means it is in the most difficult category.
3. Active Science 1, 2, and 3 were published in 1988,1989 and 1991 so that at least 
the last of these could be expected to be influenced by the NC.
4. Most of the Modular Science Key Stage 3 series were published in 1991. Each 
unit has two levels -  Book 1 aimed at levels 3 to 5 and Book 2 aimed at levels 5
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to 7. According to the cover every book integrates ‘the nature of science’ but it 
would seem reasonable to expect that the higher level books would contain more 
material demonstrating how scientific ideas change since that is a requirement of 
the higher attainment levels of the National Curriculum (see Fig 3.a).
5. The Letts Key Stage 3 Science Classbook was published in 1998. The book was 
written specifically to provide complete coverage in a single volume of the 
science National Curriculum at Key Stage 3. The focus of the book is on concise 
explanations and clear examples of the key information which students are 
required to learn.
I have used all five publications as class texts but I had little influence on the choice of 
these books as department texts and I know that the extent of their historical content was 
not one of the criteria for selection. The choice of textbooks depended mainly on how 
closely they matched examinable Key Stage 3 curriculum content. I know from my links 
with other school science departments, from visits to teachers’ centres and contact with 
teachers at science inset courses, that the books I surveyed were widely used by many 
other science teachers. I am confident that they are typical of the school science textbooks 
available for the 11-14 age group.
1. Biographical narratives and ‘human interest’ material
In the school textbooks I inspected there is a scattering of information about the life and 
times of famous scientists and, on the face of it, this would seem the least problematic 
category. Many practising scientists were set on the road to scientific careers by reading 
about the exploits of scientists like Humphrey Davy or Charles Darwin. Some textbooks 
have a wealth of interesting details, which enrich and enliven the text. For instance, it 
comes as a welcome relief from the grind of heavy thinking to be informed that 
Rutherford whistled ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’ in his laboratory when things were 
going well and ‘Fight the Good Fight’ when things got tough. It brings a wry smile to the 
face to read that Lavoisier was dispatched to the guillotine with the words ‘France has no
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n eed  o f  m en  o f  s c ie n c e ’.
A more serious aspect of this seemingly harmless practise of peppering the ‘hard’ science 
text with personal anecdotes emerges when one considers the negative image of scientists 
which is often portrayed in popular culture -  that of the intellectually arrogant and 
irresponsible social misfit. I contend that school science textbooks need to counteract that 
image with a more accurate and attractive picture. It seems to be playing into the hands of 
the creators of popular culture to include biographical material like the following (Gott, 
Price, and Thornley, 1991):
‘Albert Einstein was a strange mixture. He was a pacifist who helped develop the 
atomic bomb, a Jew who did not believe in God and a politician who turned down 
the offer of the presidency of Israel’ (pi 43).
Such comments, together with the obligatory snap-shot of an old man with an unruly mop 
of hair and generally uncared-for appearance reinforce the perception that science is for 
eccentric geniuses. In my opinion science education ought to counteract this popular 
myth by stressing that, apart from their professional capacity, there is nothing that 
distinguishes scientists from the rest of the population.
2. Accounts of scientific discoveries
The classic cases of scientific discovery are well known. Galvani and the frog’s leg, 
Fleming and ftingal growth and Becquerel’s photographic film are presented collectively 
(Fraser, and Gilchrist, 1985) to reinforce the idea that careful observation, especially of 
the unexpected, has had enormous significance for the growth of science knowledge. A 
more novel and pedagogically valuable exercise concerns Pasteur’s discovery of the 
mechanism by which bacteria make foods decay (Partridge, 1992). Events leading up to 
Pasteur’s classic experiment on air-bome bacteria are described followed by a re­
enactment of the experiment using simple modem laboratory apparatus. (Pasteur used a 
swan-necked flask containing broth free from bacteria to provide evidence for his
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hypothesis that it was not the air itself which made foods decay but microbes in the air, 
possibly carried by dust particles.) Pupils are asked to speculate on the likely outcome of 
the experiment and are asked questions which lead to the same sort of logical processes 
which Pasteur might have used. The advantage of this treatment is that pupils are not 
merely asked to admire the intellectual achievement of eminent scientists but get a 
genuine ‘feel’ for the problems they faced and can compare earlier scientists’ ideas with 
their own. I found no other examples at this level where pupils were able to empathise so 
directly with their scientific predecessors. It approaches most nearly the kind of material 
recommended by Miller and Osborne (1998) above.
Pasteur’s discoveries are covered extensively. Medical science, including the work of 
Lister and Jenner, is given full credit for successfully combating diseases by discovering 
the ways in which bacteria and viruses operate and by determining the means by which 
the human body’s immune system fights back. The refreshingly new twist is that there is 
also a candid admission that, so far, science has completely failed to find a cure for AIDS 
(Dobson, 1991). This sort of frankness helps to destroy the myth of infallibility and 
omniscience which has been the cause of so much hostility to the subject from some 
pupils.
The account of the discovery of the structure of DNA in Modular Science is refreshingly 
honest about the rivalry between teams of workers in their search for solutions to 
scientific puzzles. The understandable human ambition to be first with the answer and get 
the credit for the discovery is set against the benefits of publicising advances in 
knowledge in scientific journals like Nature. The news of the success of Crick and 
Watson in working out the structure is presented in the form of a newspaper article 
(Garrick, 1991). Although the ‘mock’ article is not an authentically original source its 
inclusion in the text does at least indicate that the author appreciates the need for source 
material.
The names of Crick and Watson are forever linked to the discovery of DNA despite the 
vital contribution made by Rosalind Franklin with her X-ray diffraction technique. The
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scientific principles on which each of the teams based their methods are not described 
despite the suggestion in level 7 that their approaches be compared. The case highlights 
the problem of finding examples which bring out the desired concept about the nature of 
science but whose science content can be readily understood at this level. It supports my 
contention that earlier historical cases are more likely to be within the range of secondary 
school pupils at Key Stage 3.
3. The history of the development of scientific theories
The third category of historical material has much greater bearing on how pupils 
understand the nature of science than the first two. Given the traditional method of 
approach of science textbooks in the past, active consideration of the ways in which 
scientific theories change is largely foreign territory. There were some attempts to 
address this neglected aspect of the subject.
Astronomy lends itself well to the theme of change in scientific theories. Ancient ideas on 
the shape of the earth and its position in the solar system are used to explain the nature of 
a hypothesis. The advances made in astronomy from the sixteenth century to Newton 
show clearly how scientists build on the ideas of their predecessors. Galileo’s use of the 
newly invented telescope demonstrates the dependence of scientific advance on 
technology although his dispute with the Church, which the National Curriculum cites as 
an important example of the way in which scientific advance has sometimes clashed with 
accepted ‘wisdom’ is not covered. In general, this episode was given a wide berth, which 
is not surprising since it now appears to be an example of the distortion and over 
simplification that Kuhn complained about. An alternative version suggests that the story 
was more complicated and centred, not on the Copemican system, but on the right of a 
scientist to teach and defend his scientific beliefs (Poole, 1990).
In a discussion of the theories of Newton and Einstein about the universe there is an 
intriguing reference to the relationship between science and commonsense. Whole 
textbooks have been written on this and it is not straightforward (eg. The Common Sense
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o f Science, Bronowski, 1951). Science often flies in the face of common sense. There is 
no everyday experience that suggests, for example, that tides are caused by gravitational 
attraction. Yet Newton’s laws are described as ‘simple, commonsense laws’. The text 
goes on to say ‘Einstein showed this was not possible’. By implication, therefore, 
Einstein’s ideas go beyond commonsense whereas Newton’s do not -  an interesting 
distinction. The apparently contrasting nature of scientific thinking and commonsense is 
also asserted by Wolpert in our discussion. He declares that ‘science does not fit with 
commonsense’. In his book (1993) he writes;
‘both the ideas that science generates and the way in which science is carried out 
are entirely counter-intuitive and against commonsense’ (p i)
and again:
‘if something fits in with commonsense it almost certainly isn’t science’ (pH ).
Wolpert makes clear, both in his writings and his interview, that scientific ideas cannot be 
acquired by simple inspection of phenomena and that they are outside everyday 
experience. I agree with this point of view but I also believe that pupils will still have 
their own ideas about phenomena whether or not Wolpert regards them as having any 
value. Popper thinks that in reasoning about the causes of phenomena people ‘jump to 
conclusions’, whatever the weight of available evidence. This seems to suggest that 
pupils will have preconceptions even if these are misconceptions. I believe that these 
ideas are a valuable starting point fi’om which teachers can argue a more ‘scientific case’. 
However, in our discussion, speaking of the relationship between school pupils and 
science Wolpert has said:
‘... their opinions are of no interest whatsoever ... they have nothing to contribute 
towards it -  zero.’
In my opinion this view is too extreme and too simplistic. The point is that
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‘commonsense’ knowledge is neither as reliable nor as objective as scientific knowledge 
because it is often based on misconceptions but that the reasoning people apply in science 
is the same as that used in their everyday thinking (Irwin, 1993).
I believe the danger here is that, in stressing that the feats of deduction used in science are 
of a different order to those used by ordinary mortals, science textbooks (and Professor 
Wolpert) simply convince pupils that they can never be scientists.
In an apparently mundane summary of Sir Isaac Newton’s contributions to astronomy 
and how his concept of gravity led him to an explanation for the movement of planets in 
ellipses round the sun there is an inset quotation from the scientist which makes a 
fundamental point of which Popper would have approved (Coles, Gott and Thornley, 
1989):
‘If I have seen further than other men it is because I have stood on the shoulders 
of giants’ (p 104).
Here is a basic tenet of the philosophy of science (i.e. that even Isaac Newton had to start 
with the theories of his predecessors) contained in a subtext and apparently included as a 
‘human interest’ item. In my view only the historical perspective can demonstrate this 
principle. For example, in my classroom research I focus on the development of theories 
of combustion to show pupils that, although the key to the problem of burning was 
ultimately provided by Lavoisier, his work was made possible only by the earlier work of 
Priestley. Similarly, I stress the dependence of Dalton’s Atomic theoiy on earlier work by 
Greek natural philosophers as well as the work of Boyle and Newton. I believe that an 
inset paragraph in a course textbook containing Newton’s quote fails to do justice to this 
principle.
The Modular Science text covers the formation of the Periodic Table using the theme of 
classification of the elements (Ramsden, 1990). The account begins with Newland’s work 
in sorting the elements on the basis of their relative atomic masses and comparing his
147
pattern to the notes in a musical octave. Initially, the theory was received with derision by 
the mass of the scientific community but ultimately proved to be a vital step on the way 
to present-day classification. The point is made that even seemingly far-fetched theories 
deserve respect and consideration and that established theories often owe their existence 
to an individual’s courage in venturing a barely credible idea. This is a useful lesson for 
pupils to remember, especially in group work, when they are tempted to reject too easily 
the ideas of others or lack the self-confidence to voice their own hypotheses.
The work of Mendeleev in building on Newland’s ideas is given full prominence. While 
following up Newland’s work Mendeleev realised that his theory was fundamentally 
correct but that any errors or gaps in the pattern were the result of missing elements not 
yet discovered. The value of the historical treatment is not just that it brings out the way 
in which theories are revised and improved to fit existing facts -  (the theory was in fact 
changed again to take account of Moseley’s discovery that the most fundamental 
characteristic of an element is its atomic number) -  but that the best theories make 
powerful predictions about things yet to be discovered. In a classic example, Mendeleev 
made some daringly detailed predictions about a missing element which he called eka- 
silicon. When it was discovered in 1886 it was to have almost exactly the properties he 
predicted.
This is a classic example of the kind of scientific theory that Popper advocated in his 
book. Conjectures and Refutations (1972). He maintained that non-scientific or pseudo­
scientific theories, using astrology, Marxism and Freud’s psychology as examples, 
always managed to incorporate new facts into their systems by interpreting each new case 
as a confirming instance of the theory and that any predictions they made were so vague 
as to be irrefiitable. Truly scientific theories, he contended, invited falsification by 
deliberately making risky predictions. In my opinion the history of the Periodic Table 
provides an opportunity of distinguishing between theories that can be classified as 
science and those that fall outside the boundaries of science. The theories of astrology, in 
which many pupils are interested, provide a useful contrast.
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Later philosophers of science, most notably Feyerabend, contested the assumption that 
there is a universal scientific method to which all forms of knowledge should conform 
(Feyerabend, 1979). In Feyerabend’s image of a free society science should not be given 
preference over other forms of knowledge. This point of view is given some support by 
the postmodernist perspective in which alternative traditions are valued (Matthews, 
1994). The influence of such views can be detected in a less arrogant and more tentative 
assertion of theories like those concerning the origins of the universe. The ‘big bang’ 
theory is humbly prefaced with the statement that ‘it is one view of the universe’, 
reflecting a less dogmatic approach by modem scientists and a sense that, whilst this 
model is advocated as the most plausible description of the events, there is no automatic 
dismissal of alternative views be they scientific or religious.
It has been suggested that science textbook writers make greater use of contemporary 
material to circumvent the distortion of the record which disguises the true nature of 
events (Medawar, 1968). But Medawar pointed out that even contemporary research 
papers often conceal the ideas which initiated their research in order to give the 
impression that their findings arose solely from a disinterested inspection of the facts 
(Coles, Gott, Thornley, 1988). This casts doubt on the usefulness of such material in 
providing school pupils with an insight into the methods of science. Suitable papers are 
therefore difficult to find. The only genuine example of a contemporary document 
described the social conditions arising from the woefully inadequate water supply in 
Leeds during the Industrial Revolution (Coles, Gott and Thornley, 1988). As a substitute 
for genuine documents authors were reduced to fabricating their own newspaper stories 
of the times as in the report of the discovery of DNA. This scarcity of source material 
contrasts markedly with that in a typical history textbook (Shephard et al, 1992). 
Opportunities for ‘assessing the significance’ of such material are, consequently, severely 
limited. There are, however, several references to the role played by contemporary 
scientific journals as a means of publicising work and linking scientists together at a time 
when travel was more difficult.
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(ix) The extreme ^final form^ approach
I analysed the historical content of the Letts Key Stage 3 Science Classbook three years 
after my work on the other series of textbooks. It is reasonable to assume that the author 
of this text would, by then, be thoroughly familiar with the demands of teachers and 
pupils in the teaching and learning of Key Stage 3 of the National Curriculum. It covers 
all the content of the National Curriculum in one volume and states that:
‘it is designed to help you prepare for the tests at the end of Key Stage 3’ (pi).
In 114 units presented as double page spreads the historical content is much less than the 
other series of textbooks. For instance, there are three consecutive double page spreads 
devoted to Atomic theory. Inside the atom and The Periodic Table. The sole historical 
reference appears in a caption below a diagram of a simplified version of the inside of an 
atom viz.
‘Electrons were discovered in the early 20th century. The protons and neutrons in
the atom’s nucleus were discovered later’ (p92).
Compared to the earlier textbooks this is the most extreme ‘final form’ text. There is no 
attempt to ‘humanise’ units with biographical material either as inset text or integrated 
within the body of the text. There are no accounts of discovery even in topics where these 
would be most expected like the Periodic Table or in the treatment of diseases. The five 
double page spreads on astronomy entitled ‘The Sun and other stars’, ‘The Solar system’, 
‘Gravitational forces’, ‘Days and seasons’, and ‘Satellites’ make no mention of theories 
of the universe and how these have changed. Here again the constricting role of the 
assessment tests is in evidence. Unexamined aspects of science at Key Stage 3 have no 
place in this textbook.
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(x) Discussion
There exists already a vast amount of published information on the life and times of the 
principal scientists involved in scientific advances together with well documented 
accounts of scientific discoveries. Until 1994 there were encouraging signs that the use of 
historical material to shed light on the nature of science was increasing. The National 
Curriculum has made it mandatory for improvements to be made and has offered 
examples of cases although there is some question as to the suitability of those cases. 
There are clear attempts being made to present science as the product of human 
endeavour with all that entails in terms of luck, inspiration, mistakes and sheer 
determination (Holton’s SI). The motivating value of these accounts is generally 
accepted although the image presented of scientists in seemingly harmless biographical 
details is often unappealing. The history of science contains many examples of great 
intellectual achievements. The presentation of these achievements needs to be made in 
such a way that their significance is conveyed and yet pupils are left with the impression 
that science is an enterprise in which they can participate -  not one which leaves them 
feeling alienated or overawed.
The nub of the problem lies in providing a view of the intellectual development of the 
sciences. At the centre of scientific endeavour is the need to explain and from this arises 
the competition between rival theories. This is the central issue that characterises the 
nature of science rather than accounts of discovery or biographical narrative. The 
traditional ‘final form’ presentation of science is a denial of the essential nature of 
science in that it actually conceals the process by which prevailing theories came to be 
accepted. A ‘cohesive view’ of the nature of science can only be possible when that 
approach to scientific textbook writing is rejected and a concerted effort is made to 
explain how scientists came to their current state of knowledge.
The predominantly ahistorical approach adopted in the 1998 textbook, the Letts Key 
Stages Science Classbook, reveals a disparity between the de jure requirements of the 
National Curriculum and the de facto assessment in SATs and at GCSE. It seems that the 
author has designed the book in the knowledge that SATs test exclusively science content
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and, since teachers ‘teach to the SATs’, there is little demand for ‘extraneous’ material 
that would occupy valuable lesson time. The lack of historical perspective in this 
textbook points towards a ‘final form’ treatment even more extreme than that used in 
textbooks before the National Curriculum was introduced.
Although the analysis presented here is based on a relatively small sample of textbooks I 
have looked at textbooks on offer fi*om publishers and in other school science 
departments. None of these provided historical material that varied greatly fi'om my 
sample, either in character or extent. As noted earlier, the conclusions I present are based, 
therefore, on a fairly representative sample.
I contend that there needs to be a more consistent use of historical development of 
theories as a central theme and à movement away from the ‘interesting sideshow’ status 
that such themes still currently have. Since this aspect of science education is in its 
infancy it is not surprising that science teachers are ‘scratching at the surface’ of the 
subject and that textbook writers have found little to use which clearly demonstrates how 
science works and at the same time can claim historical accuracy. There is an obvious 
need for intensive research to remedy that situation. Only when a sufficiently large bank 
of cases is available will it be possible to construct that ‘cohesive view’. This leads me to 
my own attempts at developing case studies with my own pupils that might help fill the 
resource gap revealed by my research into textbooks. The following classroom research is 
given added urgency by the recommendations contained in the report. Beyond 2000 
(Millar and Osborne (1998), which argues for a substantial increase in the role of history 
of science in school science.
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CHAPTER 5 The classroom research
Introduction
My research into the use of historical material in secondary school science textbooks 
clearly indicates a reluctance to use the historical approach as a central theme. What little 
classroom research that has already been carried out using a historical perspective 
testifies to the scarcity of ready-made resources. Thus Solomon et al (1992) found it 
necessary to prepare materials in the preliminary phase of their investigation for use in 
their later action research into ‘Teaching about the Nature of Science through History’. 
They found that ‘almost nothing was available commercially’ (p411).
The evidence so far from textbooks and from previous researchers in the field suggests, 
therefore, that there is scope for further classroom research into the effectiveness of key 
episodes in the history of science in bringing about desired understandings of the nature 
of science. The treatment of such episodes would include ‘warts and all’ descriptions of 
the science that took place. In the traditional science curriculum, references to 
disagreement, conflict or doubt have been rare even though they have played an essential 
role in scientific progress. I do not see that it serves the pupils well to present a cleaned- 
up version of events which points to a nobler and more idealised field of endeavour than 
actually exists despite Brush’s (1974) misgivings.
I describe my research as ‘action research’ because its form follows closely the 
definitions of action research in the literature -  for example, Kemmis (1983) in Hopkins 
(1987):
‘Action research is trying out an idea in practice with a view to improving or 
changing something, trying to have a real effect on the situation’ (p33).
In my case I recognised what I considered to be a weakness in the National Curriculum 
for science at Key Stage 3 in that the ‘final form’ treatment of content gave pupils a false
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impression of the nature of science. I felt that the ‘snap-shot’ of modern-day science 
presented to pupils in the National Curriculum denied them access to the epistemology of 
science resulting in a distorted view of the way in which scientific progress is made. 
According to Kemmis (1983) in Hopkins (1987), only the practitioner can study praxis 
because nobody else has access to the commitments and practical theories which inform 
praxis. He describes the process in these terms:
The action researcher will embark on a course of action strategically (deliberately 
experimenting with practice while aiming simultaneously for improvement in the 
practice, understanding of the practice and the situation in which the practice 
occurs); monitor the action, the circumstances under which it occurs and its 
consequences; and then retrospectively reconstruct an interpretation of the action 
in context as a basis for future action. Knowledge achieved in this way informs 
and refines both specific planning in relation to the practice being considered and 
the practitioner’s general practical theory (p56).
The course of action I embarked on was to adopt a historical theme for the teaching of 
two units in chemistry. I designed the action to bring out explicitly some important 
philosophical issues relating to the Nature of Science. My design was guided by Solomon 
(1992 and 1995). She acknowledged the need for a ‘preliminary diagnostic study’ as an 
essential part of action research (Solomon, 1992) which, in my case, took the form of a 
pilot study. As the following case study will show, this uncovered a number of 
misconceptions held by pupils, such as their identification of current theory with the 
‘truth’ and their high degree of realism and determinism, together with a patronising 
attitude towards past scientists. The strength of this kind of research is that the diagnosis 
made possible by the pilot study allows the researcher to address the issues raised by 
modifying the action before embarking on the next unit of research. This meant designing 
the second research unit with the expressed aim of setting the appropriate historical 
contexts, focusing on real people and their intellectual achievements, as well as 
acknowledging their mistakes and character defects.
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The pilot study took place in May, 1996 and the extended research project on Atomic 
theory and the Periodic Table was carried out in February, 1997. In the pilot study I used 
classroom observations of teacher-pupil and pupil-pupil interaction, written responses to 
questions, homework and a questionnaire to probe the views of pupils on issues related to 
the nature of science.
A) Theories of burning: a case study using a historical perspective
(i) Background to this phase of the research
In my conversation with Professor Wolpert, in Chapter 2 ,1 argued against the teaching of 
science as an irrefutable and unchanging body of knowledge. Perhaps because of the 
success he had experienced in molecular biology I felt that he regarded scientific 
knowledge with an unwarranted degree of certainty. If this image o f ‘real’ science is 
reflected in school science it can leave pupils with the impression of science as dogma 
and of scientists as people with all the right answers. I believe there is a danger that, if 
pupils accept that science is an unassailable body of truths, they will be discouraged from 
questioning its legitimacy or challenging its propositions, thereby inhibiting further 
progress.
In Chapter 2 1 made the case for scientific literacy as an essential aspect of the education 
of all pupils - a major component of which is an understanding of the nature of science. 
My own classroom experience has led me to believe that pupils often misunderstand the 
nature of science as it relates to the origins of scientific theories. It seemed to me that the 
National Curriculum in science and its predecessors have placed undue emphasis on 
justifying the validity of current theories and demonstrating their usefulness, to the 
relative neglect of the circumstances from which they emerged and the scientists who 
pioneered the work. As a science teacher it disturbed me that pupils could give a 
reasonable account of the Atomic Theory or the role of oxygen in burning and could 
apply those theories effectively but were ignorant of the inspirational science through 
which these fundamental ideas became predominant. I felt that the authoritarian
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presentation of science at secondary school gave pupils the impression of an 
epistemology from which they assumed that scientific advance has been unerringly 
certain and inevitable. This chapter is a description of the classroom research I undertook 
to investigate how a historical perspective, including the origins and development of 
theory, could provide pupils with a more authentic version of the nature of scientific 
progress.
The Programme of Study for Key Stage 3 (11-14 year olds) in Science in the National 
Curriculum (DFE and Welsh Office, 1995) in the UK acknowledges the importance of 
‘The nature of scientific ideas’. The Programme of Study states that ‘Pupils should be 
given opportunities to:
a) consider the importance of evidence and creative thought in the development of 
scientific theories;
b) consider how scientific knowledge and understanding needs to be supported by 
empirical evidence;
c) relate social and historical contexts to scientific ideas by studying how at least one 
scientific idea has changed overtime.’
However, unlike the original 1989 version, it does not include specific examples of 
historical episodes. As part of Attainment target 3: Materials and their properties, the 
Programme of Study requires that pupils ‘should become aware of the role of oxygen in 
combustion’ but there is no requirement that pupils should understand how the oxygen 
theoiy was determined and no mention of its forerunner, the phlogiston theoiy.
(iil The overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory
I chose the overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory by the Oxygen Theory as an example of 
the respectability that mistaken theories can attain and the tenacity with which they can 
survive all attempts to discredit them. The value of the phlogiston episode to the pupils’ 
conception of the nature of science is that it testifies to the fallibility of science as well as
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to the often revolutionary nature of theory change. An added advantage is that the 
sociological and psychological aspects of the historical drama reveal the human face of 
science.
It seems to me that the revolutionary change in ideas on chemistry which took place at 
the end of the eighteenth century offered many of the characteristics of the contexts in 
which great advances in science occur. These included:
1. An established theory which explained several chemical phenomena satisfactorily 
- the Phlogiston Theoiy.
2. Advances in experimental technique and apparatus which made possible new 
approaches to the problem - Lavoisier’s emphasis on careful accounting for the 
masses of substances involved in his experiments.
3. The emergence of unexplained anomalies which resisted the best efforts of 
scientists to explain them using the established theory - in this case the failure to 
account satisfactorily for the increase in mass when substances burned.
4. The discovery of a vital part of the jig-saw - Priestley’s experiment in which ‘de- 
phlogisticated air’ was produced from mercuric oxide.
5. Increased communication between scientists working on the same problems 
which made possible cross-fertilisation of ideas - e.g. Priestley’s reporting of his 
experiment to Lavoisier.
6. The failure of many excellent scientists to free themselves from a conceptual 
scheme to which they had committed themselves in the face of overwhelming 
evidence of its inadequacy - Priestley remained committed to the Phlogiston 
Theory throughout his life.
7. The use of ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses to ‘save’ the established theory in the face 
of apparent falsification - the ‘phlogistonists’ went as far as proposing a negative 
weight for phlogiston to account for the gain in weight when substances bum.
8. The emergence of an individual scientist with the necessary courage to condemn 
the established theory and propose a new theory which explained the known 
phenomena more convincingly - in 1783 Lavoisier proposed that air consisted of
157
two parts, one which combined with substances during combustion and and 
another which took no part in this process. This, effectively, led to the 
abandonment of the phlogiston theory by most scientists.
9. The tangled web of mistakes, misconceptions, blind alleys, luck and flashes of 
insight which led stumblingly to a new conceptual scheme which has since been 
presented as the inevitable outcome of scientific advance.
I hoped, also, that pupils might see a connection between their own commonsense ideas 
on burning and earlier theories of burning so that they could empathise with the 
intellectual struggles of a bygone age and relate them to their own changing conceptions. 
It is not difficult, for instance, to see the similarity between the pupils’ commonsense idea 
that a candle is ‘burning away’ and the early idea that an invisible substance is being lost.
(iii) Using Stinner’s guidelines
In Chapter 3 I described Stinner’s (1995) recommendations for the development of a 
storyline on a historical theme. His guidelines are set out below accompanied by 
abstracts from my own case history on theories of burning (in bold) to illustrate the 
approach:
1. Map out a context with one unifying central idea that is deemed important in science 
and is likely to capture the imagination of the student. What happens when 
something burns? (all pupils seem to have a fascination with the bunsen flame).
2. Provide the student with experiences that can be related to his/her everyday world as 
well as being simply and effectively explained by scientists’ science but at a level that 
makes sense to the pupil. This might entail burning a candle, a piece of 
magnesium and a pile of wood shavings.
3. Invent a stoiy line that will dramatise and highlight the main idea. Identify an 
important event associated with a person and find binary opposites, or conflicting 
characters or events which may be appropriate to include in the story. A suitable story 
line might be as follows: As a result of the commonsense notion that things ‘bum
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away’ earlier scientists developed the theory that when things burned they lost a 
substance called phlogiston. In the eighteenth century Priestley’s discovery of 
‘dephogisticated air’ and Lavoisier’s evidence that things gain weight when they 
hum led Lavoisier to the modern theory of burning which was adopted by the 
rest of the scientific community. Priestley still clung to the phlogiston theory. 
Priestley’s own account of the discovery of the gas which Lavoisier subsequently 
called oxygen is an example of the drama which a conventional, decontextualised 
treatment of this topic could not reproduce -see  above (Carey, 1995 -  Two Mice 
discover Oxygen)
4. Ensure that the major ideas, concepts and problems of the topic are generated by the 
context naturally; that it will include those that the student will learn piecemeal in a 
conventional textbook approach. The conventional textbook approach would 
confine itself to the concept of burning as a chemical combination of the elements 
contained in the substance with the oxygen of the air. The pupils would probably 
know already, on the authority of the teacher, the composition of the air. The 
story line version ensures that instead of the decontextualised transmission of 
the modern theory pupils would see the emergence of that theory from the 
creative efforts of a few individuals within a particular historical setting.
5. Secure the path from romance to precision to generalisation. This is best 
accomplished by showing the pupil that:
a) Problem situations come out of the context and are intrinsically
interesting. The problem was how to reconcile the gain in weight when 
things burned with the notion that a substance was being lost, 
h) Concepts are diversely connected, within the setting of the story as well as 
with present-day science and technology. The phlogiston theory was also 
used to explain the reduction of oxides by charcoal, and the process of 
respiration. The modern concept of oxidation connects burning, 
breathing and rusting,
c) There is room for individual extension and generalisation of ideas,
problems and conclusions. Pupils can explore the wider applicability of
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the phlogiston theory as well as its more satisfactory successor.
(iv) Methodology
I teach in a mixed secondary school (school years 7-11, age range 11-16) hi an outer 
London borough with slightly higher than the national average number of pupils with 
special educational needs. Achievement in public examinations at 16+ is slightly lower 
than the national average. The pupils participating in the main part of my classroom 
research on Atoms and the Periodic Table were drawn from the Year Group which sat 
GCSE examinations in 1999. My original intention was to focus on Year 10 and Year 11 
pupils (aged 15-16 years) and to analyse end-of-unit test results as a means of measuring 
the effectiveness of such a historical perspective. My colleagues were sympathetic but 
were also, understandably, reluctant to experiment with a new teaching approach at what 
they see to be a crucial stage in pupils’ education. The current political climate in which 
schools operate is one in which GCSE examination success is vital for departments and 
for the school. It influences parents’ choice of school when pupils make the transition 
from primary school to secondary school and can have a direct bearing on the viability of 
schools, which has implications for teacher employment. The results of Standard 
Assessment Tasks at the end of Year 9 are also available to parents but do not attract the 
same degree of attention. It was, therefore, agreed that I could carry out my research with 
a Year 9 class.
Pupils at the school are taught in three ability bands in Year 9 and selection for them is 
based on Year 8 attainment as reflected in test results and teachers’ reports. My timetable 
for the academic year 1995/6 included a top ability band Year 9 group. I judged that they 
would be suitable for my research because:
a) they had the necessary foundation knowledge.
b) they were likely to be motivated by the events and personalities involved in the 
episode, having not reached that stage in their school careers where I have generally 
detected a degree of cynicism in pupils’ approach to the subject.
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c) they had not made a formal decision for or against science in regard to their future 
studies.
At Key Stage 3 the Programme of Study in the National Curriculum relating to 
Attainment target 3 (Materials and their properties) states that ‘They (pupils) should 
become aware of the role of oxygen in combustion’ and further ‘They should investigate 
different types of reactions, such as combustion.. .’. There are two tiers of examination 
papers available for pupils when they are entered for SATs examinations -  a lower paper 
ranging from level 3 to level 6 and a higher paper from 5 to 7. (There is an extension 
paper covering level 8, which is rarely required at my school.) The pupils in my target 
group reach a level of attainment ranging from 5 to 7. The statement of attainment at 
level 5 states that pupils ‘understand that rusting and burning involve a reaction with 
oxygen.’ At level 6 the corresponding statement requires that pupils ‘understand 
oxidation processes, including combustion, as reactions with oxygen to form oxides.’ 
Level 7 makes no specific reference to combustion but there is a requirement that pupils 
‘be able to relate knowledge and understanding of chemical principles to manufacturing 
processes and everyday effects.’
None of the statements makes any reference to a discussion of the historical evidence that 
justifies the oxygen theory as the best available for explaining combustion but they do not 
preclude such a treatment. My unit focused on the historical episode covering the 
overthrow of the phlogiston theory and the establishment of the oxygen theory as the 
‘received’ knowledge.
(v) The lessons
This pilot study took the form of three lessons with a group of 23 pupils on theories of 
burning using a historical theme. The essential elements of the lesson plans were:
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Lesson 1.
Aim - to introduce the earlier theories of burning and compare them with the pupils’
own ideas.
(i) Man discovered fire - perhaps by lightning striking a tree.
(ii) He discovers how to use fire for warmth, cooking, baking clay.
(iii) Alchemists (the people who tried to make gold out of base metals), discovered 
that many metals formed powders when they were heated slowly - the powder 
was called ‘calx’.
(iv) 1650 - Robert Boyle heated some tin in a sealed flask and found that when he 
broke the seal the weight had increased. He thought that particles of fire had 
got through into the flask. At that time it was thought that fire was a material 
with weight.
(v) Demo - burning a splint, a candle and a piece of copper foil in air. The splint 
and the candle seem to lose weight but the copper gains weight. What happens 
when a substance bums?
(vi) 1670 - The ‘phlogiston’ theory - every substance that can bum consists of two 
parts, the calx (or ash) and the phlogiston. This might be represented as;
SUBSTANCE (heated in air) — > CALX + PHLOGISTON
(vii) The more phlogiston a substance contained, the smaller the amount of ash or 
residue left behind when it was burnt. Therefore such substances as oils, fats 
and charcoal, which burn away completely, were thought to contain a large 
amount of phlogiston.
(viii) Pupils’ experiments - timing the duration of burning for a candle in inverted 
jamjars of varying sizes. The candle bums for longer in a larger amount of air.
The explanation according to the Phlogiston Theory might be as follows:
The air surrounding the candle absorbs the phlogiston until it is saturated, thus
explaining why the candle burns for longer in a larger amount of air. The problem with
this theory was that it did not explain the increase in weight when metals burned in air.
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Nevertheless, its explanatory power extended to other well-known chemical 
phenomena like metal displacement reactions and the reactions of metals with acid 
(Brown and Dronsfield, 1991). It therefore remained the dominant theory for most of 
the eighteenth century.
Lesson 2.
Aim -  To achieve an understanding of the overthrow of the phlogiston theory - 
Lavoisier’s theory of the role of oxygen.
(i) 1772 - Lavoisier discovered that sulphur and phosphorus gain weight when heated 
in air. He thought that this was because they combined with the air. He also realised 
that the increase in weight when metals burned was because they combined with the 
air. At this stage he did not realise that it was only part of the air with which they 
combined.
(ii) 1774 - Priestley - discovered that when the calx of mercury (a red powder obtained 
by slowly heating mercury in air) was heated he could collect a gas in which a candle 
burned with a strong flame and a mouse became livelier. Priestley told Lavoisier of 
this experiment. Lavoisier improved on it and was able to show that the part of the air 
which combined with mercury was also the part of the air which was necessary for 
breathing. He called this part of the air ‘oxygen’.
This was the key to the riddle. Lavoisier had shown that combustion involves a 
chemical combination of the substance burnt with part of the air resulting in an overall 
gain in weight. To be consistent with this experimental evidence the supporters of the 
old theory were forced to propose that phlogiston had a negative weight and most 
scientists could not accept that. Some die-hards continued to argue the case for 
phlogiston but eventually Lavoisier’s discovery meant that most people no longer 
accepted the phlogiston theory although Priestley continued to believe in it until he 
died.
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(iii) Demonstration - simulation of Lavoisier’s experiment using red lead. This to be 
followed by a description of Lavoisier’s experiment on the reversible reaction between 
mercury and oxygen.
Lesson 3.
Aim - To show that substances gain weight when they burn
(i) Demo - collecting the products of combustion when a candle burns in air to 
show that there is an overall increase in weight - standard KS3 demo.
(ii) Pupils heat magnesium in crucibles and compare the weight of the crucible 
before and after burning. All substances gain in weight on burning as long as 
the products of combustion are not lost. (In practise some pupils calculated a 
loss in weight which I reasoned could have been caused by a loss of oxide as 
the lid was removed to replenish the oxygen supply).
The question now is ‘How well did pupils understand the reasons for change in theory?’ 
It is a common practice of mine to give pupils a series of written questions at the end of 
each lesson to assess their understanding of the lesson objectives and I used these now as 
a basis for this research. For these three lessons the questions were as follows:
Lesson 1.
Q. 1 What was the reason for the candle going out inside a jam jar according to the
phlogiston theory?
Q.2 How do we explain this according to modem theory?
Homework - write an account of Priestley’s discovery of the gas we now call 
oxygen.
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Lesson 2.
Q. 1 Which solid did Priestley use to make ‘dephlogisticated air’?
Q.2 How did Priestley test the gas that he collected from his experiment?
Q.3 How did Lavoisier reason that phlogiston could not be given off when things
burned?
Homework - How could you show that a candle gains weight when it burns? 
Lesson 3.
Q. 1 How does the modern theory of burning explain the overall increase in weight 
when a candle bums?
Q.2 How did we ensure that all the products of combustion were collected?
Q.3 What chemical compounds are produced when a candle bums?
Q.4 How could the experiment be improved?
Homework - describe how you would explain to an intelligent layman that the oxygen 
theory of burning is superior to the phlogiston theory.
165
(vi) Analysis of answers to questions
Table 5.a -  Answers to questions used in case study A)
Lesson 1. (20 pupils attended)
Q 1.15 pupils wrote that the candle went out because the air was saturated 
with phlogiston (or could not ‘take any more’ phlogiston). 2 pupils answered 
incorrectly and 3 did not answer.
Q 2.16 pupils wrote that the candle ‘ran out of oxygen’ or ‘had used up all 
the oxygen’ or that ‘there was no oxygen left’. 1 pupil answered that there was no air 
left. 3 pupils did not answer.
Lesson 2. (22 pupils attended)
Q 1.12 pupils answered ‘red lead’. 4 pupils answered ‘lead oxide’. 6 pupils 
did not know.
Q 2.10 pupils referred to a mouse ‘becoming livelier’ or ‘running around’.
5 pupils answered that a candle flame was brighter or stronger. 6 pupils mentioned 
both tests. 1 pupil did not answer.
Q 3.16 pupils wrote there was a ‘gain in weight’ or that the ‘weight went 
up’. 1 pupil wrote that phlogiston could not have been given off ‘unless it had a 
negative weight (impossible!)’. 5 pupils gave incorrect answers or did not answer.
Lesson 3. (19) pupils attended)
Q 1.16 pupils explained the increase in weight as a result of the candle 
‘combining with oxygen’ or ‘reacting with the oxygen’. 2 pupils answered incorrectly. 
1 pupils did not answer.
Q 2.13 pupils wrote ‘carbon dioxide and water’. 2 pupils wrote ‘carbon 
dioxide and steam’. 1 pupil wrote ‘carbon dioxide’ only. 1 pupil wrote ‘water and 
carbon monoxide ’. 1 pupil answered ‘water’ only. 1 pupil did not answer.
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Q 3. 5 pupils suggested another U-tube containing soda lime. 7 pupils 
suggested using a more accurate balance. 3 pupils suggested a better pump. 2 pupils 
suggested ‘testing for leaks’. 2 pupils gave no answer.
(vii) Pupils’ response to the historical theme
In addition to the test and homework I asked the class to answer the following
questionnaire:
BURNING QUESTIONS
1. Does it make the topic of burning more interesting to learn of the part played by 
earlier scientists like Priestley and Lavoisier?
2. Is it worth teaming about the phlogiston theory if it is no longer used?
3. Do you think the phlogiston theory had any use at all or was it just a mistaken idea?
4. Do you think there is anything left to discover about buming or do we know all there 
is to know?
5. Do our modem ideas on burning owe anything at all to the earlier theory about 
phlogiston or could we just as easily have done without it?
6. If you came up with a theory of burning better than the one we now use how easy do 
you think it would be to convince other people that you were right?
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(viii) Responses to questionnaire
Table 5.b -  Pupils’ Responses to questionnaire in case study A)
Responses 
to question 
1.
(0
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
1 pupil felt that they could have been doing more interesting 
things and that the historical material ‘slowed down the project’
3 pupils said that the historical aspects did not increase their 
interest in the topic but did make it easier to understand the 
concept of burning.
14 pupils answered ‘yes’. This was an encouraging response. I 
felt that this response alone justified my use of the historical 
approach.
1 pupil did not answer
Responses 
to question 
2.
(i) 2 pupils said that it showed how people have learned from their 
mistakes
(ii) 3 pupils felt that it helps understand the present theory
(iii) There was a consensus of all the pupils that if the phlogiston 
theory had never existed then nobody would have challenged it 
to arrive at the present theory and that had been good reasons for 
thinking that the phlogiston theory was right.
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Responses to 
question
3.
(i) 7 pupils felt that the ‘present’ theory was ‘based on’ or 
‘developed from’ the earlier theory.
(ii) 2 pupils described our current theory as the ‘true’ explanation 
and 4 more referred to it as what ‘really happens’. 1 pupil 
referred to it as the ‘correct’ theory - another as the ‘proper’ 
theory.
(iii) There was a patronising tone from 3 pupils eg. ‘the phlogiston 
theory was useful because it was quite close to the truth’ - as if to 
suggest that present-day scientists have a monopoly on the 
‘truth’.
(iv) 2 pupils answered ‘yes’ without elaborating.
Responses 
to question 
4.
(i) 1 pupil wrote ‘Yes, because if the phlogiston theory was wrong 
what’s to say today’s theory is right.’
(ii) ‘There is always something left to discover’ - 5 pupils
(iii) ‘I don’t think we can know everything’- 1 pupil
(iv) ‘I don’t know - we can never know’ -  1 pupil
(v) 5 pupils said there was nothing left to discover
(vi) 1 pupil said that we could discover more if we had the right 
technology.
(vii) 5 pupils said ‘There is more to discover’.
Responses 
to question 
5.
(i) 2 pupils said that the current theory would still have been arrived 
at - but later.
(ii) 16 responses were similar to 2. above.
(iii) Again the patronising tone from 1 pupil - “Its not their fault they 
were wrong.”
Responses 
to question 
6.
(i) The feeling was unanimous that this would be very difficult. 
However one pupil said that it was difficult for Lavoisier to 
make everyone believe his theory (but he did eventually).
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Responses 
to Question 
6 (cont.)
(ii) The time factor was very important. Our present theory ‘has been 
around for such a long time’ -  1 pupil. It would be hard to 
convince people - ‘especially older people’ -  1 pupil. ‘People 
have got used to our present theory - it would be hard to change 
their minds’ -  1 pupil. ‘It would be hard for people to accept 
that this theory has been wrong all the time’ -  1 pupil.
(iii) ‘You would have to show your evidence’ -  1 pupil. ‘It depends 
on how much evidence you have’ -  1 pupil.
(iv) ‘People think they know all there is to know about burning’ -  1 
pupil
(v) 10 pupils said it would be difficult without elaborating
(vi) 1 pupil responded ‘I don’t know’.
(ix) Summary
From the pupils’ written answers to the questions at the end of each lesson it was possible 
to make the following conclusions:
(i) The phlogiston theory’s explanation of a candle going out -  that the air 
surrounding it had become saturated with phlogiston -  was clearly understood.
(ii) The crucial experiment made by Lavoisier by which he demonstrated a weight 
gain on burning, rather than a weight loss, was accepted by most pupils as 
decisive evidence against the phlogiston theory.
(iii) The superiority of the oxygen theory in accounting for the weight gain as a 
combination with oxygen, on condition that all the products of combustion 
were accounted for, was generally understood.
(iv) The link between the two theories and the dependence of Lavoisier’s work on 
the work done by Priestley was apparent to pupils.
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A significant disadvantage of using this episode to show the struggle between competing 
theories is that the pupils already know the ‘right’ answer. The pupils I used in this piece 
of research already had a basic knowledge of the composition of the air. They knew that 
the process of buming involved oxygen so that it was difficult to give due credibility to 
the phlogiston theory because the pupils were predisposed to favour the modem account. 
It is likely that some of the pupils had already been exposed to the ‘logical 
reconstruction’ of lower school science textbooks which had already influenced their 
ideas on buming. Consequently, it was difficult to re-create fully a situation in which the 
pupils could make a fair assessment of the relative merits of the competing theories since 
they knew that one of them had already been consigned to the historical scrap heap.
One of the legacies of the positivist philosophy of science has been to ascribe undue 
authority to science as a body of knowledge. The widespread belief that scientific ‘tmth’ 
could be established by a strictly logical process linking empirical observations to 
indisputable conclusions led to the common perception of science as an ideal form of 
knowledge. But the historical record conflicts with this rigid conception. Typically, new 
knowledge has become established only after intense stmggles between rival theories. 
The advantage of the historical episode described in this pilot study is that it clearly 
illustrates the way in which the power of the successful traditions can be broken (see 
Chapters, pi 17).
This is of central importance in integrating a historical dimension in science education 
because it teaches pupils that no scientific theories have a ‘divine right’ to their status as 
accepted knowledge. Rival theories can be examined and compared for their scientific 
value and the reasons for the ultimate success of the currently accepted theory can be 
drawn out. The value of the phlogiston episode to pupils was that they recognised that the 
Oxygen Theoiy of burning had its origins in its ultimately unsuccessful predecessor. 
Although an apparent ‘failure’, this theory was consistent with an extensive range of 
chemical phenomena and was rejected only after a long stmggle. They could see that, to a 
large extent, the currently accepted theory owes its very existence to a discarded theory 
that is now considered to be unscientific.
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The view of scientific progress as a process of learning by mistakes was clearly one 
which most pupils accepted. They could see that, whatever the shortcomings of the 
phlogiston theory, its great value lay in providing an explanation for known phenomena 
which could be challenged and, ultimately, improved upon. The process of examining a 
theoiy to genuinely test its validity was clearly not something they were used to. They 
learned that overthrowing a theory is not a simple task of ‘proving’ that it is wrong but 
that it involves a careful comparison of its usefulness and power with its rivals. What was 
also apparent from this episode was that the final outcome was strongly influenced by the 
personalities involved - the ‘objectivity’ of scientific progress was clearly being 
challenged.
There was evidence of a high degree of determinism in pupils’ image of scientific 
knowledge. From the responses to the questionnaire and from classroom discussions it 
was clear that scientific advance is viewed as an inevitable progression towards the 
‘truth’ and that, sooner or later, scientists arrive at the ‘truth’ even if there are mistakes on 
the way. Furthermore, it was difficult to shake off pupils’ perception that what scientists 
have got now is the ‘truth’. This shows an arrogance that I found in my survey of 
textbooks, in which the treatment of earlier scientific ideas is often condescending (see 
Chapter 4). I made a concerted effort to show that several related phenomena (like the 
reduction of oxides by charcoal and respiration) could just as well be explained by the 
earlier Phlogiston Theory and there were signs that some pupils regarded it with 
increased respect because of this. Some commented, in response to the questionnaire, that 
there had been good reasons for thinking that the Phlogiston Theory was right.
A notable lesson to be learned from the historical perspective is that hypotheses that 
appear to be grounded in common sense are sometimes misleading. From discussions 
with pupils it is easy to see that an initial inspection of a candle burning leads to the idea 
that something is being emitted. They can sympathise with the phlogiston theory to that 
extent. The conception of air as a single pure substance is also one that is not difficult to 
envisage. The fact that these two misconceptions led ultimately to the wrong explanation 
teaches pupils that the relationship between science and common sense is not simple. It 
demonstrates ‘the unnatural nature of science’ (Wolpert, 1993).
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In answer to the question ‘Do you think there is anything left to discover about buming or 
do we know all there is to know?’ one pupil admitted that she didn’t know - ‘we can 
never know’. At least one pupil had formed the idea (like Popper) that scientists’ present 
state of knowledge could never be the full picture.
There was some discussion of the reasons why many scientists like Priestley could not 
accept the new theory in the face of what seemed like overwhelming evidence that it was 
better than the old one. I made the point that fresh approaches to a scientific problem are 
usually more successful than years of toil because of the habits of mind which become 
entrenched and prevent the scientist from opening his mind to novel ideas (Margolis, 
1993). The significance of age and psychological factors in the stmggle for acceptance 
was brought home to the pupils.
Bearing in mind that this is a small-scale research project carried out on a qualitative 
basis, a significant finding was that the historical treatment of this topic shook the pupils’ 
faith in the certainty of scientific knowledge. It brought home the realisation that widely 
accepted scientific ‘tmth’ can ultimately be found to be baseless even if its explanatory 
power has attained for it the status of dogma.
A striking result of this pilot study was that it revealed many pupils’ misconception of 
scientific progress as a process of discovery by experiment. The ‘reconstmcted’ textbook 
accounts of burning often attribute the ‘discovery’ of oxygen to Priestley and fail to 
acknowledge the phlogiston theory or the means by which Lavoisier overthrew it. This 
kind of omission reinforces many pupils’ empiricist perception of scientific method -  i.e. 
discovery by a process of continuous experimentation.
(x) Weaknesses of the methodology used in the pilot study
I was conscious that the study was carried out with an able group of pupils and that the 
results would not be representative of the whole school population in this age group. 
Sustained discussion between teacher and class is a regular feature of my lessons. I 
doubted whether this would be possible to such an extent with a group of average or 
lower ability. I therefore decided that my next study would focus on middle band pupils 
whose abilities would be clustered round the average for their age group.
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In the pilot study above I concentrated on historical and philosophical aspects of science 
in the hope that my delivery of content would be at least as efficient as usual, if not more 
so. I did not assess the effectiveness of pupils’ learning in this regard by formal testing 
since there was no comparable group to act as a control. This limited my results to less 
formal end-of-lesson questions, which were designed to probe pupils understanding of 
the nature of change in theory - not simply an understanding of the standard oxygen 
theory of combustion. In the next phase of my research I sought to eliminate these 
weaknesses by adopting a quasi-experimental approach, which would involve an 
additional control group.
B) Atomic theory and the Periodic Table
(i) Introduction
In the pilot study I describe some qualitative research into the extent to which the 
revolution in the theory relating to combustion could influence pupils’ understanding of 
the way in which scientific knowledge grows. The story of the overthrow of the 
phlogiston theoiy is a suitable means of showing how scientific theories change. That 
historical episode is an appropriate means of counteracting the prevailing view of science 
as a gospel of unassailable ‘truths’ and points to the danger of scientific dogmatism. 
However, my research also illuminated a popular misconception of the origins of 
scientific ideas. It was clear fi*om the results of that study that many pupils associate the 
growth of scientific knowledge largely with ‘discovery’ and have little appreciation of the 
part played by human imagination as a source of powerful ideas. The larger scale 
research I describe below seeks to counter this misconception.
Also, according to Bybee (1991):
“Some episodes in the history of the scientific endeavour are of surpassing 
significance to our cultural heritage” p i44.
And:
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“It is important for people to understand science as a key element in intellectual 
history - the achievements of the human mind” (pi 45).
I support this argument and I believe that the growth of chemical knowledge from 
Dalton’s Atomic Theory in 1807 to the publication of Mendeleev’s Periodic Table in 
1871 includes a series of such episodes and I wanted pupils to share my respect for the 
scientists who made those achievements.
(ii) Rationale for the methodology of research
In designing the study I was influenced by the Harvard Case Histories in Experimental 
Science edited by Conant (1957), the general aims of which had similarities with my 
own, even allowing for the different context. The case histories described by Conant were 
designed primarily for students at Harvard University majoring in the humanities or the 
social sciences. The rationale for the project was that such students require an 
understanding of science that will help them relate developments in the natural sciences 
to those in other fields of human activity. In Conant’s view this ‘demands an 
understanding both of the methods of experimental science and the growth of scientific 
research as an organised activity of society’. The aim was to combat the layman’s 
‘fundamental ignorance of what science can or cannot accomplish’ and to achieve an 
understanding of science independent of any knowledge of scientific facts or techniques. 
Conant’s target group was well defined. They were committed non-scientists, all of 
whom, by definition, had rejected science as a choice of career. My target group 
consisted of a few pupils who would go on to further education in science and take up 
scientific careers, together with a much larger number who would be the non-scientists of 
the future. The future scientists, as Kuhn (1970) pointed out, will ultimately obtain an 
accurate picture of the workings of modern science by actually doing research. In this 
sense I felt, like Conant, a greater responsibility to the future non-scientists in providing a 
more accurate account of scientific progress. Nevertheless, at this stage of their school 
careers, all the pupils are potential scientists. I was, therefore, concerned that the human 
achievement described in this episode would inspire and motivate all the pupils and that.
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hopefully, this could have some bearing on pupils’ choices in regard to further education. 
Conant writes:
‘The purpose of the case histories presented in this series is to assist the reader in 
recapturing the experience of those who once participated in exciting events in 
scientific history’(pix).
I embarked on this study in a similar spirit, albeit tempered by the knowledge that pupils 
have certain expectations of science lessons that might conflict with my plans, typified by 
the question “Are we getting the Bunsen burners out to-day, sir?” (Nott and Wellington, 
1995). However, judging from their response to my pilot study, I was confident that the 
personalities and stories associated with the chosen episodes would appeal more to 
typical 14 year olds than the more conventional, ‘final form’ treatment.
I wanted to emphasise the importance of SI (science as the personal struggle) by setting 
the problems in their historical context, emphasising that the scientists involved lacked 
the benefit of hindsight, and bringing out the boldness and inspired guesswork that 
characterised their work. Like Conant, I wanted to dispel the myth that scientific theories 
emerge from an impersonal examination of all the facts followed by a logical analysis of 
various ways of formulating a new principle - an S2 approach.
I was also influenced by a classroom study of 12 months duration by Solomon et al 
(1994), on how pupils’ views of the nature of science changed when some of their 
learning materials were historically situated. Five classes with an age range of 11-14 
were involved in this research and the evidence comprised pre- and post-tests, 
questionnaires and interviews. The researchers rejected the idea that epistemology is the 
kind of disembedded knowledge which could be abstractly encoded in the memory. They 
found that stories from history seemed to provide alternative images of scientific 
epistemology which generated more reflection. One notable effect of such stories was 
that there was a substantial increase in the number of pupils who thought that scientists
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set out to seek explanations rather than make discoveries. They concluded that stories of 
the actual activities of science are memorable enough to create a valuable library of 
epistemological ideas in the minds of young pupils.
(iii) Rationale for the choice of the Atomic Theory as the historical theme
The concept of the atom had its origins in philosophical speculation, the emergence of 
which can be traced back to the Greeks of the 6^ and 7* centuries B.C. (Lloyd, 1982). 
The establishment of democracy in some Greek city-states encouraged participation and 
debate on political issues, a practice that helps explain the tradition of debate on a wide 
range of philosophical questions. Natural philosophers sought explanations for the causes 
of natural phenomena. They were dissatisfied with explanations resting on supernatural 
authority and so began a quest for rational explanations that could be argued in free 
debate. The measure of the their achievement is the advance they made in grasping the 
problems.
Amongst these was the problem of change. For instance, the Greeks were aware that 
nature regenerated itself. Although leaves were consumed each autumn new ones 
appeared in the spring. There was change and yet there was regeneration. In the 5^  ^
century B.C. the Greek Atomists claimed that there is change on a macroscopic scale but 
not on a microscopic scale. The main assumption of their atomic theory was the existence 
of tiny, indivisible and indestructible particles called atoms. The atoms were invisibly 
small, completely full of matter, had different shapes and sizes, acted with each other by 
direct contact and were in continuous motion. Apart fi*om atoms only void existed. Atoms 
in motion coming together into combination and recombination, or going apart causing 
decay of bodies, produced continuous change of matter. Atoms and void were the only 
ingredients of nature. The explanation for change was therefore, that although individual 
things decay by losing their atoms, these could come together again to form something 
new.
The chief characteristic of this early form of science was the abstract nature of the debate.
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It was not the empirical data that counted in support of a theory, so much as the economy 
and consistency of the arguments on which it was based. Popular acclaim was to be 
gained by natural philosophers through the success of their logic and rationality in debate 
rather than their practical skills. Since the Greeks did not carry out practical experiments 
the evidence for atoms relied, to some extent, on thought experiments. The problem of 
slicing a solid cone horizontally and posing the question, “Is the upper surface exposed 
by the slice the same size as the lower surface?” is an intriguing puzzle for the pupils. 
The aim is to lead them through the same sort of reasoning that the Greeks used to reach 
the conclusion that if the upper surface were not at least one atom smaller in radius at the 
lowest possible limit then the cone would be a cylinder.
A cruder example of thought experimentation was to ask the pupils to imagine an iron 
nail being cut in half, followed by one of the halves being cut in half and so on until the 
stage was reached when no further division was possible. I asked the question “Is there a 
point where we reach a particle which is indivisible?” The purpose of the exercise was 
not to guide them to the desired answer but to show them the kind of thinking the Greeks 
used to come up with their theory, deprived as they were of the enormous amount of 
technical information and instruments available to us today. The point was made that 
thought experiments had had a significant part to play in making scientific progress.
Further development of the theoiy took place in a completely different historical context 
in the era of the Chemical Revolution, during which time the importance of empirical 
evidence in support of theory became paramount. Conant (1957) believes that the 
development of the atomic theory at the beginning of the nineteenth century was an 
example of the way in which an immediate interest in the ‘practical arts’, in this case 
meteorology, could lead to the formulation of a more generalised conceptual scheme. The 
crucial historical factor was the combination of methods of experimentation developed in 
the ‘practical arts’ with deductive methods of reasoning developed in mathematics. The 
research I describe seeks to contrast the nature of science in these two eras.
The essential features of the modem atomic theoiy are generally attributed to John
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Dalton. As part of his meteorological investigations he tried to solve the problem of why 
the gases in the atmosphere are so thoroughly mixed despite the differences in their 
specific gravities. His reading of Newton’s Principia, together with the results of Boyle’s 
experiments on the pressure/volume relationship in gases, led him to the assumption that 
gases consist of particles repelling each other with a force proportional to the distance 
between them. He also accepted the contemporary theory of heat, according to which 
each gas particle is surrounded by a sphere of caloric fluid, endowed with the quality of 
self-repulsion. Finally, from his own experimental results he concluded that the 
individual particles of one pure gas must differ in size from those of another gas.
The application of these assumptions to his original problem enabled Dalton to conclude 
that mutually repulsive contiguous particles of several different sizes would not be in 
equilibrium in strata, thus explaining the thorough mixing of the gases in the atmosphere. 
More significantly, it was this very work that led Dalton to the concepts of the chemical 
atom, atomic weight and the Law of Multiple Proportions. Despite these ultimate 
achievements Holton (1988) asserts that:
"each and every one o f his steps as just given was factually wrong or logically 
inconsistent ’ (p403).
Newton’s proof was a mathematical exercise, not applicable to real gases; the calorific 
theory of heat contained inherent contradictions; Dalton’s own experiments were often 
inadequate to support his conclusions and his final conclusion did not even follow from 
his own premises. Indeed, many of Dalton’s contemporaries doubted the validity of his 
basic assumptions and, whilst they would admit the instrumental usefulness of atoms, 
they remained sceptical about the real existence of these atoms (Conant, 1957).
(iv) Aims of this phase of the research
The aim of the case study I describe is to show pupils that there are episodes in the 
history of science which illustrate the the power of the human mind to make brilliant and
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bold conjectures on the basis of little or no direct evidence but which can lead to gigantic 
strides in scientific knowledge. The pilot study had indicated that pupils have an image of 
science which is highly determined; the ‘truth’ is out there and scientific progress consists 
in discovering it. I designed the curriculum unit with the explicit aim of providing 
opportunities for pupils to appreciate that scientific progress does not amount simply to a 
series of incidental discoveries. I wanted them to see that the growth of scientific 
knowledge is characterised by feats of imagination and creativity that account for sense 
data and yet go beyond these to establish powerful models and unifying principles.
It was also evident from my pilot study that, far from recognising the work of pioneering 
scientists as inspirational, many pupils (in accordance with many textbooks) adopt a 
patronising attitude. Typically, textbook authors assess the work of past scientists in 
terms of their contribution to what we now regard as established knowledge - the so- 
called Whig approach to history (Brush, 1974). With the benefit of hindsight it is 
tempting to judge the work of previous scientists as misdirected, incomplete or simply 
wrong. It is not surprising that pupils pick up this note of condescension, whether from 
textbooks or teachers. My intention was to counteract this tendency by giving pupils 
opportunities to appreciate the problems faced by their scientific predecessors in the 
context of the knowledge available to them at the time.
My hope was that pupils who had gained an appreciation of the challenges and 
difficulties faced by scientists of a different era and who were aware of the context of 
scientific advance would have a firmer foundation on which to base their own 
understanding of theory. Support for this aim is provided by Monk and Osborne (1996) 
who contend that;
‘The study of scientific ideas in their original context of discovery will help to
develop students’ conceptual understanding’ (see Chapter 3, page! 03).
I felt it was important to provide evidence, at least, that the historical approach did not 
detract from pupils’ understanding of scientific concepts even if my results did not
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indicate any decisive gain in this regard. I therefore analysed the results of a post unit test 
on content only, from which I was able to compare a control group with the group to 
which I taught the historical theme. The latter aim is important in order to reassure 
science teachers that in giving due emphasis to this non-examinable part of the national 
curriculum they are not also jeopardising the pupils’ understanding of examinable science 
content. Given the pressures of accountability and the competitive atmosphere that 
currently exists, it would be unrealistic to expect science teachers to adopt any curriculum 
material unless they were entirely convinced that there was no threat to examination 
results.
(v) Research methodology
In this phase of the research I wanted to carry out a quasi-experimental investigation of 
the historical approach so that I could gain a more accurate estimate of its advantages, as 
indicated by the pilot study. Therefore I needed 2 groups, one of which would be the 
historical theme group and one of which would be the control. My choice of target groups 
was determined by the following conditions:
(1)1 needed to teach two groups of similar age, ability and ease of management. One 
group would be taught the unit with a historical perspective and the other would be 
taught the conventional ‘final form’ version. The latter group would act as a control.
(2) The two groups had to have close similarity in their background knowledge of 
science, with some previous knowledge of elements, mixtures and compounds and the 
particulate nature of matter. These topics are covered in Years 7 and 8 (i.e. at the age 
of 11-13 years) in my school. (The pupils participating in this part of my classroom 
research on Atoms and the Periodic Table were drawn from the Year Group which sat 
GCSE examinations in 1999. 33% gained five A-C pass grades or more compared to 
a national average for secondary schools of 42%.)
My timetable for the academic year 1996/7 included two middle band Year 9 classes.
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each consisting of 25 boys and girls. For the purposes of my research one of these groups 
was designated the ‘Historical Theme Group’ or ‘HTG’ and the other was designated the 
‘Final Form Group’ or FFG. The HTG contained 13 boys and 12 girls; the FFG contained 
15 boys and 10 girls. In order to verify that both groups were starting from approximately 
the same base in their understanding and knowledge of this topic I gave them a pre-test 
(see Appendix I). Each group was then taught 8 lessons on the topic ‘Atoms and the 
Periodic Table’ without any extra time for the historical content of the HTG unit.
In lessons 1 -4 of the HTG unit there was an emphasis on theory development in a 
historical context. The corresponding lessons for the FFG presented the theories in logical 
order without any reference to history (see Fig. 1). The difference in approach can be 
illustrated by my treatment of Dalton’s atomic theory. For the first of these groups I 
described the context of his work - the fact that he was aware of the Greeks’ ideas on 
atoms and his familiarity with the work of Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton. I gave the 
pupils a list of the few ‘elements’ available to Dalton and pointed out the inadequate data 
on which he based his proposals i.e. that some of his ‘elements’ were compounds which 
were as yet resistant to analysis into their component parts. The FFG were denied the 
background to Dalton’s work. I simply provided them with his three assertions.
Lessons 5-8 were identical for both classes and consisted of a conventional treatment of 
the periods and groups of the Periodic Table. The last lesson consisted of a post-test with 
no historical content (see Appendix H) and a questionnaire, suitably amended for the FFG 
where necessary. (Fig. 5.a shows the format of the case study).
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Fig. 5.a_ Format of case study
TheoriesEmphasis on theory
Pre-test (no historical content)
Historical Theme Group Final Form Group
development in a 
historical context
in logical order 
without historical
erence
No questions relating to 
historical aspects of science
Some questions relating to 
historical aspects of science
Post-test (no historical content)
Lessons 5-8 (conventional 
treatment of periodicity and 
groups)_______ ___________
Questionnaire probing 
pupils ideas on the 
nature of science
Focus group discussion -  4 pupils from HTG and 3 pupils from FFG 
discuss historical and philosophical issues arising from lessons
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(vi) Using Stinner’s guidelines
I used the Stinner (1995) guidelines again to create a storyline, which is set out below:
1. Map out the context. In this case I wanted to explore the pattern to be discerned 
between the chemical elements and any relationships between the elements.
2. Provide the student with experiences that can be related to his/her everyday world. 
The intention here is to work with a vastly restricted number of known elements 
proposed by a man called Newlands. He argued that some of these elements 
obeyed a periodic law. He placed them in order of their atomic weights and 
found that there was a pattern in that the nature of the eighth element seemed to 
be a repetition of the first. He called this the ‘law of octaves’ because of the 
parallel with musical notes.
3. Invent a storyline that will dramatise and hightlight the main idea. When Newlands 
proposed this theory at a meeting of the Royal Institution it was met with 
derision -  one opponent going as far as to say that Newlands may as well have 
arranged the elements in alphabetical order to get an equally valid periodicity. 
The idea was taken up by a Russian scientist, Mendeleev, who had more 
elements at his disposal and found that there was greater merit to the proposal 
than had at first been thought, despite the fact that the occasional element did 
not fit the pattern. The inspirational aspect of the story lies in Mendeleev’s 
having so much confidence in the Periodic Table that he forecast the existence of 
more elements for which he left gaps in the table. These were subsequently 
discovered and Mendeleev’s theory was vindicated.
4. Ensure that the major ideas, concepts and problems of the topic are generated by the 
context naturally. The historical perspective is essential here to bring out the 
creativity and the brilliance of the science. A purely ‘final form’ treatment 
cannot bring out the cultural significance or the human aspect of the advance in
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chemical theory. However an up-to-date study of the modem Periodic Table is 
perfectly compatible with this historical approach.
5. Secure the path from romance to precision to generalisation. This is best 
accomplished by showing the pupils that:
a) Problem situations come out of the context and are intrinsically interesting. 
The problem for Mendeleev was the fact that some elements did not fit 
the pattern. Some pairs of elements were the wrong way round. There is 
an opportunity to extend the historical treatment to the discovery by 
Moseley that the atomic weights of the elements was not as fundamental a 
characteristic as the atomic number.
b) Concepts are diversely connected, within the setting of the story as well as 
with present-day science and technology. The Periodic Table connects a 
whole network of concepts like periodicity, groups, metal and non-metal 
elements and this can be extended to relate to sub atomic particles.
c) There is room for individual extension and generalisation of ideas, problems 
and conclusions. Pupils can be supplied the details of a fictitious element 
and asked to give it a position in the table on the basis of its physical and 
chemical properties.
The form of my research was partly determined by circumstances. It had to be an integral 
part of my teaching because I wanted it to take place under as near normal conditions as I 
could arrange. I regarded that as an essential requirement of action research. None of my 
colleagues felt sufficiently confident with the materials to get involved although they 
sympathised with my philosophy. They feared that the project would entail more 
‘thinking and discussion’ and less practical work, which would be too great a departure 
from their normal mode of teaching. The very nature of the outcomes I was looking for 
were difficult to assess quantitatively and, given the small sample to which I was
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restricted, the results could hardly have been statistically significant. I therefore decided 
on qualitative methods of research for the main investigation on improving pupils’ 
understanding of the nature of science. As a teacher-researcher I made my own 
observations. Unlike the kind of research done by Solomon et al my findings were not 
complicated by the affect of a third party observer. The pre-test and post-test were 
included to compare the learning of conventional science content by the two groups, (see 
Fig. 5.a).
(vii) The lessons
HTG Lesson 1
Aim -  to show the progression fi’om ancient ideas about the elements of matter to modern 
ideas
(i) Teacher summarises ancient ideas on elements as the building blocks of matter 
starting with the early Greek idea of air, earth, fire and water.
(ii) Teacher recaps on Boyle’s definition of an element as a simple substance that 
cannot be broken down by physical or chemical means.
(iii) Pupils are set the task of finding the discoverer and date of discovery of various 
elements using a computer database, leading to the general conclusion that many 
elements were discovered relatively recently (ie. post 1850).
(iv) Pupils are asked to research the idea of the atom for homework.
I approached the meaning of the word ‘element’ from a philosophical standpoint. I started 
with the ancient philosophy that all matter was believed to consist of the four simple 
components, air, earth, fire and water and that although this philosophy was now known 
to be false it retained a kernel of useful knowledge. The essential principle that all 
substances are made up from more simple component substances is still valid even 
though modern-day understanding of what those simple substances are is more advanced. 
My aim was to clarify the word ‘element’ as an idea rather than present its strict chemical 
definition.
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FFG Lesson 1;
Aim -  understanding of the currently accepted scientific concept of the chemical element.
(i) Pupils inspect a display of elements, mixtures and compounds and classify each 
substance according to their own ideas.
(ii) Pupils are presented with the currently accepted definition of an element as a 
simple substance which cannot be broken down by a physical or chemical change.
(iii) Pupils are set the task of using a computer database to research the physical 
properties and uses of some common elements.
(iv) Pupils are asked to give an account of the Atomic theory for homework.
Pupils were asked to inspect a simple display of elements, compounds and mixtures and 
to place each substance in the display into one of those three categories. This was 
preceded by a short discussion of the criteria on which the choice would be made. It was 
evident fi*om the tables constructed by pupils that their understanding of the differences 
between elements, compounds and mixtures was not sound (despite pupils having 
touched on this topic in Year 8). Typically, crude oil was classified as a compound and 
copper sulphate as a mixture. The elements in the display were listed under all of the 
three headings. At the end of this exercise I presented the familiar definition of the 
element as ‘a substance which cannot be broken down into simpler substances by 
physical or chemical changes’. I went on to define the atom as ‘the smallest part of an 
element which can take part in a chemical change’. I offered no evidence for these 
assertions.
HTG Lesson 2
Aim -  to contrast the early philosophical idea of the ‘atom’ as posited by the Greeks with 
the more practical propositions of Dalton
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(i) Pupils are given examples of arguments used by Greek natural philosophers as 
evidence for the existence of atoms (eg. the wearing away of stone paving slabs a 
few atoms at a time and the seasonal cycle as a rearrangement of atoms).
(ii) A biographical sketch is given of Dalton from his humble beginnings as a 
schoolboy in Cumbria and then career as a schoolteacher in Manchester - his 
practical interest in meteorology leading to more general conclusions about the 
composition of elements is described.
(iii) Dalton’s familiarity with the work of Newton and Boyle is discussed -  the fact 
that he did not start with a blank sheet.
(iv) A summary is presented of Dalton’s ideas about atoms and his reliance on 
‘educated guesswork’.
I raised the issues debated by Greek philosophers such as the decay and regeneration of 
living things associated with the seasons -  the fact that there is change on a macroscopic 
scale but not on a microscopic scale. They argued that matter is made up of tiny, 
indivisible particles called atoms which can rearrange themselves to produce changes in 
living things but cannot themselves be changed. For example it was generally accepted 
by pupils that our bodies can only be formed from the food and water we eat by a 
redistribution of the atoms present in them. (The statement ‘We are what we eat’ was 
volunteered by one of the pupils as an alternative representation of this concept.) Pupils 
readily appreciated that the gradual loss of a few atoms at a time is a credible explanation 
for the wearing away of ancient steps by the repeated tread of feet throughout centuries. I 
found the roots of understanding of the atom could be better laid using these ancient 
arguments than by the presentation of hackneyed definitions to the FFG with the 
authority of the teacher as the sole basis for belief. The HTG pupils empathised with 
these arguments and could see the usefulness of the concept of the ‘atom’. Their 
motivation for further development of the concept was clearly superior to that of the FFG. 
The latter were simply expected to commit themselves to the concept whether or not they 
found it convincing in principle.
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FFG Lesson 2
Aim -  to establish that matter is particulate using practical evidence. Pupils to understand 
the definition of the atom and modem atomic theory,
(i) Pupils are presented with the evidence of Brownian motion in the smoke cell and 
bromine diffusion leading to the understanding that matter consists of particles.
(ii) A definition is given of the atom as the smallest part of an element which can take 
part in a chemical change.
(iii) The three basic assertions of the modem Atomic theory are presented.
HTG Lesson 3
Aim -  to trace the evolution of Dalton’s ideas on atoms (given his restricted knowledge 
of elements) from the ideas of Newton and Boyle and his own problems with 
meteorology.
(i) Dalton’s limited range of known elements. For example, part of the lesson began;
‘In 1807 Dalton’s list of atomic weights was restricted to 20 elements (some of which 
are now known to be compounds). His list of symbols and atomic weights are shown 
below:
HYDROGEN 1 STRONTIAN 46
AZOTE 5 BARYTES 68
CARBON 5 IRON 55
OXYGEN 7 ZINC 56
PHOSPHORUS 9 COPPER 56
SULPHUR 19 LEAD 90
MAGNESIA 20 SILVER 190
LIME 24 GOLD 190
SODA 28 PLATINA 190
POTASH 42 MERCURY 167
Tick off the names of the substances that we still regard as elements.’
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(ii) Dalton’s assertions about atoms including his assumptions and ‘mistakes’ are 
noted.
(iii) His use of the combining weights of elements to establish relative atomic weights 
using his assumption of chemical combination of atoms in simple whole-number 
ratios are presented. For example, the following sentences were used:
‘If Dalton had no idea of the numbers of atoms involved in chemical combinations he 
applied the rule of greatest simplicity - i.e. that one atom of element A combines with 
one atom of element B. Since he could calculate the weights of elements which 
combined (such as the weights of hydrogen and oxygen in water) he could work out 
the relative weights of the atoms, 
e.g. Ig hydrogen combines with 8g oxygen to give 9g water
.’.1 atom oxygen is 8 times the weight of 1 atom of hydrogen ( In this case he was wrong 
- 2 atoms of H combine with 1 atom of 0  and 1 atom of O is 16* heavier than 1 atom of 
H)’
This episode in the development of chemical theory provided opportunities for showing 
that flawed theories can lead to advances in knowledge. I gave the HTG a list of the 
elements available to Dalton showing 20 substances some of which are now known to be 
compounds. I told the group that Dalton made some highly risky assumptions such as his 
assumption that one atom of hydrogen combines with one atom of oxygen in the 
formation of water. This led to errors in calculating the relative atomic weights of other 
elements which caused problems until Faraday electrolysed water to discover that the 
correct ratio was 2:1. Nevertheless, Dalton’s general assumption that the combining ratios 
of atoms of elements are simple was the basis on which other workers proceeded. I 
stressed the audacity of Dalton’s contribution in adopting ‘the rule of greatest simplicity’ 
when there was no empirical evidence indicating any rule at all. There was no hint of 
condescension at the limited data available to Dalton. On the contrary, pupils were 
impressed by the brilliance of this strategy. They could see that scientific progress had 
been made despite error and that the growth of knowledge is not nearly as simple as most
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sc ie n c e  tex tb o o k s w o u ld  h ave us b e liev e .
(iv) Homework: to trace the development of the Periodic Table of the elements in 
preparation for next lesson.
FFG Lesson 3
Aim -  to achieve an understanding of modem Atomic theory, the concept of relative 
atomic mass and how atoms combine to give simple molecules.
(i) The FFG was presented with Dalton’s statements about atoms as a cornerstone of 
chemical theory without any historical context, viz:
‘Our modern idea of atoms is based on Dalton’s Atomic theory.
(i) The atoms o f any one element are identical to each other and differentfrom 
the atoms o f  any other element, especially in the weight o f the atoms.
(ii) Atoms are indivisible and indestructible and cannot be created.
(iii) When atoms o f different elements combine they do so in small, whole number 
ratios. ’
(ii) The lesson continued by saying: ‘Since it is not possible to weigh accurately one 
atom of an element a more convenient idea is to compare the weight of an atom of 
each element. This can be done by comparing the weights of elements known to 
contain an equal number of atoms. As hydrogen has the lightest atom it is 
convenient to think of the weights of the other atoms in terms of how many times 
heavier they are than hydrogen.
e.g. an atom of hydrogen = 1 
an atom of oxygen is 16 times heavier 
.’.an atom of oxygen = 16’
This ‘Final Form’ presentation is a simplified, cleaned up version of the events. In fact 
Dalton’s ‘rule of greatest simplicity’ initially led him to the assumption that the 
formula of water was HO. (The HTG was made aware of his mistake).
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(iii) Pupils make ball and stick models of simple molecules using formulae and 
diagrams -  molecules include H2O, CO2, CH4 and HCl.
HTG Lesson 4
Aim -  to trace the development of the modem Periodic Table from its origins as a 
speculative idea to its present unquestioned status as accepted knowledge.
(i) The lesson began with: ‘In the years up to 1870 the list of known elements and 
their atomic weights increased to 63. Also a Swedish chemist called Berzelius 
devised a new system of symbols and produced more accurate atomic weights in 
1826. This increased knowledge was accompanied by several efforts to detect a 
pattern amongst the elements.’
In 1866 a British chemist called John Newlands arranged the atomic weights of 
the known elements in increasing order and found they formed a Taw of octaves’ 
in which the first element in the series was similar to the eighth. This speculative 
pattern was treated with scorn by other scientists. It was discussed at a meeting of 
the Royal Institution where a fellow scientist asked him sarcastically if he had 
ever investigated the pattern formed by the elements when he sorted them into 
alphabetical order. Despite this crushing initial opposition, the idea was taken up 
by a Russian chemist called Mendeleev who decided that Newlands had tried to 
fill gaps with known elements when they ought to be filled by elements yet to be 
discovered.
(ii) Mendeleev’s background and education are described.
(iii) A section of Mendeleev’s Periodic table is presented:
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HYDROGEN
LITHIUM BERYLLIUM BORON CARBON NITROGEN OXYGEN FLUORINE 
SODIUM MAGNESIUM ALUMINIUM SILICON PHOSPHORUS SULPHUR CHLORINE
POTASSIUM CALCIUM ................... VANADIUM...................
COPPER ZINC .................  ARSENIC SELENIUM BROMINE
(iv) The lesson was then continued by saying:
‘Mendeleev was so convinced that his Periodic table was right that he predicted 
the discovery of elements in the future that would fit into the empty gaps he left in 
the table. Here is a comparison of his predictions for Germanium with the 
observed facts about the element when it was discovered.
PREDICTIONS (1871) OBSERVED FACTS (1886)
1. Relative atomic weight 72 1. Relative atomic weight 7 3
2. light grey metal 2. dark grey metal
3. will combine with 2 atoms of 3. combines with 2 atoms of
oxygen to form a white powder oxygen to form a white powder
4. the chloride will have a 4. the chloride boils at
boiling point less than 100 deg.C 86.5 deg.C
Mendeleev’s classification created little interest until his prediction of missing 
elements and their compounds was borne out by their discovery eg. discovery of 
Germanium (Ge) by Winkler in 1886. ’
This episode is a clear example of the development of the germ of an idea, through to a 
respected but tentative theory, and henceforth into the undisputed bedrock of scientific 
knowledge.
FFG Lesson 4
Aim -  understanding of the modem Periodic Table as a pattern of the elements based on 
relative atomic masses of the elements.
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(i) Presentation of a version of the Periodic Table showing pictures of the elements 
under standard conditions. Location of metals and non-metals (related to physical 
properties as shown in database used in lesson 1.)
(ii) Simple description of Periods and Groups and relationships of neighbouring 
elements.
(iii) How a new element might be placed in its correct position in the pattern.
The aims and contents of the lessons are summarised below:
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Table 5.c -  Summary of aims and contents of lessons in case study B)
Historical Theme Group Final Form Group
Lesson 1.
a) pre-test
b) showing how the Greeks ideas on 
elements developed
c) 1661 -  Boyle’s definition of an 
element as a substance which cannot 
be broken down by physical or 
chemical means.
d) Computer database search on the 
discovery of elements.
Homework -  Where did the idea of the
‘atom’ first come from and how has the
theory on atoms changed?
Lesson 2.
a) Discussion of ideas arising from 
homework. Early Greek ideas on 
atoms
b) Dalton’s background and the 
influences on him of previous work
c) Dalton’s ideas on atoms, including 
where he made ‘mistakes’.
Lesson 3.
a) Recap on Dalton’s ideas and how he 
acquired them.
b) Dalton’s use of combining weights to 
calculate the relative atomic masses of 
elements
Lesson 1.
a) pre-test
b) differences between elements, 
compounds and mixtures. Definition of 
element as substance which cannot be 
broken down by physical or chemical 
means.
c) Computer database search on physical 
and chemical properties and uses of 
elements
Homework -  give an account of the
modern Atomic theory
Lesson 2.
a) Recap on the particulate nature of 
matter and the concept of the atom
b) definition of the atom
c) Modem Atomic theory
Lesson 3.
a) Recap on 3 assertions of Atomic 
theory
b) concept of relative atomic mass of 
elements
c) building ball and stick models of 
simple compounds eg. hydrogen
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c) His assumption of the rule of greatest chloride, water, ammonia, methane.
simplicity when atoms combine
Homework -  Give an account of the Homework -  What is the Periodic Table of
historical development of the Periodic the elements. Why is it useful?
Table.
Lesson 4.
Lesson 4. a) Use of relative atomic masses as a
a) Early attempts at finding a pattern in means of drawing up the Periodic
the relative atomic masses of elements Table
eg Newlands. b) Discussion of nature of elements in
b) Mendeleev’s background and different areas eg. metals and non-
education. His improved knowledge of metals
the elements and his early periodic c) Relationships of the elements in
table in which he left gaps, guessing Groups and Periods
correctly that some elements were yet use of table in predicting the nature of
to be discovered. elements using related elements
c) Mendeleev’s accurate predictions of
the properties of undiscovered
elements and confirmation by
subsequent discoveries.
(viii) Results
1. Pre-test
Although both class lists consisted of 25 pupils the numbers taking pre-test and post-test 
and the attendance at lessons varied for each group.
Final Form Group (FFG) 24 pupils - Average mark 34.3%
Historical Theme Group (HTG) 18 pupils - Average mark 28.9%
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Despite my efforts to the contrary I was unable to ensure an exactly equal number of 
pupils or a fully equal range of ability in each group. The pupils gaining the 3 highest 
marks in the pre-test were all in the FFG. Two of these pupils were so motivated that they 
maintained contact with pupils in the HTG and kept abreast of the lessons taught to that 
group despite my attempts to research two clearly separate groups. Their homework on 
‘the modem account of the Atomic theory’ included a thoroughly researched section on 
the historical background despite my efforts to restrict them to the final form version.
2. Post-test
Final form group (FFG) 22 pupils Average mark 36%
Historical theme group (HTG) 22 pupils Average mark 35.7%
There was a greater improvement in pre-test and post-test scores for the HTG. This 
finding is in agreement with my own observations of more conscientious homework and 
more enthusiastic participation in discussion which reflected this group’s greater 
motivation. Whilst the similarity in the average marks cannot be claimed as decisive 
evidence for a more efficient learning of content by the HTG is does at least indicate that 
this group was not disadvantaged by the historical approach.
3. Motivation indicators
(i) The level of concentration as indicated by the attention paid to the teacher was
higher during the story-telling episodes with the HTG than at any other time with 
either group. For instance, the pupils were impressed by the determination of 
Mendeleev’s mother in overcoming all her personal and financial difficulties to 
give her son the best possible education. They were amused by Mendeleev’s 
insistence on having his hair cut once a year in springtime.
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(ii) Pupil participation in genuine debate was at its highest in discussions concerning 
philosophical issues. The issues debated most vigorously were:
a) The evidence for atoms according to Greek philosophy -  some pupils 
felt that no theories could be justified without experimental evidence.
b) Dalton’s assumption of the rule of greatest simplicity -  again several 
pupils said that this amounted to guessing and one said that it was not 
‘scientific’.
c) Mendeleev’s predictions were thought to be justified as long as his 
table did not contain too many mistakes.
d) An informal debate took place with several HTG pupils during lesson 
7 (two weeks after lessons 1 -4 had been covered) on the concept of 
genius in which Dalton and Mendeleev were considered. I suggested 
that ‘genius is 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration’. We agreed that 
scientific progress owes as much to the hard work of the many 
undistinguished scientists as to the few outstanding personalities. I 
concluded that pupils do empathise with scientists of the past and are 
motivated by their achievements.
(iii) More thoroughly researched and conscientious pieces of homework were 
handed in by the HTG. The few worthwhile homeworks from the FFG included 
the work from those pupils who had been influenced by their friends in the HTG. 
Despite my efforts to limit them to ‘final form’ science they had carried out some 
thorough and detailed historical research.
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4. Questionnaire
Table 5.d -  Pupils’ responses to questionnaire in case study B)
Question FFG HTG
Q l. Were atoms 
discovered or did 
somebody imagine 
them?
all pupils answered that atoms had 
been discovered
10 pupils answered that atoms 
had been imagined. 12 answered 
that they had been discovered.
Q2. How would you 
describe an atom?
3 pupils said that they were 
indivisible -  14 focused on the size 
of the atom e.g. ‘microscopic’ and 
‘ 1 million could fit onto a frill 
stop’.
13 pupils answered that atoms are 
indivisible, cannot be split, cannot 
be broken down or cannot be cut 
in half
Q3. Did Mendeleev 
leave gaps in his 
Periodic table because 
he was not sure about 
his theory or because he 
was sure he was right?
Question not asked as pupils did 
not cover this aspect of the unit
13 pupils thought Mendeleev was 
sure he was right
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Q4. If Mendeleev found 
that there were some 
elements he could not 
easily fit into his pattern 
would he:-
(i) ditch his theory
(ii) search for an 
explanation
(iii) accept that you 
can’t explain 
everything
Tick the one you 
think is most 
reasonable
Question not asked 0 chose response (i) - ‘ditch 
the theoiy’
14 chose response (ii) - ‘search 
for an explanation 
7 chose response (iii) - ‘accept 
that you can’t explain 
everything’
Q5. Which would 
impress you most - a 
theory which explained 
things we already know 
about or a theory which 
predicts things yet to be 
discovered? Which of 
these is taking the bigger 
risk?
18 pupils said that a predictive 
theory would impress them most
15 pupils said that a predictive 
theory would impress them most
Q6. Are scientists ever 
wrong in their theories? 
Can wrong ideas in 
science ever be useful?
1 pupil said that you could learn 
from your mistakes, 3 others said 
that the wrong idea could lead to a 
new idea. 3 pupils said that wrong 
ideas could not be helpful. 15 
pupils answered ‘yes’ without any 
further elaboration.
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12 pupils elaborated on their ‘yes’ 
answers. 3 of these said that you 
could learn from your mistakes, 4 
pupils said that the wrong idea 
could lead to other ideas, 1 pupil 
said that the wrong idea could 
‘uncover’ other ideas, 3 pupils 
said that a wrong idea would 
prevent other scientists from 
making the same mistake.
Q.7 Do scientists make 
up their theories from 
scratch or do they get 
ideas from other people?
. 7 pupils answered that scientists 
get their ideas from other people 
6 pupils answered that scientists 
make up their ideas ‘from 
scratch’
8 pupils answered that it was a 
combination of these two things
8 pupils answered that scientists 
get their ideas from other 
people
5 pupils answered that they make
up their ideas ‘from scratch’
6 pupils answered ‘both’
5. Focus group discussion -  taped
The taped discussion lasted 20 minutes. It was interesting that the four HTG pupils 
dominated the discussion, partly because I asked them questions directly but also because 
they seemed more comfortable with the situation i.e. a philosophical discussion about the 
nature of scientific knowledge rather than science per se. In retrospect, it might have been 
more instructive to have held separate discussions for the HTG participants and FFG 
participants since the latter were at a disadvantage in regard to historical and 
philosophical issues. However, I felt that the interaction between the two sets of 
participants might reveal more clearly their different views. There was also a practical
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difficulty in involving the more conscientious members of the FFG since they had 
unfortunately ruled themselves out for reasons I have given already. From the discussion 
I was able to identify three general results:
1. It was apparent that the HTG pupils had gained some understanding o f  the way in 
which scientific knowledge grows. They were aware o f  the origin o f  the ‘atom ’ as a 
model which enabled philosophers to explain some puzzling phenomena: - tape 
transcript 1. (T=teacher and teacher's comments are in bold to make the discussion 
easier to follow)
“T - What did the Greeks say?
Jason - About atoms. That you can only split things up to a certain point.
T - O.K. we took an iron nail and we said you could split it in half and you keep 
splitting it in half until you get to what?
Jason - To an atom.
T - O.K, did the Greeks do any experiments?
Jason -  No.
T - So in fact they only thought about atoms and talked about atoms. So in the first 
case do you think the atom was discovered or did somebody imagine it?
Jason - Somebody imagined it.
T - They said that you can’t divide atoms but they also said that you can re-arrange 
atoms. They said that the food that we eat makes up our bodies - our bones, our 
blood, our skin. So what happens to the atoms in our food?
:W2
Richard - oh! yes - you are what you eat.
T - Right. So the atoms in what you eat just get re-arranged inside your body.”
2. The pupils were able to empathise with Dalton's lack o f data and to appreciate the 
power o f  his imagination and creativity in proposing a theory based on flimsy 
evidence. Even the fact that Dalton's theory was wrong in some parts did not 
diminish its power to establish more scientific knowledge. In the lessons I  stressed 
particularly the small number o f (what are currently recognised as) elements known 
at the time and that there were compounds which were mistakenly thought to be 
elements because o f the lack o f  any suitable method o f analysis: - tape transcript 2.
“T - Dalton said something about atoms.
Alice - He said they were indivisible and couldn’t be created.
T - Was he right about that? Was he right about the fact that they were indivisible?
Alice -No.
T - No he wasn’t right. It was in fact subsequently found out that they can be
smashed up. O.K. So his ideas weren’t entirely correct. Were they useful ideas?
Alice, do you think they were useful.
Alice - Quite useful, because they could see what he’d done wrong.
T - Right. O.K. Does anyone remember how many elements, from the people who
did the history, how many elements did Dalton have to play with?
Jason -  ten.
T - No, he had twenty. But you’re right, in the end he only had about ten because,
was he right about some of the elements? Were they elements? What were they?
Richard - They were compounds.
T - Why did he think they were elements?
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Richard - he didn’t have the equipment.’
3. The discussion showed that pupils appreciated that scientific knowledge was not a 
static body o f facts and principles but was always in a state o f flux. They were aware that 
all scientific knowledge is open to question and that some knowledge is more 
questionable than others. They seemed to think that future growth in scientific knowledge 
will depend on advances in technology and experimentation: - tape transcript 3.
“T - Mendeleev had about sixty elements to play with, slightly more than that, and 
he decided that Newland’s idea was right. He could actually see periods in the 
elements. What was brilliant about Mendeleev’s Periodic Table, Alice? Do you 
remember? What did he do?
Alice - He predicted that there were elements yet to be discovered and he left spaces.
T - Brilliant. Absolutely. He left gaps in his Periodic Table and in fact eleven years 
later one of those gaps was filled by an element which he predicted to be exactly as it 
was. Right. OK. Do you think that’s it for the Periodic Table? Do you think there is 
anything left? Is there a possiblity that somebody could come up with some new idea 
or have we got the whole story there?
Alice - There might be more.
T - Do you think that in general in science what we have got now is the finished 
article or are we going to get more ideas, more theories coming up - or have we 
finished?
Alice - 1 think we’ll get more because scientists will still keep on doing experiments.”
(ix) Weaknesses of the methodologv
The seven pupils who took part in the taped discussion were invited to do so as a result of 
any interesting comments, oral or written, they had made during the study. I wanted to
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give them the opportunity to amplify those views. I selected four pupils from the HTG 
and four from the FFG to constitute a focus group. (In the event only three of the FFG 
took part.) The disadvantage of being a teacher-researcher in such a discussion is that it is 
difficult to refrain from teaching when a more objective enquiry mode is more 
appropriate. Hence, the transcript of the tape could be viewed as a series of leading 
questions in which I invited the answers I was looking for or in some cases provided 
those answers myself. In retrospect, my role here should have been less the teacher and 
more the objective researcher. I was conscious of a weakness of action research when 
undertaken by an individual and that is for the data to be self-serving and not subject to 
the same degree of rigour that could be attained with a third-party observer (Hopkins, 
1987). Unfortunately, as a teacher-researcher I found it impossible to separate completely 
the roles of teacher and impartial observer.
At the time I saw this part of the research, which was conducted two days after the last 
lesson, as a means of underlining and sharpening the understandings and attitudes I had 
already detected during the pilot study, the recent lessons, and by means of the 
questionnaire. Solomon et al (1996) also recognised the dual nature of the role needed in 
this kind of action research. During lessons they adopted a collaborative role in helping 
and supporting the teachers but, in order to collect objective and impartial evidence of 
pupil progress, they had to restrict their role to interviewer rather than helper once the 
lessons were over.
One of the problems I met was that some conscientious members of the FFG noticed, 
through informal discussions with their friends in the parallel group, that there were 
aspects of the unit which they were not being taught. Despite my best intentions in 
avoiding ‘cross-contamination’ of historical references I could not prevent such pupils 
producing homework which demonstrated very thorough research into the historical 
aspects of the topic. It caused some disappointment when these same pupils were not 
invited to be part of the focus group. I placated them by explaining that the purpose of the 
discussion was to compare and contrast pupils’ views from two different angles and that 
their over conscientiousness had ruled them out. (Fortunately, they are well versed in the
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co n cep t o f  a ‘fair te s t’.)
(x) Discussion
When I embarked on the unit using a historical theme it was evident that pupils were 
slow to accept my different approach. I noticed the same initial reluctance in the pilot 
study and it was, therefore, no surprise. The reason, I believe, is that the storyline 
approach conflicts with pupils’ expectations of science lessons. The fact that most science 
lessons are carried out in laboratories leads pupils to expect that the lessons will be 
characterised by practical work rather than philosophical discussion. I think this indicates 
a pedagogical stance that has become ossified, making it difficult, at first, for pupils to 
accept a more innovative approach.
Having cleared this initial hurdle, pupils in the HTG seemed to welcome the opportunity 
to participate in philosophical discussion. For example, a comparison of responses to Ql 
on the questionnaire shows a greater willingness by the HTG to consider the 
philosophical arguments relevant to the nature of science and to articulate those 
arguments. Philosophical reflection seemed to form an integral part of class discussions 
with the HTG. The response to the questionnaire by the FFG suggested that they had 
been ‘caught cold’ by the philosophical questions. I deliberately stressed with the HTG 
that the philosophical questions were fundamental to their understanding of the subject.
The most striking result of the questionnaire was that all the pupils in the FFG believed 
that atoms had been discovered and even 12 out of the 22 pupils in the HTG thought 
likewise. This result indicates that most pupils adopt the ‘realist’ stance towards scientific 
knowledge. They clearly assume that atoms exist in the same way that tables and chairs 
exist. That the FFG should make this assumption could well be the result of my own and 
the text-books inability to stress that the concept of the atom is a model, i.e. it was 
originally an arbitrary construct which could usefully explain observed phenomena. The 
fact that over half the HTG should take the realist position is more disappointing given 
my efforts to establish the origins of the atom as an idea arising from natural philosophy.
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However, the same finding is confirmed by Aikenhead in Driver (1996):
‘few students appeared to view scientific models as provisional, adopting instead
a naïve realist view’ (p53).
My finding testifies to the tenacity of the realist view amongst pupils. Solomon (1996) 
confirms the prevalence of the realist view in her survey of secondary school pupils. She 
finds that 60% of pupils preferred the realist claim that ‘scientists have proved by 
experiment that particles exist’ whilst only 17.3% chose the instrumentalist response that 
‘scientists can explain what happens by imagining how particles move’ (p500).
This result leads me to wonder how many other models in science are accepted by pupils 
unquestioningly as ‘real entities’. Unless teachers place due emphasis on the process 
whereby these models come to be accepted then it will not be surprising if pupils (and 
subsequently the public) come to regard human imaginings, however widely accepted, as 
absolute truth. Even in Dalton’s time there was debate between those who accepted that 
matter behaved as though it consisted of atoms and those who believed in atoms as ‘real’ 
entities. Whatever the strength of more recent evidence for atoms teachers do pupils a 
disservice by talking about them as if they have the same ontological status as ordinary 
objects because this obscures the origin of the concept as a human construct, freely 
imagined and postulated as an explanatory theory. The wide belief during the 18^ century 
in the existence of phlogiston bears testimony to the danger of a plausible model with 
general applicability taking on ‘real’ existence and yet ultimately being found to be a 
chimera.
I am not suggesting that pupils are encouraged to adopt an extreme instrumentalist 
position in regard to scientific theories, merely that it is appropriate in school science to 
consider the status of theories. Hodson (1986) argues that both the extreme realist 
position and the extreme instrumentalist position have serious limitations when compared 
with the actual practice and history of science. He recommends a ‘critical realist’ position 
as a compromise. Critical realists can be realist about some theories (which they believe 
to be true) and instrumentalist about others (i.e. theoretical models). He contends that use
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of the terms ‘model’ and ‘theory’ within the science curriculum, should, therefore, be an 
indication of the ‘degree of certainty’ with which we hold a particular view. The 
historical episodes covered in this case study seem particularly suitable for making this 
distinction since there are clearly traceable ‘degrees of certainty’ attached to the 
developing theories.
I found that the the realist approach goes hand-in-hand with a high degree of 
determinism. In teaching about the construction of the Periodic Table to the HTG I 
stressed the inadequacies of the table in dealing with some elements and the likelihood 
that, however sophisticated scientists’ technical skills became, it would never be more 
than an attempt to construct a pattern which would be of use to them in summarising our 
knowledge and drawing generalisations. It could never be regarded as a complete 
description of the ‘truth’. Most pupils in the HTG got the idea that scientists are involved 
in a never-ending quest for explanation but that their theories are never fully satisfactory.
On the other hand I freely invited pupils to admire the brilliance of scientists like 
Newlands and Mendeleev in establishing a pattern despite the realisation that their 
information was incomplete and that ‘in sticking their necks out’ they risked censure 
from their fellow scientists. I stressed that although Newland’s octaves were ‘far fetched’ 
his was the kernel of an idea that was picked up by Mendeleev. With more information at 
hand Mendeleev was able to see flaws in the pattern and to use a more sophisticated 
version of periodicity to point the way ahead for the discovery of more elements. The 
pupils appreciated the power and fruitfulness of Mendeleev’s work in producing a theory 
that pre-dated the discovery of corroborating evidence. I emphasised that, in effect, the 
theory had determined the evidence, in the sense that chemists searching for new 
elements now knew what to look for. In setting the historical context I think I conveyed 
my own admiration for their achievements leading to an absence of condescension from 
the pupils.
It is important to bear in mind the fact that, for most of the pupils involved in this study, 
school science would be their last contact with science in a formal sense. Norris (1997)
208
argues that one of the goals of science education ought to be to make such non-scientists 
develop ‘epistemic distance’ from science knowledge claims. Given that non-scientists 
are not in a position to critically assess substantive science knowledge claims directly (in 
the same way in which even scientists are unable to do so in scientific fields remote from 
their expertise) the nonexpert should yet be able to ask and answer questions like: “Is the 
relevant field of enquiry sufficiently developed and sophisticated that there is reason to 
regard its practitioners as experts?”
The historical episode I used gave pupils in the HTG the opportunity to see the transition 
of a field of knowledge from a speculative idea which was greeted with derision and 
hostility (Newland’s octaves) into a theory which had the backing of more substantial 
empirical evidence (Mendeleev’s Periodic table). The proponent of this Periodic Table 
had enough confidence in his convictions to make risky predictions about future 
discoveries but, at this stage, there was still considerable scepticism about the whole line 
of thought. After the discovery of the missing elements and the confirmation of his 
predictions the status of the theory changed completely. There was then no longer any 
question of its general acceptance and all activity in the field was directed into filling in 
the missing parts of the puzzle. Judging by their comments on the questionnaire and in 
the taped discussion it is evident that the HTG pupils were able to see, with the advantage 
of hindsight, how the theory of periodicity of elements had been subject to these changing 
degrees of doubt. I contend that they would, therefore, be in a stronger position than the 
FFG pupils to attempt a critical appraisal of the stage of development of a contemporary 
scientific field in regard to the likely certainty of knowledge and to the extent of the 
reliance which could be placed on the ‘experts’.
Time spent discussing historical contexts and philosophical questions meant that much of 
the practical and ‘contemporary’ content of the HTG unit had to be squeezed into an 
inadequate amount of lesson time. Despite this problem there was no indication in the 
post unit test results of any weaker grasp of principles by HTG pupils. If anything, the 
progress made by the HTG in understanding conventional science content was slightly 
greater than that of the FFG judging from the difference between pre-test and post-test
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scores. In retrospect I should have allowed more time for the HTG unit. This research 
does show that more time spent on the historical aspects of science might well lead to a 
cut in conventional curriculum content but that, in regard to pupils’ motivation and 
understanding of the nature of science, this time would be well spent.
(xi) Review of data
It seems appropriate at this stage to summarise and review the data collected in support of 
my thesis. The main points are as follows:
1. Professor Wolpert sees the scientific endeavour as fundamentally different from the 
arts in that it is deterministic. He has an uncompromising view that science is an 
unnatural way of looking at the world that is at odds with commonsense. He feels that 
the history of science can inform this view. He sees pupils’ own ideas on science as 
being much less significant. Wolpert believes that science is the most powerful way 
of viewing the world and adopts a commonsense realist stance to scientific theories -  
that there is an external world which can be studied. It is against this backdrop that I 
engage in a challenge of some of his ideas.
2. My discussion with two teachers forging links between the history and science 
departments in a large secondary school revealed that teachers are torn between their 
desire for closer links between science and history and their strong identification with 
their own subject as independent disciplines. Science teachers feel that science 
teaching is characterised by a hands-on approach and a commitment to the most up- 
to-date delivery of the subject.
3. Dr. Sutton, representing science educators, feels that science should be taught as an 
essential aspect of culture and that, although they have different traditions, the arts 
and sciences are compatible. He believes that the current ‘final form’ approach to 
science teaching obscures the origins of scientific theories and leads to an
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oversimplified idea of scientific discovery. In his view science teaching ought to be 
imbued with a historical approach on a broad front.
4. My inspection of science textbooks shows that historical material is used by authors 
but mainly to ‘humanise’ and ‘personalise’ the main subject of the text. Although 
there are rare examples of the historical approach being used as a central theme this is 
far outnumbered by the use of such material as inset items. The ‘interesting side­
show’ approach prevails.
5. The pilot study reveals that pupils’ view of science as a process of uninterrupted 
success produced by the continuous application of an infallible scientific method can 
be modified by historical cases. The phlogiston episode points to the tenacity with 
which erroneous theories can be held. It confirms Wolpert’s view that scientific 
theories are often at odds with commonsense and illustrates the importance of SI 
(personal science) and its links with 82 (public science).
6. My research on Atomic theory and the Periodic Table confirms that the historical 
theme and the storyline approach can enhance pupil motivation. Two historical 
episodes show how the nature of science and the status of scientific theories can 
change according to the evidence available. The results of pre-test and post-test scores 
demonstrates that the use of the historical perspective does not detract from the 
learning of conventional science content even though I am unable to conclude that it 
is of positive benefit in this regard.
I am now in a position to assess all the data and to discuss my conclusions.
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusions and Discussion
(i) The restoration of Personal Science -  SI
The greatest strength of the historical case studies described above is that they 
succeed in demonstrating that the human element (SI) is as essential to science as it is 
to any other aspect of culture. The traditional image of science as an objective and 
dispassionate activity in which the participants are much less important than the 
knowledge they produce can be counteracted effectively by the appropriate use of 
historical episodes. From the responses to the questionnaires and from discussions in 
class it was evident that pupils empathised with the actors involved in the dramas 
associated with scientific progress. This finding is unsurprising but important because 
it points to one of the most significant handicaps that science carries as a school 
subject. That is, in attempting to mirror ‘real science’, it has sought to portray the 
products of science (S2) as separate from their human origins. In its desire to reflect 
the objectivity o f ‘real science’, school science has minimised the role of the human 
agent. As a result, it has succeeded in driving students away from science into other, 
more humanistic, areas of study.
(ii) Discussion of rationale
The epistemology of science is of fundamental importance in teaching pupils the 
nature of science. ‘How we know’ is just as important as ‘What we know’. The ‘final 
form’ teaching method that I adopted with the FFG was characterised by a lack of 
discussion. My style was authoritarian and failed to ‘invite’ pupils to make a 
contribution or contest an assertion. I neglected to make any distinction between 
reliable knowledge and contested knowledge because I did not discuss the evidence 
on which the knowledge was based. The lively interaction I experienced with the 
HTG failed to emerge with the control group because there were no opportunities for 
philosophical argument. The pupils were required to accept the knowledge on the 
basis of my authority, which I believe is a poor foundation on which to construct 
further knowledge. I employed a straightforward ‘transmission’ mode of teaching.
The knowledge that the FFG pupils managed to gain was useful in the short term for
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the sake of the post-unit test but was hardly educative in the best sense of ‘leading 
out’.
It has been noted by other researchers such as Edwards and Mercer (1989) that pupils 
can successfijlly gain mastery of principles and concepts in the short-term for the 
purposes of (say) examinations whilst retaining their own pre-conceptions in the 
longer term. Unless they are provided with convincing evidence or warrants for belief 
it is possible that pupils will ‘learn’ scientific theories in the interests of expediency 
without ultimately relinquishing their strongly held belief systems based on intuition. 
Rather than be persuaded of the superiority of the received theory they adopt it 
temporarily whilst ‘suspending belief in their own intuitive theory. In Terhart’s terms 
pupils’ existing belief systems are merely ‘colonised’ (Terhart, 1988). When called 
upon to use their knowledge they revert to the misconceptions they held before they 
‘learned’ the scientific version. Knowledge of the historical development of theories 
gives access to the evidence used to justify them in different eras, ultimately 
providing justification for the modern theory as the best currently available. My 
contention is that such an approach lays a surer foundation for genuine acceptance of 
present theory over the longer term than does a ‘rhetoric of conclusions’. A 
comparison of post-test results for the HTG and the FFG after an extended period 
might have provided some evidence to support this theory. Although the results of the 
post unit tests indicated no significant difference in understanding of content 
immediately after the unit it would have been a useful exercise to test both groups 
again after twelve months to see in which group the knowledge had been better 
retained. Unfortunately, these groups did not exist beyond Year 9 and the difficulties 
of drawing them together for a follow-up investigation proved insurmountable.
The highly determined view of scientific progress may well have some currency 
amongst practising scientists. My research certainly indicates that it is a commonly 
held view amongst secondary school pupils. It is possible that the Oxygen Theory of 
burning could have been developed by way of a different historical route. For school 
pupils the point is that knowledge of the development of the theory of burning is 
valuable as an illustration of scientific epistemology in the sense that the development 
was problematic -  not a smoothly inevitable accumulation of knowledge.
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This epistemology contrasts markedly with that conveyed to pupils by much of 
classroom science. It has been a common practice for science teachers to expect 
pupils to make observations and draw conclusions from them as if they followed in a 
direct and logical way from the observations despite the now widely held view that 
observations are theory dependent. Driver et al (1996) found that a common 
misconception amongst pupils was that ‘experimenting’ by scientists gave 
unproblematic access to the ‘truth’. My research revealed that some pupils viewed the 
growth of scientific knowledge as a matter of scientists ‘keeping on doing 
experiments’ with increasingly sophisticated technology. By this means further 
uncontested ‘facts’ are added to the body of existing ones. Solomon (1992) noticed a 
more extreme perception by some pupils that scientific research took the form of 
‘serendipitous empiricism’ -  scientists were simply taking a ‘shot-in-the-dark’ when 
they did an experiment, without any anticipation of the outcome. The historical case 
studies reveal that scientists do not start from a ‘blank sheet’. They begin with a 
knowledge base. Pupils can see that scientific progress has often been less a matter of 
accumulation of knowledge than the exposure o f error and its replacement or 
substitution.
Driver (1996) has reservations about using the historical approach because ‘it may 
involve the learning of scientific ideas which are no longer accepted’. The implication 
is that scientific theories like the phlogiston theory have no place in the science 
curriculum because they are ‘obsolete’. By the evidence of my analysis of school 
textbooks this is certainly the view of the authors. Indeed, in using the ‘scientific 
method’ to arrive at ‘a complete explanation of burning’ Goddard and Hutton (1950) 
make no reference to the phlogiston theory. In a chronological list of dates of 
discoveries in their textbook, A school chemistry fo r  today, the period from 1669- 
1776 merely has the entry ‘False theories of burning’ (p526). Evidently, a scientific 
theory which successfully explained a range of chemical phenomena for almost a 
century before being replaced by a more successful one, was not worth mentioning by 
name.
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For those curriculum designers who stress the importance of content on the basis of 
utility the inclusion of such discarded scientific theories might seem inappropriate. If 
it is accepted, however, that an understanding of the epistemology of science is a 
significant aspect of scientific literacy then there is a strong case for including such 
ideas. They are essential to the context from which the successful theories emerged. A 
sympathetic evaluation of the superseded theories counteracts the high degree of 
determinism, which I found to be a feature of many pupils’ image of scientific 
epistemology.
The perception of scientific epistemology as a process by which science moves 
inexorably closer to the truth can be seen to imply that scientific knowledge will 
ultimately be complete in the same way that jigsaws are ultimately complete (Griffith 
and Benson, 1994). The influence of this kind of thinking on school science education 
was apparent in pupils’ response to my phlogiston questionnaire. There was a 
common misconception that the oxygen theory of burning was the ‘truth’ and that 
there was nothing left to discover about burning. However, some pupils saw that this 
kind of complacency was exactly the reason why the phlogiston theory was 
predominant for such a long time and why it had proved so difficult to replace. The 
Priestley/Lavoisier episode illustrates the danger of accepted scientific knowledge 
becoming dogma and never being contested or improved upon.
My research shows that many pupils adopt a ‘realist’ stance in regard to scientific 
knowledge. In my discussions on atomic theory with the FFG, for instance, it was 
apparent that pupils ascribed the same ontological status to atoms as they did to 
ordinary, everyday objects. They were not aware of the philosophical origin of the 
‘atom’ as a theoretical entity with a purely instrumental status. My authority as a 
teacher together with the authority of science as a subject was enough to condition 
pupils into accepting atoms as real objects. Sophisticated modem techniques have left 
little doubt as to the ‘real’ existence of atoms since it is now possible to measure their 
size and mass and to describe their constituent particles. My use of the ‘final form’ 
approach, however, denied these pupils the opportunity of grasping an important 
lesson about the epistemology of science -  that the status of a scientific theory 
changes as the evidence in its support changes.
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A profound philosophical discussion of the realist/instrumentalist issue would have 
been inappropriate for most pupils in this age group. However, it was possible to 
discern a shift in pupils’ philosophical views as a result of the phlogiston case study. 
This clearly demonstrated that an entity like phlogiston, which clearly had ‘real’ status 
for eminent scientists like Priestley, could eventually be exposed as a myth. The 
historical case study teaches pupils that unless modern scientists have a monopoly on 
‘truth’, there clearly exists the possibility now that entities that are currently regarded 
as having real existence may well suffer the same fate as phlogiston at some future 
date. This is a severe blow to the realist position.
The logical positivists set out to rid science of the speculative nature of scientific 
theories and to base all theory-making on rules, the most significant of which was that 
all theory had to be rooted in empirical observation. They took great care to develop 
logically consistent theories by deriving theoretical statements from observational 
statements. The clear distinction between observation and theory was a basic tenet of 
positivist philosophy. It is now generally accepted that such a distinction can never be 
achieved. Hanson (1958), amongst others, exposed the fallacy of this philosophy 
which was that what people observe is, to a large extent, determined by what they 
already know. Unfortunately, this post-positivist thinking came too late for the 
discovery methods of learning which were widespread in the 1960s. Textbook authors 
and curriculum designers still clung to the hypothetico-deductive method of scientific 
investigation (state a hypothesis, conduct observations, collect data, test hypothesis). 
Many of today’s school science teachers would subscribe to this as the classical 
method of scientific enquiry (Lakin and Wellington, 1991) even though it retains the 
observation/theory distinction that has been the object of so much criticism. The great 
advantage of the case histories involved in my research is that pupils were not 
hidebound by the positivist approach. The investigative part of the units took the form 
of evaluation of known theory and comparison of given theories rather than the more 
ambitious formulation of theory directly from empirical evidence.
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(iii) Textbooks
My survey of popular secondary school science textbooks published in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s revealed some signs of a fresh approach to the use of scientific 
history. The usual treatment was to include vignettes of famous scientists and 
accounts of discovery but to keep this material apart from the ‘hard’ science (often by 
the use of inset text). Kuhn (1970) drew attention to the traditional use of historical 
material in science textbooks as a means of convincing students that they were part of 
an established tradition of scientific enquiry. The ‘interesting side-show’ approach 
was a response to the call for ‘human interest’ to be added to the traditional dry and 
objective style of most science textbooks. Despite this attempt to attach a human face 
to science I found that most of the textbooks I surveyed still employed an ahistorical 
approach to the ‘hard’ science, with the emphasis squarely on the ‘context of 
justification’.
I found that the use of genuinely historical themes was rare. Where there was 
acknowledged to be educational value in the historical theme, for instance in the 
development of theories on burning, the material was published in ‘supplementary’ 
texts. The popular textbooks reflected the National Curriculum status of any aspects 
of science that came into the category of the ‘nature of science’. That is, they were 
officially part of the compulsory attainment targets but were, in practice, not 
examined and could therefore be ignored. The message was clear - pupils’ 
understanding of the ‘nature of science’ was desirable but not essential. Since the 
historical aspects of science come under this umbrella they are viewed by authors as 
‘optional extras’. My research has shown this belief to be unjustified. The use of a 
historical story line as a main theme reaps valuable educational rewards even if this 
approach is inherently problematic.
The problems are inherent because any history can be written to serve the interests of 
the authors. Since all history is necessarily selective the temptation is to omit or de- 
emphasise those events which contradict the desired general impression. Kuhn 
exposed many textbook versions of history as distortions. Lakatos (1970) described 
these re-written accounts as ‘rational reconstructions’. The purpose was to make it
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seem that the growth of scientific knowledge is a smoothly cumulative process where 
each new piece of knowledge follows logically from the last. The effect of this 
cleaned-up history on pupils is to reinforce the infallibility and authority of science 
and preserve its elitist image.
Yet the movement towards more accurate and candid accounts of scientific history 
posed problems of a different kind. Brush (1974) feared that the consequences of such 
honesty might be to shatter the façade of idealism which textbook authors had 
carefully preserved and to disillusion those attracted to the subject by its high moral 
stance. My research leads me to the conclusion that Brush’s fears are baseless. The 
danger to the pupils from revisionist accounts of history lies in the false impression of 
scientific epistemology they form. The accurate historical details testify to the human 
failings of scientists as well as their achievements, thereby bringing those 
achievements into greater relief. The whole scientific enterprise becomes more 
accessible and less forbidding in the process.
In our conversation Wolpert was concerned that the reaction against dogma in science 
might go too far and lead to the view that all scientific knowledge is tentative and 
therefore is not dependable. He repeatedly stressed the reliability of the core of 
science and emphasised that only the ‘fringe’ is debatable. He describes himself as a 
critical realist whose epistemological stance entails a high degree of determinism 
(Wolpert, 1993):
‘Science is progressive in that the truth is being approached, closer and closer, 
but perhaps never attained with certainty. But very close approximation can be 
a great achievement and is infinitely better than error or ignorance’ (p i00).
The key to Wolpert’s position might be the outstanding successes achieved in his own 
field of molecular biology in the last fifty years. Popper and Kuhn’s influential ideas 
on the growth of scientific knowledge were drawn largely from their studies of the 
history ofphysical science. Kuhn’s background as a physicist resulted in his focusing 
on major episodes in physics and chemistry to the virtual exclusion of biology. His 
view of the epistemology of physical science was that progress in this area has been
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made by revolutionary change. He believes that steady progress within a paradigm is 
made by accretion but that major progress is made only when that paradigm is cast 
aside and a new one takes its place.
Since my research focuses on major advances in chemistry it may be that the results 
cannot be generalised to science as a whole and that there may be separate 
epistemologies appropriate to biological science and physical science. Like Wolpert, 
Harding and Vining (1997) focus on achievements in biology and reject Kuhn’s 
epistemology. Their conception of the rapid advance in molecular biology since the 
early 1950s is that of a revolution in the sense of ‘knowledge explosion’ and not the 
complete overthrow of ideas. From their research into the growth of biological 
knowledge they conclude that old theories are not simply rejected. Rather, they are 
gradually modified until they have a new look about them. They support the 
reorganisation of whole textbooks to leave out or decrease coverage of items that are 
no longer considered essential to the orderly progression of ideas or development of a 
theme. In their view the logical presentation of scientific knowledge facilitates the 
efficient learning of theory. In direct contrast to Conant’s (1957) view of the value of 
historical case studies Harding and Vining warn against the use of the history of 
discoveries. They say that:
‘this is often unrewarding because students become confused by the details of 
a long historical story’ (p972).
They are also critical of the use of enquiry methods to recapture the early stages of 
discovery, which they claim are characterised by confusion as well as genuine 
excitement. In their view the later stages of discovery are characterised by greater 
clarity but lack the excitement. They claim that the experience of recent science 
cannot be produced artificially; the topic must be genuinely new and uncertain. But 
Harding and Vining do concede that pupils need suitable experimental work in order 
to see the phenomenon for themselves. They conclude that:
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‘neither a pure historical approach, nor an enquiry approach is likely to be 
suitable, because neither gives this combination of clarity and experience’ 
(p973).
Although I can claim that the units I designed were faithful to the historical 
perspective it was never my intention to teach pupils the history of the episodes as 
they might be taught in history lessons. As a science teacher my ultimate aim was to 
achieve a better understanding of currently accepted scientific knowledge and, beyond 
that, to use the historical narrative to shed light on some issues relating to the nature 
of science. The pupils were impressed with the brilliance of the major players in the 
dramas I described. It would not be an overstatement to say that there was a sense of 
wonder that such great intellectual achievements could be made on the basis of so 
little empirical evidence. Unlike history teachers I had the great advantage of practical 
activities that could simulate or illustrate the kind of evidence which was available to 
scientists like Priestley, Lavoisier, Dalton and Mendeleev. These were interwoven 
with the historical narrative at appropriate points in the story. It was precisely this 
combination of historical narrative and illustrative practical work which proved such 
an effective means of achieving my aims.
(iv) Content and utility
Harding and Vining (1997) argue against what they see as the current fashion for 
diminishing the status of scientific knowledge as the ‘inert product of science’. They 
reject the rationale for such a view, which is that since scientific knowledge is ‘fragile 
and subject to change’ it is no longer to be valued as an important part of science. 
Hence the emphasis on problem-solving, process skills and the methods of science. 
Harding and Vining reject this shift in emphasis. They call for pupils to be given a 
framework of knowledge so that they have something to build on in the future. 
Unfortunately, the content of the present National Curriculum goes beyond a 
‘framework of knowledge’. In my view it reads more like a catalogue of facts and 
concepts compiled on the basis of perceived utility with little sign of coherence.
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Yet the possibility of pupils being able to apply their school science directly in real- 
world situations is becoming less likely as the rapid expansion in technology widens 
the gap between science in an everyday context and science in the classroom. The 
case studies presented above provide pupils with an explanatory framework on which 
detailed knowledge of scientific principles and applications can be built. To pretend 
that the current science content of the National Curriculum is necessary as a basis for 
action beyond school in science related situations is dubious. In my experience many 
pupils and some teachers fail to see the relevance of much of the National Curriculum 
content. The perennial question from pupils, “Why do I need to know about this?” is 
becoming increasingly difficult to answer. When pupils see no connection between 
classroom science and their own real-life context the motivation for learning science 
in the later stages of secondary school is reduced solely to the desire for examination 
success. It seems that only rarely are pupils stimulated enough to take a genuine 
interest in the subject and often this results from the efiforts of enthusiastic teachers 
rather than the inherent appeal of the curriculum. Where pupils are motivated neither 
by interest in science nor by examination success the result is frustration and 
disaffection with the subject.
If it is accepted that the utility rationale has been weakened then the fundamental 
question “Why do we teach pupils science?” needs to be re-addressed. My research 
suggests that it is possible to stimulate a genuine wonder at and admiration for the 
achievements of scientists without whom modem culture and quality of life would be 
so much poorer. This is exemplified by pupils’ interest in the concept of genius.
Rather than burden pupils with the nuts and bolts of scientific facts and principles it 
may be better to aim for a broad understanding of important themes in science and to 
make them comfortable with the main ideas. Typically, this should enable them to 
understand a newspaper report describing a breakthrough in the treatment of disease 
or follow a TV documentary on the benefits and dangers of genetically modified food. 
This kind of science education would counteract the alienation and blow to the self­
esteem experienced by Trilling (see Chapter 2, p75) whilst avoiding the tediousness of 
much of the ‘science-for-action’ content of the present National Curriculum. It might 
enable more pupils to sympathise with the whole scientific enterprise to the extent that
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they might wish to continue their contact with the subject beyond the secondary 
school stage.
One of the practical benefits resulting fi'om a ‘slimmed-down’ curriculum is that time 
would be made available for consolidation of major ideas. In my case study of the 
teaching of Atoms and the Periodic Table the total lesson time for the FFG and the 
HTG was the same. In the interest of a fair test I was not able to extend the time for 
the HTG even though it became obvious that the opportunities for (and the inclination 
towards) philosophical discussion were greater. It would have been valuable to have 
pupils devise role-plays, to organise a debate between proponents of the Phlogiston 
Theory and proponents of the Oxygen Theory or to give free written expression to 
their thoughts had they been placed in Priestley or Lavoisier’s shoes. However, it was 
not possible to devote time to this kind of activity because of the need to cover the 
conventional content of the unit as well.
(v) The story-line approach
The transmission mode of teaching I employed in my teaching of Atoms and the 
Periodic Table to the FFG conveyed implicit messages to pupils about the status of 
knowledge. In teaching pupils about the Atomic theory I presented it as three 
assertions:
(i) All matter is made up of tiny particles called atoms.
(ii) The atoms of any one element are identical and different to the atoms of every 
other element
(iii) When atoms of different elements combine they do so in simple, whole 
number ratios
I made no reference to Dalton or the fact that at the time of his pioneering work, 
atomism was a philosophical stance. I made no mention of the fact that he postulated 
his theory in order to explain existing data and his ideas were to form the basis of 
other important breakthroughs in science. I neglected to point out, for instance, that 
his emphasis on the atoms of different elements having different masses eventually
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led the way to the periodic classification of the elements. I described atoms as tiny 
particles without further elaboration but I left pupils to form their own mental model 
of the atom. Their only practical guidance came in the form of a rudimentary plastic 
‘ball and stick’ model kit with which they constructed simple molecules. The pupils in 
the FFG were passive recipients of accepted facts which, apparently, needed little 
justification. They absorbed all this information without demur. It is little wonder, 
therefore, that they conceived of atoms as yet another scientific ‘discovery’, the 
existence of which was unquestioned.
The story line approach I adopted with the HTG was at odds with this ‘rhetoric of 
conclusions’. The origin of the word ‘atom’ as a Greek word for ‘indivisible or 
uncut’, and the knowledge that the Greeks were natural philosophers without access to 
any but the most rudimentary empirical evidence, firmly established the origin of the 
atom as a philosophical ‘claim’ (Sutton, 1996) -  a theoretical entity with purely 
instrumental value. I described the debate between the two schools of thought, one 
arguing the case for matter as a continuum and the other adhering to the philosophy of 
discrete particles. In this original context, therefore, the word ‘atom’ took on a 
meaning that was both interpretive and persuasive. I was tentative in my description 
of both sides of the argument using phrases like ‘the Greeks thought that matter 
behaves as i f  it were made up of tiny particles’. The vital difference for the HTG was 
that this approach preserved the notion of the atom as a model, notwithstanding the 
evidence which has subsequently been amassed to support its ‘real’ existence. The 
story of the emergence of the atom was powerful enough to convince at least some of 
the HTG pupils that the atom was a product of human imagination and not a 
discovery. It was not until Dalton postulated his atomic theory in 1805 that the 
concept of the atom became any more than a speculative idea. At that stage the theory 
was still only a ‘broad working hypothesis’. Only the combined efforts of other 
scientists over an extended period earned its acceptance as a reliable conceptual 
scheme.
The FFG, by familiarity with the term, talked of atoms in the same way that I talked 
of atoms. Their ontological status was equal to that of everyday objects except they
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were too small to be seen by the naked eye. Einstein pointed to the danger inherent in 
this habit (Holton, 1988) when he wrote:
Concepts which have proved usefiil for ordering things assume easily so great 
an authority over us, that we forget their terrestrial origin and accept them as 
unalterable facts. They then become labelled as ‘conceptual necessities’, ‘a 
priori givens’, etc. The road to scientific progress is frequently blocked for 
long periods by such errors. It is therefore not just an idle game to exercise our 
ability to analyse familiar concepts, and to demonstrate the conditions on 
which their justification and usefulness depend, and the way in which, in 
specific cases, they developed, (pvi - my italics)
Subsequent scientific history has given the atom an unassailable position as a 
‘conceptual necessity’ which it is unlikely to lose, but the fate of phlogiston teaches 
pupils a salutary lesson because after 200 years as a ‘conceptual necessity’ it was 
described be Sir John Herschel in 1830 (Allchin, 1997) in the following terms:
The phlogistic doctrine impeded the progress of science, as far as science of 
experiment can be impeded by a false theory, by perplexing its cultivators with 
the appearance of contradictions... and by involving the subject in a mist of 
visionary and hypothetical causes in place of true and acting principles (p473).
The words used to describe the gas originally isolated by Priestley, ‘dephlogisticated 
air’, clearly relate to the discarded phlogiston theory and are not now in common use 
in science. However, Lavoisier named this gas ‘oxygen’ (Greek: ‘acid-former’) in the 
erroneous belief that it was an essential component of all acids. In other words, the 
currently accepted name was originally chosen to persuade others of its assumed 
significance, even though that assumption was ultimately found to be false. Not only 
has the inappropriate name been retained but also many school textbook accounts of 
this historical episode persist in naming Priestley as the discoverer of oxygen 
although, as a die-hard phlogistonist, he could make no such claim. The typical 
cleaned-up version of this story is a travesty of the actual events leading to a mistaken 
view of scientific epistemology. The HTG could see that the actual events were
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messier and more complicated than the ‘rational reconstruction’ would have us 
believe, just as they are in the modern development of theory.
It is at this ‘nascent stage’ of scientific progress where real co-operation could be 
beneficial between science and history teachers in schools. History teachers’ skills 
with source materials and their insistence on looking at events from a range of 
perspectives could be combined with science teachers’ understanding of theory to 
bring historical episodes ‘alive’ for pupils. This involves genuine co-operation on 
schemes of work and classroom teaching rather than token gestures of departmental 
liaison. This is an area of research I am keen to explore in the future.
(vi) The benefits for non-scientists of the historical perspective
I referred in Chapter 2 to the dual purpose of the science curriculum. From a political 
perspective, science education as a training in science for those pupils who would go 
on to be scientists has always taken precedence over ‘science for all’. Successive 
governments have promoted science education in the belief that scientific expertise is 
essential for national prosperity in a competitive global economy. Whilst 
acknowledging the importance of maintaining such expertise my research was carried 
out in the knowledge that the problem for most pupils in their future lives would be to 
live with that expertise rather than function as an expert. Given that non-scientists are 
in no position (by virtue of their lack of expertise) to make an independent assessment 
of knowledge claims by directly weighing up the evidence, it seems that an 
understanding of scientific expertise is essential. According to Norris (1995) this 
would include:
‘its basis in a community of trust, the uncertainty and ambiguity that often 
accompany expert claims to knowledge, and the disputes, disagreements, and 
differences of opinion that pervade science. Students should be taught the 
sense in which knowledge does rest on authority, and that this authority is not 
infallible’ (p215).
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Norris suggests that this practice should be based on real-world problems that 
currently affect their lives. My finding is that the case studies described above provide 
pupils with the opportunities to consider these aspects of scientific expertise with the 
added advantage that the scientific concepts involved are within their grasp. Conant 
writes of his case histories in experimental science, which are drawn from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:
‘But irrespective of their dates, the examples presented illustrate the methods 
of modem science. Familiarity with those methods will increase the ease of 
understanding of the work of scientists today; as one consequence, popular 
accounts of scientific progress can be read with more appreciation’ (pix)
It is my contention that these historical case studies are valuable in encouraging non­
scientists to make critical assessments of new knowledge claims in science. They 
foster the creation of epistemic distance between science and non-scientists. With 
reference to the range of views which Norris regards as desirable (see page 118). I 
believe the case studies above reinforce the following:
(i) That not all o f science can be believed -  even scientific concepts which 
formed the bedrock of scientific knowledge (like phlogiston) can sometimes 
be found to be baseless. Pupils were aware that Dalton’s postulate that atoms 
were indivisible turned out to be false.
(ii) That there is always significant debate in science - the long-mnning argument 
about the discreteness of matter versus the continuum, the rivalry between the 
phlogistonists and the anti-phlogistonists, and the conflicting views on the 
concept of periodicity of the elements testify to the way scientific claims are 
often fiercely contested.
(iii) That no scientific statement is completely clear in its meaning -  The statement 
‘All elements consists of tiny particles called atoms’ leaves undefined the 
matter of what exactly an atom consists of.
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(iv) That scientific knowledge usually involves approximation and compromise -  
pupils in the HTG were made aware that Dalton was not scrupulously precise 
in details. He was never a very able experimentalist and his atomic weights 
were well wide of the mark owing to the inaccuracy of his analyses and 
faultiness of the assumptions on which they were based. His atomic theory 
was based on ‘happy generalisations of approximate results’(Conant, 1957) 
rather than the kind of precise quantitative data that Lavoisier used in his 
work.
Mendeleev’s periodic scheme was basically sound despite his inability to 
make some elements fit the pattern using their atomic weights to position 
them. He was convinced of the fondamental virtue of his periodic table even 
though he was unaware that the atomic number (and not the atomic weight) of 
the elements was the fondamental characteristic on which the classification of 
the elements would ultimately be made. Pupils could see that perfection in 
science is rarely attained.
(v) Scientific theories are always built upon idealisations o f real phenomena -  
Dalton’s rule of greatest simplicity was at the heart of his Atomic theory but it 
was an arbitrary assumption and the least ‘correct’ of all his statements. Using 
the formulae provided by his rule Dalton was able to determine atomic 
weights even though some of his formulae were mistaken and produced 
incorrect values. (Dalton’s religious background suggests that his willingness 
to make his assumptions sprang from his belief in the ‘regularity and 
simplicity generally observable in the laws of nature’ (Conant, 1957)). 
Whatever inspired Dalton to make his simplifying assumption, it is a classic 
example of a scientific tactic which is sometimes applied in the early stages of 
a scientific investigation. If the investigator is unable to make sense of the data 
available he/she has recourse to the strategy of considering the situation in a 
grossly oversimplified way, using arbitrary rules as a mechanism for the 
organisation, assessment and comprehension of his/her data. In Dalton’s case, 
whether or not his theory was a definite picture of reality was less important 
than its ability to suggest new experimental work and to explain phenomena
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like the law of definite proportions. The inadequacy of the rule became 
apparent only after it had served this purpose.
The examples i to v above also create epistemic distance by encouraging the belief 
that scientific knowledge is tentative - that every current statement of science may, in 
the fullness of time and scientific enquiry, be discarded or revised despite Wolpert’s 
view of the certainty of most of scientific knowledge. However, I do accept that, at 
any given time, it is reasonable to assume the reliability of some central theories or 
people would be left with no basis for action. The fact that scientific knowledge is 
fallible and thus liable to error does not imply error and to think that all scientific 
knowledge is unproven or uncertain is to adopt an unjustifiable route to epistemic 
distance fi'om science (Norris, 1997). It would not, for example, be reasonable to 
regard the oxygen theory of combustion as uncertain since it has, by now, withstood 
such exhaustive testing. Rather than a naïve belief in the transience of all theories I 
left pupils with the impression that they could have confidence in the tried and tested 
theories as long as they retained a healthy scepticism regarding those which were ‘in- 
the-making’. There is an important distinction here between fallibilty and uncertainty. 
The distinction is neatly summarised by Norris (1996);-
Fallibility is an inherent liability to error (Norris, 1997). Uncertainty means 
that something is open to doubt. Although it may follow from the fact that all 
scientific knowledge is a human construction that all scientific knowledge is 
fallible, it does not follow that all scientific knowledge is uncertain. For much 
that we know scientifically, there are no specific and compelling reasons for 
uncertainty. To distance oneself from science by recognising that all scientific 
knowledge is fallible, and thus liable to error, all the while recognising that 
liability to error does not imply error, is a justifiable epistemic stance. To think 
that all scientific knowledge is uncertain is to adopt an unjustifiable route to 
epistemic distance from science (p254).
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(vii) Morality in science
Wolpert (1993) concedes that creativity in science is influenced by many factors such 
as authority, fashion, conservatism and personal prestige and that scientists may be 
interested in the pursuit of power. Undoubtedly, social factors do influence science. 
However, he believes all of this counts for nothing if the theory does not conform 
with the evidence, if it is not internally consistent or if it does not provide an adequate 
explanation. Wolpert describes himself as a commonsense realist. That is, he believes 
a theory is true or false by virtue of the way the world is. But Harre (1986) asserts that 
it is not within the power of scientists to decide on truth or falsity. He argues that 
scientists can never know whether a belief about the behaviour and nature of natural 
objects is really true or really false. Many beliefs which have seemed to be true have 
come to be thought false (like phlogiston), and some which have been thought to be 
obviously false have come to seem to be true (like the periodicity of the elements). He 
asserts that neither falsehood nor truth is an attainable epistemic ideal.
According to Harre the most we can expect of scientists is that they say what they 
honestly believe to be true. That is, what they have found to be the case using the 
methods and standards sanctioned by the community. The most typical of these is the 
peer-review process. But the peer-review process is not infallible. It is often not 
possible to check every claim explicitly. Sometimes claims are accepted by the 
community solely on the basis that they have been made in accordance with 
sanctioned practice. Harre says that the scientific community is characterised by a 
moral order based on trust. The trust that scientists claim from laypersons entails a 
commitment to intellectual honesty, to having made efforts to substantiate claims in 
the way that claims are substantiated in the community. It cannot possibly be based on 
a naïve claim to the truth because that is not within their capacity.
Norris asserts that the trusting stance of the nonscientist regarding science should not 
be interpreted as a passive stance. Whilst deferring to the scientist in respect of the 
evidence for the claims to scientific knowledge which he/she makes the non-scientist 
has to decide which experts to trust by adopting a ‘policy of circumspection or 
‘reflective scepticism’. The pupils involved in my classroom research could see that.
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ultimately, the development of the Atomic theory and the Periodic Table could not 
have taken place without a community of scientists committed to a moral order in 
which they reported to each other what they honestly believed to be true according to 
the standards pertaining to their historical context. This moral order produces 
knowledge on which the non-scientist can rely. (That is why the public outrage at the 
exposure of deliberate fraud is so vehement). However, trust is not maintained by 
scientists telling each other only literal truths. The case of phlogiston shows that it is 
possible for a theory to maintain public respectability if scientists adhere strictly to the 
moral order and present their findings as honest beliefs even while pursuing a line of 
thought that eventually loses all credibility. Priestley stood his ground as a 
phlogistonist when almost every other scientist had switched to the oxygen theory of 
burning. He used a number of ad hoc modifications to the theory to ‘save’ it. As it 
turned out he was backing the wrong epistemological horse, but his scientific morality 
was never in question and he retained his integrity as a scientist. The point is made 
that the fallibility of science does not cast doubt on its standards of honesty but that 
those standards of honesty cannot eliminate error.
Harre defends the moral superiority of the scientific community relative to any other 
human association. He writes:
‘I believe that the scientific community exhibits a model or ideal of rational 
co-operation set within a strict moral order, the whole having no parallel in 
any other human activity. And this despite the all-too-human characteristics of 
the actual members of that community seen as just another social order’ (p91).
It is this moral aspect of science which Harre sees as the safeguard to reliability of 
knowledge and not ‘logical essentialism’. In his view the concept o f ‘good reason’, as 
it is used by the scientific and to an extent by the lay community, does not yield to an 
explicatory analysis in logicist terms. He says that logic does have a place in the 
creation of scientific discourse, but not at its core. For Harre logic is a socially 
motivated addition, a rhetorical addition to persuasive power. His view of logical 
positivism is that of a ‘corrupting and deeply immoral doctrine’:
‘It was positivistic in that it restricted the content, source and test of scientific 
knowledge to the immediate deliverance of the senses. It was logicist in that it
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confined the task of philosophers to the laying bare of the logical form of 
finished scientific discourse’ (p i9).
So the allegations of data fixing made against scientists like Dalton or the ignoring of 
counter-evidence by Pasteur stand out as rare lapses in a field of human endeavour 
which sets high moral standards. My approach as a science teacher was to emphasise 
the moral order of science in safeguarding against spurious knowledge claims whilst 
acknowledging that there may have been times when scientists have fallen below this 
high standard since they are human like the rest of us.
(viii) Research and innovation
Most science teachers I know would agree that it is important to strive to improve the 
quality of their teaching yet Pekarek et al (1996) reported that teachers find only a 
‘very small’ place for science education research in their daily routine. They quote 
Richardson (1994) who pointed out that:
‘Many teachers still consider research on teaching to be irrelevant to their day- 
to-day practice.. .This may be because formal research cannot provide teachers 
with knowledge for their immediate needs within their unique contexts’
(p ill) .
The result is that teachers are not changing their practice in line with research 
findings, leading to a gap between research and practice. One way of narrowing the 
gap (or even eliminating it) might be to encourage the direct participation of teachers 
in research. Richardson (1994) identified four perspectives of the teacher as 
researcher:
(i) teaching as research
(ii) teacher as reflective practitioner
(iii) action research
(iv) teacher as formal educational researcher.
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The advantage of the teacher-researcher is that the usual format of educational 
researchers developing theory, which is then translated for subsequent use by 
teachers, is by-passed. The weakness of this traditional pathway was pointed out by 
Monk and Osborne (1997):
‘too many of the justifications for the use of the history of science are 
provided by historians and philosophers with little knowledge of primary or 
secondary pedagogy rather than by teachers with a reasonable knowledge of 
history and philosophy’ (p408).
My own approach incorporated elements of all four perspectives above. I wanted to 
carry out research that was relevant to and informing of my own practice but I also 
hoped that it would be instrumental in influencing the views of other teachers and 
perhaps curriculum designers. Having been involved in research schemes and 
innovative curricular projects before the advent of the National Curriculum I am in a 
position to compare the situations before and after. In my experience there were 
frequent opportunities for innovation and classroom research before the National 
Curriculum. It was possible, for instance, for science departments to write their own 
CSE courses, moderated by examination boards, and to retain a large degree of 
autonomy in regard to content and teaching methods. The situation since the National 
Curriculum was introduced is much less flexible for two reasons:
1. The content is heavily prescribed, leaving little scope for teachers’ 
individual expression of personal expertise in specialist areas.
2. The accountability of teachers in secondary schools for the examination 
success of their pupils plays a much more significant role in these times 
of SATs and competition for pupils from primary schools.
Since my research focused on historical case studies relevant to ‘the nature of science’ 
the lesson content came within the bounds of the National Curriculum (Sc 0). To date, 
however, the attainment targets relevant to this aspect of science have rarely been 
tested in SATs or at GCSE. The nature of science has generally been regarded as 
‘desirable’ rather than ‘essential’ knowledge. The climate of accountability within
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school science departments is such that examination success is paramount. Any 
activities that might detract from this primary aim need to be fully justified.
Ideally, I would have liked to involve other members of the science department in my 
research, thereby establishing a departmental community of teacher-researchers.
There were several teachers who expressed sympathy with my aims and would have 
liked to be involved but the overriding concern of the department was that the 
conventional content of the National Curriculum be covered. The consensus view was 
that time and energy spent researching innovative curriculum material could risk the 
examination prospects of pupils and was therefore professionally irresponsible. As the 
situation stands, therefore, the possibility of innovation ‘from the bottom up’ seems 
unlikely. In areas of the science curriculum where new curriculum materials are 
needed and research into their use is vital the rigidity of the present system 
discourages change and adaptation. Instead of encouraging the innovative practices of 
teachers at the classroom level the sole means of curriculum development is currently 
‘from the top down’. This situation curtails the potential sources of innovation and 
effectively excludes the classroom teacher from participation in curriculum 
development. This project has shown that it is possible for individual classroom 
teachers to carry out meaningful action research into curriculum innovation without 
jeopardising pupils’ understanding of conventional content on which summative tests 
are based.
(ix) Assessment
In the present climate of education summative assessments have assumed a pre­
eminent position in teachers’ priorities. The target pupils of my research were in Year 
9 (aged 13-14 years) and were assessed by SATs at the end of the year. As with my 
own post-test results, the results of SATs tests for the FFG and the HTG showed no 
overall difference in attainment, providing further confirmation that my research had 
not adversely affected those pupils who were the subjects of the curriculum 
innovation. The present form of summative assessment is well suited to the traditional 
requirement to recall a catalogue of concepts. Pupils are not required to trace the 
development of the major themes in science (like the atomic theory) or to apply them 
in real-life situations. As the situation exists, they are not required to demonstrate
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understanding of the importance of evidence in deciding between competing theories. 
My research shows that historical examples (such as the theories of burning) could be 
used to provide that understanding. Experience gained in comparing theories in the 
classic historical cases could provide a sounder knowledge base for evaluating 
modem theories as they are presented in the media.
Serious consideration by teachers of these aspects of science, which have more direct 
relevance to the public understanding of science, will never come about without a 
commitment to testing these aspects of science. The kind of understanding required 
may be difficult to test. Often it involves divergent thinking rather than convergent 
thinking. The conventional test items used in science examinations in science do not 
lend themselves easily to assessment of this kind of thinking. But it is the curriculum 
which should determine the form of assessment -  not the reverse. If the present tests 
do not cater for ‘the nature of science’ then the tests should be changed to make that 
provision. My analysis of a typical source-based history examination gives some 
indication of the kind of assessment methods which could be used to widen the scope 
of science examinations. For instance, comprehension exercises based on media 
reports of scientific advances might provide a means of testing pupils’ ability to 
exercise their epistemic distance. In Fig. 6.a below I offer my own design of an 
examination question which demonstrates this idea:
Fig. 6.a Model Question.
SOURCE 1. The following is an extract from a textbook written in 1957 explaining a 
theory of burning which claimed that something called phlogiston was lost by a 
substance when it burned:
The fact that charcoal would hum hy itself when heated suggested to the founders 
o f the phlogiston theory that the phlogiston escaped in the process and became 
combined with the air. In general, substances that burned in air were said to be 
rich in phlogiston; the fact that burning soon stopped in an enclosed space was 
evidence that the air could absorb only a definite amount o f phlogiston.
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SOURCE 2. This is a report taken from a school textbook published in 1950 of an 
experiment in which magnesium is burned in a crucible.
The magnesium ribbon is weighed and put into a weighed crucible, with a lid 
partly on and heated with a bunsen burner. The metal burns brightly, especially i f  
the lid is slightly lifted. This agrees with our everyday experience that a fire burns 
better i f  there is a good draught, and suggests that air is necessary fo r  burning. 
When the crucible with ash from the burnt magnesium is weighed, the surprising 
fact is discovered that there has been an increase in weight!
a) What commonsense evidence in these sources suggests that air is necessary for 
burning?
b) According to the phlogiston theory why did burning eventually stop in an 
enclosed space?
c) What evidence suggests the phlogiston theory was mistaken?
d) According to modern theory why does the magnesium gain weight when it is 
burned?
e) Write a word equation for the burning process.
The question calls for a critical comparison of two theories and an understanding of 
the weight of evidence in favour of the modern theory. The emphasis is on 
explanation and not recall. I stress again that it is not my intention to call for a 
conversion of all exam questions to the format illustrated by my model. However, I 
suggest that occasional questions of this type would compel teachers to address the 
‘nature of science’ as an examined (and therefore important) component of the 
curriculum.
Additionally, if an education in science is to encourage the kind of science writing 
recommended by Carey, it might be valuable to give pupils opportunities to produce 
extended pieces of written work describing important developments in science, either 
historical or up-to-date.
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(x) How the history of science should be introduced into the curriculum
The minimalist approach to the history of science in secondary school science consists 
of the ‘add-on’ extra policy reminiscent of most science textbooks. It seeks to lighten 
and humanise the ‘hard’ science by including anecdotal accounts of discoveries or 
potted biographies of famous scientists, material that can be easily ignored without 
any loss of understanding of the important scientific concepts. The maximalist 
approach is that taken by Conant in The Harvard Case Histories in Experimental 
Science, where each unit was taught using a historical theme in order to give a 
perspective on the development of scientific theory. My research recognises the 
inadequacy of the first approach in teaching pupils the nature of science, as well as the 
low curricular status that such an approach implies. However, whilst the latter 
approach reflects a higher status, in terms of a pedagogical strategy it ‘puts all its eggs 
in one basket’. That is, the historical theme approach may not be the most effective 
means of engaging all the pupils and should therefore be used as one of a number of 
ways of teaching science rather than ‘the one true method’. (Even Conant, 1957) 
advocated the use of a few case histories only.)
Some researchers have suggested approaches some way between the two extremes. In 
answer to his own question, ‘What history of science. How much, and Why? Russell 
(1981) suggests that:
‘Perhaps one major topic in every science course should be taught fi*om 
accurate historical materials, and relevant methodological issues treated 
directly’ (p61).
This seems to point to expressly historical units like Conant’s, delivered infrequently. 
In my discussion with Dr. Sutton he favoured ‘re-casting the science teacher’s stance 
so that all topics are in some sense historical’, suggesting a more thinly spread 
delivery of historical material, which implies that teachers need a more 
comprehensive historical background.
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My case studies confirm the value of teaching some science units using a historical 
theme. Only a deliberate emphasis on the historical perspective can teach important 
lessons about the epistemology of science as well as providing a vehicle for 
encouraging desirable dispositions like ‘reflective scepticism’ and ‘critical thinking’. 
But the historical themes I used acted as a framework for teacher exposition, teacher 
demonstration, class discussion, pupils’ preparatory work and illustrative practical 
work all linked together to form a coherent story-line. This was faithful to the 
historical perspective without any pretence to be accurate as an historical record. The 
success of the historical cases in teaching the nature of science also suggests that a 
greater historical awareness in general on the part of science teachers would be 
beneficial in providing pupils a firmer grasp of the origins and developments of 
concepts. I believe this kind of science would be better delivered by teachers whose 
own educational background pointed to a sympathy with the humanist aims of science 
education as well as an enthusiasm for ‘scientists’ science’. In fact, as a result of my 
studies on the development of scientific theories, I have noticed that the dichotomy 
between science and humanities becomes far less marked.
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APPENDIX 1
Atoms and the Periodic Table - Pre-test
1. Carbon, Sulphur, Iodine, Water, Copper, Gold, Salt
Oil, Carbon dioxide. Iron, Sea Water, Copper Sulphate
Put the substances above under one of the headings below:- 
Elements Compounds Mixtures
2. Look at the substances in Ql. Which ones are metal elements?
3. The symbols below represent atoms. Which elements are shown?
H . 
O . 
Mg 
Br 
Fe 
K .
4. Which symbols are used for atoms of these elements?
Nitrogen .........
Aluminium ........
Chlorine ........
Zinc ........
Lead ........
Tin .......
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5. Complete the following sentences.
(i) An element is a substance which _
(ii) A compound is a substance which
(iii) An atom is
(iv) The relative atomic mass of an element is
(v) The Periodic Table of the elements is
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APPENDIX n
Atoms and the Periodic Table - Post Unit Test
1. Complete the following sentences
(i) An element is a substance which ______
(ii) A compound is a substance which
(iii) An atom is
(iv) The relative atomic mass of an element is
2. How is the relative atomic mass used to arrange the elements in the Periodic 
Table?
3. In what way is the Periodic Table useful?
4. Look at the Periodic Table you have been given.
(i) In which part of the table are the non-metal elements?
(ii) Write out the names of the elements in the group that contains Neon
(iii) Write out the names of the elements in the period that contains Sodium
5. Describe how sodium reacts with water.
How would you expect potassium to react with water?
6. The table below shows some facts about 2 elements, silicon and tin. The element 
Germanium is between Silicon and Tin in Group IV of the Periodic Table but the 
information is missing. Predict what the missing information should be.
Silicon Germanium Tin
Colour Shiny black   silver
Relative atomic mass 28   119
Melting Point degrees C 1407   232
Conducts electricity? no   yes
7. What differences are there in the physical states of the elements Cl, Br and I? 
What similarities are there in their behaviour?
SUMMkY
